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This   thesis   reports   an  examination  of  the  issue 
of  amnesty   for  Vietnam-era  deserters  and  draft   evaders 
as   treated   in  discourses   of  Gerald  Ford and  Jimmy   Carter, 
from August,   1974   to  November,    1976.     These  discourses 
were  studied  to  discover   strategies  and  tactics  of  the 
speakers and to  gauge   the effects   of this  one   issue. 
Specifically,   three hypotheses   concerning  the  effects  arc 
considered:     (1)    What   effects,   if   any,   did  the  rhetoric 
of  Ford  and   Carter  on  amnesty  have  upon  the   outcome  of 
Che   1976  Presidential   elect-'on?     (?)     In a broader  frame- 
work,   what   effects,   it   any,   did  the rhetoric of Ford and 
Carter on amnesty  have  upon   their respective public  images 
and political  careers?      (2)     How was  the status of  the 
amnesty  Issue  Itself affected by the amnesty-related 
discou  ses  of  these   two men? 
The study revelled striking similarities  between 
major discourses  of Ford and  Carter  in  their goals, 
Bel    Lngs .   internal   strategics and  tactics,   and   Immediate 
effects.      Ford's   address   to   the  V.    F.   W.   provided  a 
substantial  boost  to bis  national  ethos  as President. 
The  effects  of   this   discourse over   time,  however,  were 
substantially negated by the   effects of Ford's  pardon of 
former  Presidei       Richard   Nii::on,    three weeks   later.      Like- 
wise,  Carter's American  Legion address  significantly 
improved his national media image as a Presidential 
candidate in August, 1976.  While the effects of this 
one discourse diminished as the campaign progressed, 
it did provide a base for further image strengthening 
from other rhetorical events.  It was concluded that 
the amnesty remarks in the Playboy interview, as well 
as the amnesty discussion in the Ford-Carter debate, 
had little effect on either the 1976 election or on 
the images of Ford and Carter, due to the repetitive 
and brief nature of these remarks.  Other campaign issues 
and discourses, treated more extensively in the national 
media, had more significant effects. 
A final section of the thesis reports an evaluation 
of the rhetoric of Ford and Carter on amnesty by artistic 
standards of speechmaking and by ethical standards. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Preliminary Remarks 
During every military effort of the United States, 
a minority of American citizens have refused induction 
into the armed services or have deserted from the military. 
Traditionally, Presidents have granted some form of 
amnesty or pardon to the evaders and deserters within a 
few years after the termination of war efforts. 
The involvement of American troops in Vietnam in 
large numbers ended in December, 1972.  President Richard 
Nixon flatly stated that he would not consider amnesty for 
any war resistors.1  The issue fostered considerable public 
debate and controversy.-  Congressional hearings were held 
on amnesty, but no specific actions came out of those 
hearings.  Then newly-appointed President Gerald Ford, 
In his first speech outside of Washington as Chief Exe- 
cutive, announced a dramatic reversal of the Nixon policy 
with Ills intentions to work out a leniency program for 
^•Richard M. Nixon, News Conference, 12 November 19 71 
Cited in Curtis Tarr, Testimony, in Selective Service and 
Amnesty; Hearings Before The Subcommittee on Administra- 
tive Practice" and Procedure of the Commi' tee of  the Judi- 
Lted States Senate, p. W.    "Washington, D. C. : 
U. S." Government Printing Office, 1972. 
2See Chapter II, on the history of amnesty, infra, 
pp. 23-25, 
the return of resisters.^  The Ford clemency progra.n lasted 
through April, 1975; during that time it met with limited 
success, and drew considerable criticism from people on 
both sides of the amnesty issue. *  Yet many Americans 
were satisfied with the success of the program after its 
completion. -* 
The amnesty issue diminished some in the months 
that followed, only to be revived during the 1976 Presi- 
dential campaign.  Denocratic nominee Jimmy Carter, 
espousing the views of his party's platform, was roundly 
booed by an audience of the American Legion for advocat- 
ing a blanket pardon for draft evaders who had not 
returned under the less lenient Ford program."  While the 
amnesty issue was not frequently mentioned by either 
candidate during the campaign months, it did receive sub- 
stantial attention as a major point of disagreement between 
Ford and Carter.  Ford attempted to present the issue as 
closed; the Republican platform made no mention of amnesty, 
and Ford referred questions on amnesty back to his previous 
statements and actions.  Carter and the Democrats stressed 
their intentions of doing more than Ford had done about 
3See the New York Times, 20 August 1974, p. 3. 
^For example, see articles citing criticism from 
both deserters-evaders and from veterans in the Washington 
Post, 17 September 197't, pp. 1, 12. 
5See the Gallup Opinion Index, October, 1975, pp. 24-30. 
6See the New York Times, 2 5 August 19 76, p. 1. 
amnesty.  Carter's amnesty speech to the Ame:lean Legion 
resulted in the first negative response he received during 
the campaign from a live audience.  He discussed his 
position on amnesty in his controversial November, 1976, 
Playboy interview.  Amnesty was one of the first points 
mentioned in the first of the three televised debates 
between Ford and Carter. 
The amnesty issue came to the fore again after the 
1976 election.  In his final month as President, Gerald 
Ford received a letter from the widow of the late Senator 
Philip Hart:  as i  last request of the deceased, she 
urged Ford to grant a broader amnesty.  He refused, 
explaining once more that he believed he had done all he 
could to bring back the war resisters.  Then Jimmy 
Carter, in his first official act as President, granted 
blanket pardons to all Vietnam-era draft evaders. 
The amnesty issue has been of prime political 
importance in two recent time periods:  during the first 
months of the Ford Presidency in August-December, 19 74; 
and during and immediately following the Presidential 
campaign and election, August-November, 1976.  These 
are the time frames this study will cover.  This study 
is concerned with how the rhetoric of Gerald Ford 
and Jimmy Carter affected the amnesty issue and 
?See Ibid., 22 January 1977., p. L. 
their rhetoric on amnesty influenced their respective 
images either as President or as Presidential candi- 
date. 
Hypotheses and Approach 
The specific questions to be answered within this 
thesis include: 
(1) What effect, if any, did the rhetoric of 
Jimmy Carter and Gerald Ford on amnesty have upon the 
outcome of the 1976 Presidential elections? 
(2) In a broader framework, what effects, if any, 
did the rhetoric of Ford and Carter on amnesty have upon 
their respective public images and public careers? 
(3) How was the status of the amnesty issue 
itself affected by the amnesty-related discourses of 
these two men? 
The rest of the thesis is organized in order to 
explore answers to these questions.  In the remaining 
parts of Chapter I discussion of the following will be 
presented:  problems concerning the term rhetoric and 
rhetorical studies; problems of examining image and issue 
in political studies; standards and methods of criti- 
cism to be employed; and an explicit justification 
for this thesis.  Chapter II will be devoted to providing 
a twofold frame- ork of background to the subject; a 
history of amnesties and pardons in the United States, to 
give the historical and legal context; and biographies of 
the two speakers, to further understanding of the speakers 
themselves and their choices.  Chapter III will contain 
the rhetorical criticism of the discourses on amnesty 
given by Ford and Carter from August, 1974, through the 
1976 Presidential election.  Chapter IV will contain a 
summary, conclusions, and, hopefully, answers to the 
hypotheses listed above. 
Rhetoric 
Since the term rhetori c has a multitude of uses, 
achieving a successful working definition of rhetoric 
is useful in establishing the limits of a rhetorical 
study.  To understand the contemporary context of rhetoric, 
it is important to recognize the historical context.  Since 
Aristotle's definition of rhetoric as "the faculty of 
discovering in a particular case what are the available 
means of persusasion,"^ rhetoric has usually been associated 
with persuasive efforts.  Aristotle emphasized rhetoric as 
a rational, logical approach to investigating', the best 
ways to achieve persuasion."  This definition of rhetoric 
faded over the centuries.  By the 1800s rhetoric became 
associated with the elocutionary movement:  emphasis on 
8Lane Cooper, trans., The Rhetoric of Aristotle 
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey":  PrentIce-HaH7"T932y; p. 7. 
9Ibid., especially Book I, chapters 1-3. 
style and delivery with less   regard  for content  in    peech- 
making.     From this   ..radition,   rhetoric has a modern nega- 
tive   connotation  in   its  popular  usage.     The  meaningless 
promises   of  politicians   are  often   ca". led  "just  empty 
rhetoric."     The   term now  refers   to  words  without   sub- 
stance.      But  new   scholarly   definitions   also  exist   for 
rhetoric,   and   these   are   slightly  more   palatable   to 
students   of  communication  research.     Ehninger  posits   that 
it   is   pointless   to  attempt   a   universal,   permanent,   all- 
encompassing  definition  of   rhetoric.10     Students   of 
communication   should  instead  refer   to   rhetorics   (plural); 
every   time  period  and  situation   requires   a  definition 
unique   to   that   situation,   determined by   the  environment 
and  the  needs   present.     What   follows   is   an  attempt   at  a 
working  definition of rhetoric   for   this   day  and  time. 
For  this   study,   rhetoric shall be defined as   the 
intentional use  of discourse—including verbal,  non-verbal, 
and mass  mediated  symbols  and   indicators — to  attempt   to 
achieve   influence.     Rhetoric   is   intentional.     Granted, 
people  sometimes   influence   unintentionally,   and  a   speaker 
car. never  fully  control  how he  influences,   but  rhetoric 
as  a  discipline   is  not  concerned  primarily  with  accidental 
persuasion.     There  must  be   some   sort  of   purpose  or   intention 
on   the  par',   of   the  speaker,   whether   that   intention  is   fully 
articulated or not. 
iODouglas Ehninger,  Contemporary Rhetoric:    A 
Reader's   Course-book   (Glenview,   Illinois:     Scott,   Foresman 
and Company,   '19727",   p.   52. 
Rhetoric in Aristotle's time referred to a formal 
speech in front of a live audience of educated citizens. 
Today the context of rhetoric is not nearly so simple. 
The importance of the public speech has been overshadowed 
by the powerful influence of the mass media on the Ameri- 
can political citizenry.  Any modern definition of 
rhetoric which ignored this would be outdated.  Contem- 
porary rhetorical studies, then, treat discourse not 
only in face-to-face public speaking situations, but 
also in mass communication situations through mass media 
channels. 
When a political figure of today gives a public 
speech, he does so with the knowledge that the relating 
of, or broadcasting of, that rhetorical event to national 
mass media audiences will have a far more significant 
impact than the speech itself on the immediate audience. 
This has profound implications for the very nature and 
function of live public communication.  Also, the last 
few years have witnessed the growing importance of com- 
munications designed specifically for mass media audiences 
not physically present.  Strategies used within these 
situations also fall in the scope of the rhetorical 
study.H Finally, rhetoric attempts to achieve influence-- 
it does not necessaril} succeed.  The many variables that 
ll'x'ho 19 7 6 Presidential debates, for example, 
although conducted in front of a live audience, were 
primarily for the national television audience. 
interfere with perfect persuasion, whether these variables 
stem from speaker, environment, audience, message, or 
channel, are of prime importance in studying rhetoric. 
Image and Issue 
A recurrent problem with rhetorical issue studies 
concerns the interaction of issues, and the rhetoric of 
issues, with the political environment.  The significance 
of issues in shaping the perceptions of the political 
citizenry has been widely debated.  Nelson Polsby and 
Aaron Wildavasky, in their book on American electoral 
politics, argue that most voters adopt issues through 
parties--that is, individual stands on issues will tend 
to follow those of the party with which that individual 
identifies.12  While political figures make much of 
"discussing the issues," the issues would seem to be less 
important than either voter party affiliation or personality 
and ethos of the political figures.  Yet in a more recent 
book, You and Election '72, Doris and Harold Faber suggest 
that party affiliation is not as important as other 
factors in determining voting behavior.  They rank order 
the influencing variables as 
(1) the candidate, his personality and ability to do 
the job; (2) the issues, the positions the candidate 
takes and the ability of the candidate and his party to 
12Nelson W. Polsby and Aaron B. Wildavsky, Presi- 
dential Elections; Stratcgies_of American Electoral PoU- 
tics, 2nd ed. (Mew York:  Charles Scribner s Sons, 1968), 
pTT3. 
solve problems;    (3)   party  affiliation;   and   (4)   group 
affiliation.13 
While   the American   citizenry   is   often  ideally 
characterized  as  being  rational  and  thoughtful   in  the 
formation of   their  political   attitudes,   they  might  more 
accurately be characterized as having well-established 
opinions  and  attitudes  that  are not  easily changed by 
the campaigning process,   and as making voting decisions 
more   on   the  basis   of  candidate  personality   than  on 
policy   issues.     As   Stanley  Kelley,   Jr.,   put   it, 
The  notion  that   the   campaign  should help   the  voter   to 
cast   his   vote  wisely   is   the   ideal   function  assigned 
to   it   in   American  political   thought.      To  say   it   does 
not   serve   this   function  well,   is   to  do   little  more 
than  to state   the obvious. -^ 
Polsby   and Uildavsky   state   that   "for   the  vast 
majority  of  citizens   in  America,   campaigns   do  not  function 
so  much   to change   their  minds   as   to  reinforce   their 
previous   convictions."15     The   candidates   seek  more  to 
establish  an  effective  public   image:      "A  candidate   is 
helped by being thought of as   trustworthy,   reliable,   mature, 
kind but   firm,   a  devoted family man and in every way normal 
and presentable."1" 
13Dorifl   Faber   and  Harold  Faber,   "The  Political 
Scene,"   in You  and  Election   '72,   by  Austin,   Faber,   Faber, 
Kanncr,   Levy,   Linden,   and-Wilford   (Englewood  Cliffs,   N.   J. 
Prentice-Hall,    1972)..   p.   10. 
lAstanley Kelley, Jr., Political Campaigning; Prob- 
lems in C] Lng an Informed Electorate (Washington: D.C, 
The Brookings   institute,   1960),   p.   146. 
15i>olsby   & Wildavsky,   p.   123. 16Ibid.,   p.    123. 
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This   thesis   reports   a   study  of  the  interaction 
between  an   issue  and  two political   figures.     If issues 
are  indeed  relatively   unimportant   in  shaping  public 
attitudes   and  opinions,   then why  study  amnesty?     The 
projected   image  and  personality  of  a  political   figure 
is   influenced by   the   issues   he  chooses   to  emphasize. 
And  candidates   do  have  a  choice: 
To   a  degree,   a   candidate  can   choose   the   issues   on 
which  he   stands.      He   chooses   them in   the   speeches 
he  makes.     He   debates   every   day with  his   close  advisors 
how  to  use   :he  media  he   can  command   ....   Candidates 
do  Inject   the   issues   that  distinguish campaigns. J-7 
Political   figures   use  particular   issues   to  attempt 
to   improve   their  public   image:      "What   the  candidates 
actually   try   to  do   i?   to   smooth  off   the   rough  edges, 
that  is,   to  counter  the most unfavorable   impressions of 
specific   aspects   of  their  public   image  to  which   they 
believe   they  are   susceptible."18     Issues,   then,   are 
important   components   of poll   ical   strategics.     Amnesty 
is  one   issue which has been a vital  component of   the 
strategies   of  Gerald  Ford  and  Jimmy  Carter. 
Yet   amnesty   cannot  be  studied   in  complete   isolation; 
its   significance  cannot  be   understood   except   in  context. 
Amnesty   is   but;  one   of  many   issues,   which   in   turn  are but 
a   few of  the many   factors   that   influence,   in   varying 
17lthiel   de   Sola  Pool,   Robert   P.   Abel son,   Samuel 
L.   Popkin,   Candidates.   Issues,   and Strategies   (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts:     FT.   I.   T.   Press,   1964) ,   p.   IT. 
18polsby  and Wildavasky,   p.   140. 
11 
degrees, the process of public attitude formation.  The 
complexity of the modern political process makes the 
contemporary rhetorical study at once both more frustrat- 
ing and more rewarding.  The entire political rhetorical 
process cannot be captured in one single study.  There- 
fore, studies that examine individual aspects of the 
process are valuable in helping to understand more of 
the entire process. 
Since amnesty cannot be studied isolated from its 
context, attitudes and opinions concerning amnesty are 
also best seen in their political context.  Here Edwin 
Black's notion of "clusters of opinion" is useful.  Black 
writes, "There are specific beliefs and disbeliefs that, 
in many people, hang together as constituents of a general 
point of view."1-'  A group of opinions that arc consistent 
with each other form a relatively integrated philosophy. 
The rhetor seeks to achieve "argumentai i.ve synthesis," 
that is, to secure identification of his advocated position 
with the related cluster of opinions held by his audience. 
The concept of clusters of opinion is also useful in 
achieving understanding of the spec'-.er  himself: 
The rhetor may confine his discourse to a niggling 
subject of small consequence, but that subject may 
be a part of a larger cluster of opinions in his own 
mind .... The single discourse probably cannot 
disclose a universe of discourse, but it will often 
19Edwin Black, Rhetorical Criticism; a Study in 
"  hod (Uew York:  The MacMllTan Company, T9"oI>T, pT"T6"8. 
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be a symptom of such a universe existing in the 
rhetor's mind.  Such a presumption, at Least may help 
the critic account for the single discourse.20 
Application of this concept to this study hopefully 
will keep in mind the interrelatedness of a number of 
factors in the political persuasion process. 
Another useful notion is that of the "Second 
Persona," also elaborated by Black. ^  This idea suggests 
that a particular discourse implies an auditor, a persona, 
with an identifiable collection of attitudes that form an 
ideology.  This  offers one approach to the evaluation 
Step of rhetorical criticism:  if this "persona" can be 
isolated and its ideology examined, then evaluation of 
that ideology will in turn provide evaluation of the 
discourse itself.  Preliminary investigation indicates 
that the discourses under study in this thesis may well 
have identifiable second personae; in any event, this 
notion hopefully will provide a frame of reference with 
which to treat the rhetoric of amnesty as being indicative 
of both speakers and auditors. 
Standards and Methods of Criticism 
Any student attempting a rhetorical criticism faces 
numerous choices concerning his method and standards. 
Robert Scott and Bernard Brock write in the prefa 3 to 
their text on criticism: 
20ibid., p. 173. 
2lF.dwin Black, "The Second Persona," Quarterly 
Journal of Speech 56 (April, 1970):  109-119. 
13 
The increased use and diversity of criticism has 
resulted in such a proliferation of terms and methods 
that the field is apt to be driven either to over- 
simplify critical form so as to include all methods 
or to make criticism so individual as virtually to 
exclude any method.22 
These extremes are indeed tempting. What follows 
here is an attempt to delineate some standards, and some 
methods for this particular study. 
The ultimate goal of rhetorical criticism i: the 
making of judgments.  For the critic fully to understand 
the object of study before making judgment, Robert Cathcart 
advocates following a four-step procedure: 
(1) Des; iption:  understanding what went on in the 
speech; (2) Analysis:  considering why it went on; 
(3) Interpretation:  determining the meaning and 
. effect of the rhetorical methods employed; and 
(4) Evaluation:  judging the quality and worth of the 
speech.23 
In this thesis, description will be treated briefly 
in order to provide the reader with a partial re-creation 
of the communication situations, for fuller understanding. 
Analysis will be conducted from the perspective of 
the speaker and the choices he made.  The speaker is 
confronted with a rhetorical problem to solve, and obstacles 
to overcome.  The problems include those concerning the 
topic and the speaker, as well as obstacles coi ion to any 
2?-rvobert I.. Scott and Bernard L. Brock, Methods of 
Rhetorical Criticism; a Twentieth Century Perspec'.ive 
rNov YorkT" Harper & Row, Publishers, 1972) , p. v, . 
23R0bert Cathcart, Post Communication; Criticism 
and Evaluation (Indianapolis:  The Bobbs-MerrilT Company, 
Inc", T96£T, ~p~. 26. 
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public   communication   situation:      language  usage   and  mean- 
ing,   hearing  and  comprehension,   environmental   and  atti- 
tudinal distractions. 
This  approach   focuses   on   the   speaker  and   assumes 
that he  made  conscious   rhetorical  decisions   in  attempting 
to   achieve  his   ends.     As   Cathcart  states, 
It   embraces   the   idea   of  speech  as  purposeful  behavior 
and  recognizes   that   the   speaker   is   exercising  choice 
as   he  attempts   to  accommodate his  ideas  and desires 
to   the  persuasive  demands   of  the   subject,   audience, 
and occasion.24 
The   interpretation   step  of  this   study will  explore 
the  psychology  of   the   speakers,   their backgrounds, 
training,   beliefs,   philosophies,   and   attitudes   that   in- 
fluenced   the   rhetorical  decisions  made.     As   Cathcart   says, 
The   sun  of  a  man's   psychological   experiences   deter- 
mines   the way he  perceives  the world,   and   this 
perception  influences   the   choices  he  makes   as  he 
tries   to induce others   to see  the world as he does. 
The  critic must know   the   speaker as  a person and be 
able   to   interpret  or   give  meaning  to   the   speaker's 
rhetorical   choices  as   the   speaker  conceived  of  them. 
In   this way,   the critic makes skilled inferences 
about   the speaker's   intent. 
The most vital but   difficult   task  the  critic   faces 
is   that,   of  judgment  or  evaluation.     The   three  predominant 
standards   of  judgment   are   the   effects   standard,   the 
artistic   standard,   and  the  ethical   standard.26 
The   effects   standard  is  purely  pragmatic.      It 
attempts   to   determine   such  questions   as,   was   the   rhetorical 
24ibid.,   p.   37. 25lbid.,   p.   62. 
26scott   and  Brock,   pp.    10-13. 
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effort successful?  Did the speaker accomplish his pur- 
pose?2?  Seldom is this standard employed independently 
of other standards.  If it were, Adolf Hitler might be 
judged one of the greatest speakers ever, for he certainly 
was one of the most effective. 
The artistic standard assumes that rhetoric, as 
an art, has certain guiding principles that, having stood 
the test of time, are desirable in and of themselves. 
A speech can be judged by how closely it approaches these 
standards.  Aristotelian principles are frequently 
employed as the permanent guidelines for evaluation.2* 
The ethical standard is the most subjective of 
the thrra.  Ethical questions might include:  Did the 
speaker have good intentions? Were his ends worthy of 
rhetorical discourse?  Did he tell "The Truth?"  Did he 
avoid outright distortions and lies?  Was the audience 
deceived or tricked in any way?  Did the rhetorical event 
attempt to--or succeed in—improving the quality of life? 
The major assumptions underlying this standard of criticism 
arc that the search for truth is inherently good and 
valuable; that honesty is a virtue, and distortion is 
wrongj and that the ultimate goal of rhetoric is improving 
the quality of life.29 
27See John F. Wilson and Carroll C. Arnold, Public 
Speaking as a Liberal Art (Boston:  Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 
1964), pP .-'333-371^ 
28see Ibid., pp. 332-333. 
29see Ibid., pp. 331-332. 
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For   this   study,   some  aspects   of  all  three   of  these 
standards  will  apply.     An  attempt will  be  made   to  gauge 
the  relative  success  of   each   speaker   in  achieving  the 
desired effects with the amnesty  remarks.     Artistic 
standards  will  explore   and   evaluate  how well   the   speakers 
responded  to  the   rhetorical   problems   they  confronted. 
Finally,   the   eventual  roles   of  Ford  and  Carter  and  the 
nature of the amnesty issue present   the critic with an 
unusual  opportunity  for  judging  truthfulness  of political 
commitments   and  promises.     Ethical  judgments,   then,   will 
compare   the  statements  of  intention made by Ford and 
Carter with  their   subsequent   actions.    The   critical   aspects   of 
this   thesis  will   rely  upon  study  of   the  backgrounds  of 
Ford and  Carter,   their  views   on  amnesty,   their public 
communications   on  amnesty,   the   effects  of   those   communi- 
cations,   and the  reliability and honesty  of their promises. 
The  rhetorical  critic must   decide   the   focus,   or 
emphasis,   of his   study.     Edwin Black categorizes   three 
of  these:      the  movement   study,   which  views   the   total 
dispute   over  a  single  program or  policy;   the  psychologi- 
cal   study,   which  views   the  influence  of  the  inner   life 
of the  speaker on his  rhetorical  activities;   and  the 
neo-Aristotelian   study,   which  applies   the   classical 
canons   of  rhetoric   and  principles   derived   from  the 
Rhetoric.30 
30Black,   p.    1 
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Cathcart   discusses   the  usefulness   of  combining 
these   foci: 
There   is  over-lapping   in   these  approaches   to   criti- 
cism,   and often   the  critic   can  employ methods   from 
each   type  in  his   assessment  and  evaluation  of  speeches. 
He   needs   to  know  the  personality  and  background  of 
the   speaker;   to place  the  speaker and the speech in 
their  milieu;   to  study   the   ideas   and   arguments  con- 
tained  in  the  speech;   and   to  study   the  effects  of 
the   speech  on   the   audience  and   society.    .   .    .   It  is 
important  that  he  not  be  satisfied with  just   one  of 
these  types  of criticism,   but   that he seek that   type 
of  criticism or  combination  of  types   that will most 
satisfactorily   reveal   the   speech  and   its   impact. 31 
This   thesis  will   incorporate   these  into  a   single, 
well-defined   focus.      This   is   not   a  complete  movement 
study,   according   to   the  widely   accepted  definition of 
movemc   t   studies  by  Leland  Griffin.32     A   classic   movement 
study might   follow the   issue of amnesty  for Vietnam 
evaders   and  deserters   through  a  variety  of  speakers   and 
situations,   over   a  number  of  years.      Such  an  undertaking 
is  beyond  the  scope  of  this   thesis.     However,   this  study 
is  primarily movement-oriented,  with   some  consideration 
also give  to  the psychological background of the   speakers, 
and  some   consideration   to  content   through   the  classical 
rhetorical  canon of  invention.     This might more accurately 
be characterized as   a movement   study  crossed with  a study 
of  two  speakers--an   examination of  the brief  periods   of 
time   in  which   the  controversy  over   this   issue   interacted 
with   the   political   careers   of  Gerald  Ford  and  Jimmy  Carter, 
31Cathcart,   p.   19. 
32Leland Griffin,   "The  Rhetoric   of  Historical 
Movements,"   juarterly Journal of Speech  38   (April,   1952) 
18 ■'» -18 8.  
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The "world view" implicit in this study is of the 
political rhetor as a man who makes conscious, and at 
least relatively rational, decisions based on specific 
goals.  The speaker acts in a complex, dynamic environ- 
ment, much of which he cannot control.  Yet through his 
utterances and his actions, he docs exert a degree of 
control and influence on human interaction.  The receivers 
in the rhetorical context, too, exert some degree of 
influence, and within the framework of the socio-politcal 
environment, actively make choices and form opinions. 
Opinions and attitudes are as complex as the environment 
itself; no opinion is held, no issue is considered except 
in conjunction with other opinions and issues.  A process 
orientation makes the study of political rhetoric more 
realistic.  The view of man as a decision-maker with some 
degree of control enables the rhetorical critic to make 
judgments and evaluations.  Hopefully, a consistent and 
integrated "cluster of opinions" about the nature of 
contemporary human communication will strengthen the 
unity and validity of this thesis. 
Justification For This Study 
The study of American political campaigns, parti- 
cularly national campaigns such as Presidential elections, 
is important as one means of understanding and evaluating 
the effectiveness of the American political process. 
Much previous study has been made of Presidential politics 
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and elections.     Each new election presents now problems 
and new  developments   in  United  States   political  history, 
however,   and   reveals  another   step in the development of 
our  system.     While   the  rules   by  which  our  system 
operates   remain  relatively  stable,   one   can  safely   say 
that   the   actual  process   itself  is   in  a   constant   state 
of  change,   and   that  no   two  elections  arc  alike.      This 
makes   the   study  of  Presidential  politics more  difficult 
to  grasp;   it   also makes   that   study  more worthwhile,   and 
even mere   essential   if Americans  are to  learn and grow 
as a people   from past  experiences.     For  this  reason, 
Presidential   campaigns,   particularly  the most  recent  1976 
campaign,   merit   investigation. 
Why   study  one   issue?     Why   pick amnesty  as   that 
issue?    As   stated previously,   the  interaction of issues, 
images,   and whatever   other  factors   influence  popular 
opinion  and  voted  decisions   is  a   complex process  which, 
unfortunately,   is   not   easily   studied  in   its   entirety. 
Volumes  could  be written  on what   influenced  public   opinion 
of  Gerald  Ford  and Jimmy  Carter  prior  to  the   1976   election 
without  exhausting  the  subject.      One way  to  approach 
studying  this  mass   interaction of  our  society  is   to 
break it down—to  look at  certain  specific elements  of 
the  process.      As   a bi< Logist   can   learn much  about   an 
entire  creature, by examining  in  detail a single  cell or 
or organ or  that creature,   so   somethi ig  can be  learned 
about   the entire political process by looking at  parts  of the 
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process--a particular man, a region, a group of voters, 
an interest group, a series of events, or an issue. 
Amnesty is being studied, partially because of personal 
interest in this issue, but also because, as the last 
unresolved problem lingering from the Vietnam war, it 
has been an important issue in recent years. 
The rhetorical, or speech-communication approach 
to this thesis remains to be justified.  Why study the 
rhetoric of amnesty, instead of merely the issue itself? 
First, politics depends upon communication.  Political 
leaders in the United States, whether holding an 
elected office or running for an office, attempt through 
actions and communications to maintain sufficient public 
popularity to achieve their goals.  These efforts are 
especially demanded of men seeking or holding the office 
of the Presidency.  Through speeches, appearances, use 
of the media, written statements, or any other means, 
both the President and the Presidential candidate must 
seek maximum support for himself and his programs.  This 
implies attempts to achieve influence, or persuasion, 
which is the subject of the rhetorician.  A rhetorical 
approach, then, to a contemporary issue-election study 
should prove fruitful. 
Amnesty lends itself to such an approach, because 
it: has been in recent years an issue which has produced 
deep and strong feelings on both sides.  As political 
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leader, have proposed solutions or made policy statements 
concerning amnesty, they have felt the need to attempt 
through rhetorical means to have their views understood 
and accepted by the public.  Some policy statements made 
by political leaders produce little reaction, and 
require a minimum of explanation.  Amnesty statements, 
however, have consistently produced furor and lively 
reactions.  Therefore, studying how candidates and 
Presidents dealt with a "hot" issue of this sort should 
prove rewarding.  The thrust of this thesis is not as 
much on the actions of Ford and Carter toward amnesty 
as it is on the discourses they gave dealing with amnesty. 
CHAPV.R  II 
BACKGROUND 
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Overview of Chapter II 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the 
preliminary information needed for the rhetorical study 
to follow in Chapter III.  As stated previously, this 
thesis is a combination movement-issue study and 
biographical study, examining the rhetoric of amnesty 
in the discourse of Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter.  This 
approach suggests two areas that require preliminary 
investigation:  a study of the history of the amnesty 
issue itself, and biographical studies of the two speakers. 
The first section of this chapter is concerned with 
amnesties and pardons throughout United States history, 
from the first one granted by President Washington in 
1795, up to the present situation stemming from the Vietnam 
war.  Particular emphasis is placed upon the type of 
leniency measures granted, the categories of persons 
benefiting from those measures, and the legal questions 
raised over where the authority to grant amnesties and 
pardons is vested. 
The second section of this chapter contains 
summaries of the lives and public careers of Gerald 
tord and Jimmy Carter until the times of their discourses 
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on amnesty.  This information is presented with the 
intention of discovering the major influences that shaped 
their amnesty beliefs.  Edwin Black writes, "Discourses 
contain tokens of their authors.  Discourses are, directly 
or in a transmuted form, the external signs of internal 
state:.1" The rhetorical critic engaged in a biographical 
study must attempt to understand his subject, to know 
as much about that "internal state" as he can.  As the 
discourse presents clues to the internal state of the 
speaker, so a knowledge of other factors influencing the 
speaker's internal state should help clarify and sup- 
plement clues gained from the discourse.  This section 
will isolate and explore the experiences and attitudes 
that have most strongly affected Ford's and Carter's per- 
ceptions of the amnesty issue. 
Historical Background 
The Carter-Ford amnesty issue was complicated by 
confusion concerning several areas of the controversy: 
the legality or illegality of the acts involved, the 
definitions of terms such as amnesty and pardon, the 
justification for granting amnesty and/or pardon, and, 
if justified, which branch of government should grant 
an amnesty or pardon.  Historical precedence and justifi- 
cation has been claimed by both proponents and opponents 
1-Edwin Black, "The Second Persona," Quarterly 
Journal of Speech 56 (April, 1970):  110. 
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of amnesty.^ While the Vietman conflict is certainly 
unique ar.iong military engagements in American history, 
an examination of the tradition of amnesties and pardons 
in America is important in fully understanding the issue 
in its contemporary context.  In the followin., section 
is outlined the legal and political applications of 
amnesties and pardons throughout United States history. 
While the distinctions between amnesty and 
pardon are often muddled and inconsistently applied, the 
following is generally true:  pardons are granted to 
individuals; amnesties, to groups.-^  Furthermore, in 
Westorn legal tradition "pardon" usually refers to the 
staying of execution or other punishment for an already 
convicted criminal; "amnesty," usually applied to the 
defeated in a war, promises forgiveness of crimes and 
2Professor Harrop Freeman writes, "United States 
history is replete with general 'pardons' and 'amnesties' 
for political offenses."  "An Historical Justification 
and Legal Basis for Amnesty Today," Lav; and the Social 
Order 3 (1971):  515. 
On the other side, Kevin T. Maroncy, former Deputy 
Assistant Attorney General, testified to the Senate 
subcommittee that, "historically, a grant of amnesty to 
miles who have refused to serve th ;. r country during a 
peri . of time when the country was engaged in actual 
hor.tiiities is without precedent."  Selective Service and 
s y i  Hearings B^fqre^he^abc^mmi ttee on Administrative 
Lee and Procedure of the Committee on the Judiciary, 
' cS"S"tates" Senate (Washington, D. C. :  U. S. Government 
Printing Office, W72),  p. 272. 
^Testimony of Henry Schwarzschild, in Selective 
/ice and Amnesty, p. 301. 
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freedom from trial and punishment. f  Article II, Section 
2 of the United States Constitution states:  "The Presi- 
dent . . . shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons 
for offenses against the United States, except in cases 
of impeachment."^  The Constitution thus gives the Chief 
Executive the power to pardon all federal offenses except 
those leading to impeachment.  No mention of amnesty is 
made in the Constitution.  This Presidential power was 
first applied not long after the ratification of the 
Constitution, as a result of the Whiskey Insurrection of 
1794. 
The Whiskey Insurrection was a response to an 
attempt by the new and not fully established United States 
government to carry out an unpopular measure.  Treasury 
Secretary Alexander Hamilton proposed a tax on whiskey, 
to serve the twofold purpose of raising much-needed 
revenue and asserting federal authority.  A group of 
farmers and landowners in western Pennsylvania, many of 
whom depended on whiskey sales for most of their income, 
^Kor example, in Burdick v. United States, 
>5 (1915), the Supreme Court distinguished the t« 
236 U.S. 
9 erms: 
"The one (amnesty) overlooks the offense; the other 
(pardon) remits punishment.  The first is usually ad- 
dressed to crimes against the sovereignty of the State, 
to political offenses, f rgiveness being deemed mere 
expedient for the public welfare than prosecution and 
punishment.  The second condones infractions to classes or 
even communities, a legislative act or under legislation, 
constitutional or statutory, the act of the supreme magis- 
trate." 
5u.S. Constitution, Article II, Section 2. 
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refused to pay the tax.  The insurrection reached a climax 
on July 17, 1794, when the hone of a regional inspector 
for the government was attacked and burned.6 President 
Washington issued a call for troops from several states; 
these troops put down the rebellion easily.  On July 10, 
1795, almost a year later, Washington issued a full 
pardon to all who had participated in the insurrection, 
c v.epting those who still refused to recognize the 
authority of the government.  In a statement to Congress, 
Washington explained his action: 
For though I shall always Chink it a sacred duty to 
c :ercise with firmness and energy the constitutional 
powers with which I am vested, yet my personal feel- 
ing is to mingle in the operations of the government 
ever_, degree of moderation and tenderness which the 
national justice, dignity and safety may permit.' 
From the standpoint of the national government, 
the entire affair proved successful.  The needed tax 
revenue was raised--although C-.   gress, admitting initial 
error, rather abruptly repealed the tax;8 federal authority 
was demonstrated by the state militia responses to the 
call for troc s and by the putdown of the rebellion; and 
Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1969 edition, s.v. "The 
V1iiskey_ThsUfFec"tion, " by Alexander DeConde . 
7James D. Richardson, Compilation of the Messages 
and Papers of the Presidents, vol. I'lUcu Yuri;: Bureau 
cTTlat ionaTTiterature, Inc., 1897), pp. 276-77. 
Sjanie] Pollitt and Frank Thompson, Jr., "Amnesty. 
The American Tradition," Vtasnington post, 19 September 
1974, n. A30. 
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Washington's pardon showed a lenient, forgiving side to 
the government.^ 
The War of 1812 was neither highly popular nor 
highly successful for the United States.  The desertion 
rate ran high,10 and recruitment was not easy for the 
Americans.  Attempting to muster support for the cause, 
Pj.vsident James Madison issued a series of full pardons 
to all deserters from the military who would surrender 
within four months of the decree and return to active 
duty.  The same statement was issued on February 7, 1812, 
October 8, 1812, and June 17, 1814.  No deserters who 
chose to return were excluded from the pardon.  President 
Madison also granted amnesty to pirates and smugglers in 
the Gulf of Mexico area who had helped fight the British. 
This was the first occurrence of a Presidential amnesty 
rather than a pardon.  No explanation is available as to 
why the pirates were amnestied when the deserters were 
•ardoned, or what the practical differences between the 
two types of clemency action were.  At the time, no one 
challenged Presidential authority to grant amnesty as 
well as pardon.  Expediency prompted the generosity of 
the President in granting these measures.  America  needed 
all the help she could get, and these were attempts to 
9John C. Etrldge, "Amnesty: A Brief Historical 
Over vie.'.'," Select iye__Service and Amnesty, p. 663. 
lOpollitt and Thompson, p. A 30. 
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gain that help.  Exact figures on how many men were af- 
fected by, or responded to these pardons and amnesties 
are not known. *■*■ 
The single most divisive and controversial war in 
American history, the War Between the States, produced 
the most divisive and controversir.l battle over the 
scope of the Presidential power to grant pardons.  The 
war produced a series of pardons and amnesties, most of 
which were attempts by President Lincoln and the Union 
to encourage supporters of the Confederacy to return to 
the Union side.  On February 14, 1862, President Lincoln 
pardoned a number of political prisoners and men held 
in military custody, provided they agreed not to support 
the Confcderacy.  Then with the passage of the Confisca- 
tion Law of 1362, Congress first asserted its power over 
pardons by "authorizing" the President to provide pardon 
and amnesty to those participating in the rebellion.  In 
subsequent proclamations, both Lincoln and Andrew Johnson 
labelled their acts as amnesties and pardons;   they 
referred to the Presidential power to grant pardons, 
while Congress continued to assume that they had granted 
this power to the Chief Executive.  This conflict would 
not break into the open until after the end of the war. 
A proclamation of March 10, 1863, provided that 
deserters who reported within the month would be returned 
llEtridge, p. 664.    12Freeman, p. 441. 
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to their regiments without punishment.  A new edict on 
December 8, 1863, declared that pardons were to be 
granted, and property (except slaves) and citizenship 
rights restored to all who returned to the Union side. 
This edict did not apply to officers in the Confederate 
army or Confederate government officials.  In February, 
1864, the War Department (under the authority of Lincoln) 
reduced punishment for captured deserters from death to 
imprisonment, and permitted Union generals to return 
deserters to active duty as they saw fit.  On March 3, 
1865, Congress passed an act setting the punishment for 
desertion as forfeiture of citizenship, but requiring 
the President to pardon all deserters who returned within 
sixty days and served their tour of duty.  Then one year 
later, the War Department (under President Johnson) of- 
fered conditional amnesty to all army deserters who 
13 surrendered before August 15 of that year. 
With the succession of Andrew Johnson to the 
Presidency in 1865, a major battle developed between 
Congress and the President over the Constitutional auth- 
ority to grant amnesties and pardons.  Johnson issued an 
annesty on May 29, 1865.  While the amnesty was not 
universal — fourteen classes of persons were excluded 
from its provisions and those desiring amnesty were 
required to take an oath of allegiance—it was more lenient 
13A list of edicts and acts pertaining to amnesty 
issued during the Civil War is in Etridge, pp. 666-67. 
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than nany members of Congress expected or desired for the 
defeated Confederates.1^ On January 21, 1867, Congress 
repealed the Confiscation Law of 1862 in which they had 
empowered ihe President to grant pardons and amnesties; 
they now claimed the President had no right to grant 
further pardor.a.  AnJrew Johnson ignored the repeal and 
granted three new proclamations of amnesty and pardon in 
1867-1868.  Still not included in any pardons were 
Confederate government officials, those who had mistreated 
prisoners of war, and thor.  directly associated with the 
assassination of President Lincoln.1^  Then on Christmas 
Day 1868 Johnson pardoned all persons associated with 
the rebellion.  The pardon was not enforced, however, as 
the Senate Judiciary Committee censured President Johnson's 
actions as being beyond his Constitutional powers.16 
Although no specific action against the President resulted 
from the censure, the months that followed saw Andrew 
Johnson lose his power and be faced with impeachment 
proceedings.  Congress Btrengthed its claim on the right 
to grant amnesties with the ratification of the Fourteenth 
^Robert W. Merry, "Forgiving is Rarely Divine," 
The National Observer, 12 October 1974, p. 30. 
l^Ktridge, p. 668. 
IGjulius Duscha, "Amnesty?"  Saturday Review 55 
(6 May 19 72), p. 52. 
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Amendment on July 9, 1868. '  Section three of this amend- 
ment states: 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in 
Congress, or elector of President and Vice-President, 
or hold any office, civil or military, under the 
United States, or under any State, who, having pre- 
viously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or 
as an executive or judicial officer of any State, 
to support the Consitution of the United States, 
shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion 
against the same, or given aid or comfort to the 
enemies thereof.  But Congress may by avotc of two- 
thirds of each House, remove such disability. ° 
The passage of this amendment gave solid legal 
justification to the Congressional claim of the power to 
grant amnesties. ^    An estimated 150,000 Southerners 
were kept disfranchised by Congress until 1872, when 
restrictions were lifted on all but approximately 600 
participants in the rebellion.2^  in the years that 
followed, no President attempted any further pardons or 
amnesties relating to the War Between the States; 
Congress issued a series of relatively specific pardons, 
allowing individuals or groups who had supported the 
Confederacy to become re-eligible for holding public 
office.  Limited amnesties for ex-Confederates were 
passed an late as 1896.  By the time a universal amnesty 
17John C. Livingston and Robert G. Thompson, The 
Consent of the Governed, 2nd ed. (New York:  The Mac- 
Millan '  , my, 196J>TT~P-   ^55. 
laU. S. Constitution, Amendment XIV, Section 3. 
^Freeman, p. 446.    20Merry, p. 30. 
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was passed by Congress in 1898, there were few if any 
persons left alive who were affected by the grant.21 
Clemency measures relating to the War Between the 
States were applied primarily to deserters from the 
Union military and supporters of the Confederacy.  The 
wartime pardons to deserters served military political 
purposes of strengthening the Northern cause.  The 
pardons and amnesties granted to Confederates during the 
war attempted to weaken support for the South by bring- 
ing Confederates back into allegiance and by getting a 
government in operation in the South.22 Post-war 
clemency measures were important, even if delayed, in 
re-uniting the country.  Political and military exigencies 
prompted the amnesties and pardons issued during and 
immediately following the War Between the States. 
The Constitutional battle over the right to grant 
amnesties and pardons reached no clear conclusion.  The 
post-Civil War United States saw a powerful Congress, 
bent on revenge, and a weak President.  Congress claimed 
the right to amnesty, strengthened that claim through 
the Fourteenth Amendment, and exercised that right 
exclusively in the post-war years.  Since then no major 
disputes have occurred between the Executive and Congress 
21Etridge, p. 668. 
22Tcstimony of Henry Steele Commager, in Selective 
/ice and Amnesty, p. 185. 
33 
over  their respective powers   to  grant pardons  or amnesties. 
The   division  of  those  powers — that  the  President  may  par- 
don,   and  Congress  may  amnesty--has  generally been 
respected.23     Still,   the  absence  of  an  absolute   distinction 
b< tween  amnesty  and  pardon   leaves   some  room for   debate   and 
disagreement  over what specific  actions either  a President 
or  Congress  may  take   in  any  given   situation. 
The Supreme Court discussed the distinction between 
amnesty and pardon in the majority ruling for the case of 
Knote v.  U.S.,   in   1877.2^     Knote,   a former Confederate 
se   land  had  been   confiscated  by  the   federal   government, 
filed   suit   for   the  profits   gained   from  that  land   since 
the  confiscation,   arguing  that   the  pardon  he  had   received 
entitled him  to   those   profits.     Although  the  issue  of 
amnesty  or  pardon v/as   not   central   to   the  ruling,   the 
Court  opinion  elaborated on   those   terms: 
Some  distinction has  been  made,   or  attempted   to  be 
made,   between  pardon  and  amnesty.      It   is   sometimes 
said that  the  latter operates  as an extinction of 
the   offense  of which  it   is   the  object,   causing  it 
tc  be   forgotten  so   far  as   the  public   interests  are 
concerned,   whilst   the   former   only  operates   to  remove 
the  penalties   of   the  offense.     This   distinction  is 
not,   however,   recognized   in  our  law.      The  Constitution 
doos  not  use   the word  "amnesty,"  and  except   that   the 
'. . rm  is   generally  employed where  pardon  is   extended 
to whole  classes   or  communities,   instead of  individuals, 
the   distinction between   them  is  one  rather  of  philo- 
logical   interest  than of  legal   importance." 
2 3] reeman,  p.  446. 
24john Knote v.  D.  S.,  9 5 U.   S.   149   (1377). 
25ibid.,  p.   152. 
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This opinion in part negates prior distinctions 
empowering Congress to amnesty and the President to pardon. 
However, no substantial changes in executive or legislative 
pardoning activities resulted from this decision. 
The Spanish-American War of 1898 was brief and suc- 
cessful for the United States.  Yet the annexation of the 
Philippines as a result of that war led to a lengthy 
rebellion against the United States by Philippine national- 
ists.  The insurrection ended by March, 1901;26 on 
July 4, 1902, President Theodore Roosevelt offered condi- 
tional pardon and amnesty to a majority of those parti- 
cipating in the rebellion, provided they signed an oath 
recognizing the authority of the United States govern- 
ment. 27  N0 pardons or amnesties were granted to deserters 
from the American military for the Spanish-American War. 6 
World War I is perhaps the first war in American 
history to parallel present-day conditions, in creating 
a large number of deserters, draft evaders, and war re- 
sisters who stood to benefit from a general amnesty of 
the type sought after the Vietnam war. °  This war 
prompted the first large-scale conscription in U. S. 
history.  Persons belonging to certain recognized pacifist 
The ^Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1969 ed. , s.v. " i 
Snanish-AmerTcan War,rr"5y Julius William Pratt. 
27Allan L. Damon, "Amnesty," American Heritage 24 
(October, 197 3), p. 78. 
28ibid. 29ibid. 
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churches were  exempted  from military   service,   but   the 
Selective   Service   lav; made  no   provision   for men  outside 
those   churches  who  were  conscientious   objectors.30 
Approximately 4,000 men were assigned alternative  service 
as   a  result  of   their  conscientious  objector  status; 
another   450  men who were  either  refused   that   status  or 
simply  refused  to  register   for   the  draft  were   imprisoned.31 
The  exact  number  of  desertions   during  World War  I   is not 
known,   but was  likely  a substantial  figure;   for 
instance,   between   the  armistice   in  November,   1913,   and 
32 
February,   1920,   over  11,000 men deserted  the  army. 
Also,   at   least   2,000  persons were   arrested  under   draft 
and  espionage   laws,33   for  violations   ranging  from partici- 
pation   in   illegal   antigovernment   acts   to  merely being  a 
member  of  a  radical   organization.      President  Woodrow 
Wilson  staunchly  refused  to  consider any   form  of 
individual   or  group   amnesty   for   imprisoned  violators  of 
draft,   espionage,   or military  laws.34    His   successor, 
Warren  G.   Harding,   freed  several  hundred  men  on  a  case- 
by-case  basis.      Calvin   Coolidge   continued  Harding's 
practice   of   freeing  men  individually;   both  Presidents 
would not   consider  any widespread  universal  pardon   or 
amnesty.35     On  March   5,   1924,   following  the   formal   declara- 
tion ending  the First World War,   Coolidge  granted amnesty 
30pollitt   and  Thompson,   p.    30. 3lDamon,   p.   78. 
32ibid. 33lbi.d. 3/'ibid. 3nbid.,   P.   79. 
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and restored citizenship to approximately one hundred men 
who had deserted the army after November, 191.8.36  Then 
in 1933 Franklin Roosevelt amnestied and restored citizen- 
ship for 1,500 violators of the Draft and Espionage Acts 
who had served their sentences.37  This, the first amnesty 
granted to draft evaders in the United States, came fifteen 
years after the armistice that stopped the fighting in 
World War I. 
Selective pardoning was applied to deserters and 
evaders from World War II similar to that following World 
War I.  The number of deserters from this war is not known. 
President Truman refused to grant any general amnesty or 
pardon for deserters.38  He did establish an Amnesty 
Board in 1946 to make recommendations about the some 
15,000 men who evaded the draft or in some way violated 
the Selective Service Act during World War II.  Based on 
the case-by-case examinations made by the board, Truman 
granted 1,523 individual pardons out of the 15,000 total 
on December 24, 1947.39  Those pardoned were donj so 
because of their professed "religious convictions"; men 
who gave secular, or primarily political reasons for 
avoiding the draft, as well as some 5,000 Jehovah's 
Witnesses, were not pardoned.  This limited pardon reflected 
3&Etridge, p. 669.     37Ibid-     38Damoa> p. 79. 
39Etridge, p. 670. 
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the mood of the times.  In the months immediately follow- 
ing the end of the war, public sentiment was more lenient 
to deserters and evaders. ^  But with the advent of the 
Cold War, Americans faced the possibility of another 
armed conflict, and the willingness to forgive evaders and 
deserters faded.  By the time of Truman's pardon on 
Christmas Eve, 1947, the idea of leniency, even for 
conscientious objectors, was unpopular. fl 
In his last days as President, Truman issued two 
more pardons on December 24, 1952.  The first pardoned 
convicts who had served in the armed forces.  The second 
amnestied all persons who had deserted the military from 
1945 to 1950 and had already received punishment.^2 
Presidential action following the Second World War 
resulted in the pardoning of approximately ten percent 
of the men who had evaded the draft; further action in 
1952, seven years after the end of the war, provided par- 
dons for deserters from the military in postwar years. 
As with previous situations in American history, distinc- 
tions between amnesty and pardon were not clearly 
established or maintained/*3  But some form of clemency 
40See, for example, New York Times, 24 November 
1946, p. E-8. 
41Jack Colhoun, "Amnesty in 1947:  A Bad Deal," in 
Selec.tive Service and Amnesty , p. 407. 
42Etridge, p. 670. 
43For instance, what Truman established as an Am- 
nestv Board" recommended some pardons, but never even 
considered any amnesties.  See Schwar/.schild, p. 304. 
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was provided by the Chief Executive to at least a per- 
centage of the men who, for various reasons, avoided or 
fled military service. 
The desertion and evasion rates for the Korean 
conflict were the lowest for any of the four American 
military conflicts of this century.•'  There was no 
amnesty or pardon for either deserters or evaders from 
this conflict. ^ 
Some general conclusions can be drawn, based on 
this brief historical review, concerning the political 
context and nature of amnesties and pardons in the 
United States prior to the Vietnam conflict. 
(1)  The concepts of amnesty and pardon have not 
been consistently distinguished from each other.  Host 
persons have agreed that there is a difference between 
the two, but opinions as to exactly what that difference 
is have varied over the years.  Some leniency measures 
have been called amnesties; some, pardons; others have 
even been labeled both amnesty and pardon.  The basic 
legal differences between amnesty and pardon, diseus.;cd 
at the beginning of this chapter, have been generally 
Ignored or overlooked by Presidents and Congressmen 
addressing themselves to this issue.  The most frequently 
occurring distinctions have been that amnesties apply to 
groups while pardons apply to individuals.  Furthermore. 
^Damon, p. 79. 
^Spollitt; and Thompson, p. 30. 
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amnesty absolves the crime, while pardon only reduces 
the punishment. 
(2)  Accompanying the confusion over the terms 
amnesty and pardon has been confusion over where the 
power to grant those measures is vested.  Modern 
scholars writing on this subject reveal confusion and 
conflicting opinions.  Professor Harrop Freeman writes 
that 
The Fourteenth Amendment clearly states that the 
power to amnesty lies with Congress.  Subsequent to 
the Civil War . . . Congress and the President have 
generally respected this division of power.  It 
therefore seems clear that the President is empowered 
to grant, pardons for all past offenses for which^ an 
individual has been convicted, and perhaps for those 
for which he has not been convicted and on which the 
statute of limitations on prosecution has not run out, 
while Congress has the farther reaching prerogative 
to grant amnesties for all political activity. 
Some scholars do not see such a clear division of 
powers between the Executive and Congress.  Alan Damon, 
implying that full powers of amnesty and pardon belong 
to the Executive, writes that "From George Washington 
onward, President s have assumed that the pardoning power 
carried with it the right to proclaim amnesties." 
Douglas Jones and David Raish, in an article in the Harvard 
International Law Journal, concur with Damon that Presi- 
dential power is broader than Congressional power in this 
ar(vi : 
^Freeman, p. 446.    47Damon, p. 8. 
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The Constitution gives the President the power "to 
grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the 
United States."  This clause has been broadly inter- 
preted by the courts to allow the President to grant 
full, partial, or conditional pardons or amnesties 
for every federal offense, except in cases of 
impeachment. 
Congress appears to have the same authority as 
the President, although its pardoning power is less 
certain because it has been exercised infrequently 
and tested little by the courts.'*" 
Henry Schwarzschild, Director of the Project on 
Amnesty of the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, 
gives the opinion that amnesty may be granted by either 
the President or Congress: 
To be sure, historically amnesty has been most often 
an act of the Crown, of the Sovereign, of the Chief 
Executive.  But a series of legislative enactments, 
of Supreme Court decisions, of constitutional and 
legal doctrines and interpretations, going back over 
a hundred years, leave no doubt that the Congress, as 
well as the President, may enact amnesty or remit all 
penalties for offenses. ... We (The A.C.L.U.) 
believe that both the executive and legislative branches 
of government can properly enact amnesty.*° 
Professor Henry Commager sides more with Harrop 
Freeman in his opinion that the Presidential and Con- 
gr ssional powers are relatively distinct:  "There is no 
doubt about the constitutional right of the President to 
grant pardon and to proclaim amnesty, and none about the 
Congressional right to enact amnesty. "->0 
Prior to the War Between the States, all amnesties 
and pardons were granted by Presidents.  After the Civil 
48Douglas Jones and David Raish, "American Deserters 
and Draft Evaders:  Exile, Punishment, or Amnesty?" Harvard 
International Law Journal 13 (1972):  105. 
^Schwarzschild, p. 303.    SOcommager, p. 185. 
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War,   Congress  exercised full right   to  amnesty,   and even 
partial  right   to  pardon.     Then   in   the   twentieth  century, 
al1   amnesties   and  pardons  have   again  been  granted  by 
Presidents.     A review of  the historical precedence and 
the  legal  and   scholarly  opinions  reveals   that   pardoning 
has  been  generally  considered  as   a  Presidential power, 
while  amnesty   can  be   interpreted  as   either  a  Presidential 
or  a   Congressional  power.     But   this   distinction  is  rendered 
invalid because  of  the   confused  and   inconsistent  applica- 
tion   of  these   terms   to   various   acts  of   leniency.     As   a 
summary   in   the  Washington  Post   stated, 
The historical  fact,   many experts  agree,   is   that 
no  two  amnesties   or   clemency  moves   are   precisely  alike 
and   that   Presidents,   historians,   and  laymen  all have 
caused   confusion  by  failing   to  distinguish  between 
amnesty   and  pardon.51 
(3)     Two  broad   categories   of   individuals  have  been 
the recipients  of  amnesties  and pardons:     deserters,   and 
rebcls--dissidcnts--draft evaders.     The   first   group arc 
violators  of  military   law,   subject   to   trial  and punishment 
i    ier   the military justice  system.     Deserters  have not 
been  looked upon  favorably  in the United States.    Desertion 
is  consider    '   a   cowardly act;   at   least   until  the  time  of 
the  Civil War,   captured  deserters were  executed,  except  a 
rare   few  cases  granted  specific   .    rdons.     Pardons   for 
5lwashin£ton_Post   17  September   1974,   p.   14. 
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wartime  deserters   have  not  as   a  rule  been popular with 
the  majority  of   the  citizenry.     Usually  political  exigen- 
cies-- for   example,   the  need  for  more   soldiers   in   the War 
of  1812--have  prompted  1     liency   for  deserters. 
Rebels,   dissidents,   and  draft   evaders   are   grouped 
together  as   persons  who knowingly  violate  civilian   lav;, 
and who  consciously  oppose  actions  or  policies  of   the 
United  States.     Participants   in  the  Whiskey   Insurrection 
received  pardons   soon  after   the  hostilities   had   ceased; 
rebels   fighting  for   the   Confederacy   in  the  Civil  War 
received  pardons   eventually.     Those who  took  an   active 
part   in  the   rebellion   in   the  Philippines  were  pardoned 
within   two   years   after   fighting  ceased.     Dissidents   and 
radical  political   figures,   arrested  during  and   immediately 
following World War   I,   were not  pardoned  as   a  group;   son.' 
of   these   individuals   did  later   receive  pardons.      Draft 
evaders  have   not  been   treated   leniently  as   a   rule.     World 
War  I   draft  evaders were amnestied in   1933,   fifteen years 
after   the  war,   and   after most  had  already  served   their 
sentences.      Ten  percent  of   the  World  War  II   draft   evaders 
were pardoned  in   1947;   the rest  served  their   sentences or 
fled. 
(A)     The   time   and nature   of  amnesties  and pardons 
reflect   the  political   climate  and   the   strength  of   the 
government   at   that   time.     Pardons have been  issued during 
military  conflicts  when   the  government  needed   more  manpower 
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and broader popular support,   as   in   the War of 3 012 and  t   e 
War  Between   the  States.      Following military   engagements, 
the broadest   and  most  immediate   pardons   and  amnesties  have 
come   from  a  strong,   secure  government.     After  squelching 
the Whiskey   Insurrection   in   1795,   the  government  was 
firmly  established,   and  President  Washington   pardoned   the 
rebels  without   a  great  deal   of  controversy.     After  the 
Spanish-American  War  and   the   Philippine  rebellion,   the 
United  States   was   militarily   strong,   and  Theodore  Roosevelt, 
a popular and politically  secure  President,  was able   to 
grant   leniency.     Pardons   following  the War  Between  the 
States   and  World War   I--tincs  when  the  government   and 
nation  were   in   turmoil--were   slower   to be  granted  and  less 
inclusive.      United  States   security  following   the  Second 
World War was   short-lived,   as   the  Cold War  and   fear of 
Soviet   Communism  troubled   the  nation.     The  pardons   that 
came  at   this   time,   too,   were   limited   in   scope. 52 
The Contemporary_Situation:  Vietnam 
The amnesty--pardon issue stemming from the American 
military involvement in Vietnam can now be examined in 
52Colhoun, corroborating the view that public opinion 
is of critical importance for amnesties and pardons, cites 
an article discussing the pardoning of COs following WWII: 
It is no secret that public opinion is the major deter- 
minant of governmental policy in the treatment of con- 
scientious objectors.  Norman Thomas, in his definitive 
account of COs in WWI, explained that the War Dep t. was 
slow in formulating policy for handling these men be- 
cause "it was afraid of public clamor if it did the 
unpopular thing." 
Leo P. Crespi, "Public Opinion and COs," N  Republic 
(13 June 19'*5), quoted in Colhoun, p. 409. 
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in  light   of   this   historical   context.      From  the  mid-1960s 
to  the end  of American   troop   involvement   in  Vietnam in   1973, 
over   six million  me i   served  in   the  military   in  Southeast 
Asia.53     Exact   figures  on  how many men  deserted   the  mili- 
tary  or  evaded   the draft   are  not   agreed   upon.54     There  are 
no  accurate  statistics   for   this   seven   year  period;   but   it 
is  known   that   the  desertion   and  evasion   rates have   run 
higher  during  Vietnam  than  during  any  other  American  mili- 
tary conflict.55     Desertions  are  estimated in the hundri 
of  thousands,   and  evasions   are   estimated   in  the   thousands. 
In  any   case,   a  great   many  men  stood   to  benefit   from a 
pardon  or  amnesty.     George McGovern was   perhaps   the   first 
well-known political   figure   to propose amnesty  for Vietnam 
evaders  and  deserters;   his  proposal was   issued  on   3   October 
1971,56     Not   long  after   that,   President  Richard  Nixon was 
questioned  about   the   possibility  of  amnesty.     His   first 
response was   a   flat  "no"   to  questions   of  whether  he would 
consider any amnesty.5?     Then  in  an interview with Dan 
Rather,   Nixon  elaborated  on his  position.     When asked  if 
he would  consider  any   leniency,  with  or without  alternative 
53i)amon,  p.   7   . 
SApor a   full treatment  of the problem of statistics 
on   eva     ons  and desertions   see next  page. 
55Comr.iager,   p.   182. 
56new York Times,   4 October   1971,   p.   60. 
57Richard M. Nixon, News Conference, 12 November 
1971, as quoted in Testimony of Curtis Tarr, Selective 
S. ■-vice aiid_ Arnnesty,  p.   10. 
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service as had been proposed in Congress, Nixon said: 
As long as there are Americans who would choose t:o 
serve their country rather than desert their country, 
and it is a hard choice, . . . and as long as there 
are any POVJs held by the north Vietnamese, there will 
be no amnesty for those who deserted their country. 
Just let me say, Mr. Rather, on that score, I don't 
say this because I am hardhearted.  I say it because 
it is the only right thing to do.  Two and a half 
million young Americans had to make the choice when 
they went to serve in Vietnam.  Most of them, I am sure, 
did not want to go.  It is not a very pleasant place. 
I have been there a number of tines.  They are nice 
people, but it is not a pleasant place for an American 
to serve, and particularly in uniform.  I imagine most 
of those young Americans when they went out there did 
so with some reluctance, but they chose to serve.  Of 
those that chose to serve, thousands of them died for 
their choice, and until this war is over, and until we 
get the POWs back, those who chose to desert their 
country, a few hundred, they can live with their choice. 
That is my attitude. 
Dan Rather:  At some future time, the door might be 
opened? 
President Ilixon:  We always, Mr. Rather, under our 
system, provide amnesty.  You remember Abraham Lincoln 
in the. last days of the Civil War, as a matter of fact 
just before his death, decided to give amnesty to any- 
one who had deserted if he would come back and rejoin 
his unit and serve out his period of time.  Amnesty, 
of course, is always the prerogative of the Chief 
Executive.  I, for one, would be very liberal with 
regard to amnesty, but not while there are Americans 
in Vietnam fighting to serve their country and defend 
their country, and not when POWs are held by North 
Vietnam.  After that, we will consider it, but it 
would have to be on the basis of their paying the 
price, of course, that anyone should pay for violating 
the law.58 
This statement suns up the Nixon philosophy and 
policy on amnesty.  No further statements by the- former 
President modified or altered this position. 
58Richard M. Nixon, News Conference, 12 November 
1971, as quoted in Testimony of Curtis Tarr, Selective 
J i c e a P. d Amnesty , p. 10. 
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The next few years saw increased debate on anaicsty, 
including Congressional hearings, and some attempted, but 
fruitless, action.  By early March, 1974, there were nine 
bills pending in the House of Representatives on amnesty;^9 
none of them passed.  Watergate hearings and the resigna- 
tion of President Nixon pushed the amnesty issue back 
temporarily.  Then President Gerald Ford initiated his 
earned re-entry plan, providing pardons to some 15,000 
Finally, Jimmy Carter's blanket pardon to evaders in 
January, 1977 was the last in this series of pardons and 
amnesties throughout American history. 
How does the contemporary situation, dealing with 
deserters and evaders from the Vietnam war, compare to 
previous contexts for amnesties and pardons?  First, true 
to historical precedent, there persisted the ?,reat confusion 
over whether Congress as well as the President can grant 
amnesty.60  The limited pardons granted to date have been 
Presidential action.  As stated above, Congress has investi- 
gated the possibility of amnesty, and numerous bills were 
actually drafted; but none of those bills passed.  Next, 
there are two categories of men subject to amnesty or 
pardon:  draft evaders and military deserters.  This has 
been true of previous situations, too.  Most contemporary 
59\     ,;ton Post, 9 March 1974. 
60A fuller discussion of how the terms amnesty and 
pardon were used by Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter follows 
in Chapter 3. 
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political figures have advocated separate treatment for the 
two groups.  Finally, the current amnesty-pardon issue 
reflects the political times.  As the Vietnam conflict was 
controversial, so amnesty and pardon proposals have 
generated much controversy.  As Robert W. Merry concluded, 
Still, except for the rancor it generated following 
the Civil War, never in American history has amnes I y 
been as hot a political item as it is today.  "My 
impression," says Prof. Arthur S. Link of Princeton 
University, "is that we didn'L normally have the 
terribly deep feelings on both sides of the issue 
. . . in the past." 
That isn't surprising.  The Civil War was unique in 
American history in terms of the bitterness Americans 
felt for each other.  And the Vietnam War was the first 
time the country's leaders attempted to wage a foreign 
war in the face of substantial opposition at home.61- 
The Vietnam war had grown unpopular with the Ameri- 
can people by the early 1970s, when amnesty first received 
widespread attention.  Former President Nixon refused to 
consider amnesty until all American troops were out of 
Vietnam.  After the final evacuation of troops, the 
amnesty issue was pushed aside by a weakened Executive in 
the midst of Watergate troubles.  Within days after the 
resignation of Richard Nixon, when the government under 
Gerald Ford seemed to be regaining popularity and confi- 
dence, a partial Vietnam pardon was granted.  The granting 
of pardons and amnesties again has proved indicative of 
tl . relative strength and stability of the government. 
6'Merry, p. 30. 
48 
A Note   on  Statistics   from  tle  Vietnam War 
The  reader may  encounter  conflicting  figures  as   to 
the  number  of men  in  various   categories  who have  violated 
military   law.     There  are  different  and  overlapping   cate- 
gories.     From  1963  to  1973  the  Justice  Department  prosecuted 
9,000  violators   of  Selective  Service   laws--draft  evaders.&2 
Indictments were  dismissed against   10,000 evaders,   and 
another 4,400 were  indicted and  fled.     More  than half of 
these  men  are   thought   to  be   residing out  of   the  country. 
From  1966   to   1973  the Defense  Department   lists   over   500,000 
"incidents  of  desertion"--defined  as   absence without   leave 
for more   than   thirty  days.     Of  these,   Defense   reports   that 
all  but   23,000 have  been  resolved.      Some  2,000   of   the per- 
sons   involved   in   the  unresolved  cases   are  thought   to be  out 
of  the   country.      In  his  V.F.W.   speech,   Gerald  Ford  estimated 
that   50,000  men were  at   large,   in   trial,   or  had beer,  con- 
victed of desertion or evasion.     Advocates of amnesty give 
much  higher   figures   of  up   to   100,000 men who  stand   to bene- 
fit  from a general amnesty. 
The  reader  should  note  that   administration  sources, 
such  as   the  Justice  Department  or  Defense  Department  or 
the  President  are  not  necessarily more  reliable   than  other 
sources.     The  Gallup  Opinion   Index,   in  a  summary  article, 
stated   that approximately  125,000 men were eligible  for 
62These   and  following  figures are  from the Hew York 
Times,   20  August   1974,   p.   18. 
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the   Ford   leniency  program,   and   that  nearly  25,000  of   those 
applied.   J    This   is substantially higher than the Ford 
estimate.     John Geiger,   former head of the American Legion, 
estimated   70,000  at-large deserters and  evaders.^    A 
safe  guess   from  these   various   sources   is   that   the  number 
of  deserters   and   evaders   convicted,   being  tried,   or   fugitive 
;  Ford   .-poke   in August,   19 74,   was  between  50,000  and 
12!),000;   the   total  when  Jimmy  Carter  spoke,   two  years   later, 
was  approximately   25,000  less.     Any more  specific   estimates 
at  this point would be mere conjecture. 
Biographical   Information 
aid Ford 
The   thirty-eighth  President  of  the  United  States 
born   14 July   1913,   and named  Leslie  Lynch  King,   after 
his  father.     His   parents  divorced when he was  two;   his 
mother   remarried,   to Gerald  R.   Ford,   Sr.,   and  the   child was 
renamed  after  his   adopted  father.      Gerald  and his   three 
younger stepbrothers were raised as  Episcopalians   in 
i'.apids,   Michigan,   a  city   strongly   influenced  by   large 
sh  Catholic  and  Dutch   Calvinist  neighborhoods.    ^     Young 
Gerald  developed  an  early  interest   in  sports,   becoming  an 
accc tplished football player.     His   spare  time during his 
S^Yb^GVjJ^ip^pi^nior^jjTde^^,   October   1975,   p.   24. 
'''•John  H.   Geiger,   "Amnesty:      The  Availability  of 
Procedures,     Vital  Speeches_of_the^ Day 38   (1 March 
L972),  pp.   401-403. 
65J.   F.   teriiorst,  Gerald  Ford and the Future of the 
mcy   .,     •.  York:    Joseph Okpaku Pub.  CoT~i   Lnc.,  1974), 
i" • 
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teen  years  was  devoted  to working  parttime   in  restaurants 
to  supplement   the   family   income  and  playing center on  his 
high  school  and  college  football  teams.      At   the  University 
of Michigan,   Ford  played  on   two  consecutive  national 
championship   teams,   and was  selected  All-American  his 
senior  year."6     After   graduating  from Michigan with  a 
solid  "B"   average   in   1935,   he   took   a  job   at  Yale   as   an 
assistant   football   coach  and  boxing  coach.     This   enabled 
him to  enroll   in  some   courses   at  the  Yale  Lav/ School,   to 
which  he  had  previously been  denied  admission.     He  com- 
pleted his   studies   there,   receiving  an  L.   L.   B.   degree  in 
1941.67     He   finished   in   the  top   third  of  his   law  school 
graduating  class."° 
A budding new   law  career  was   delayed when  Gerald 
Ford joined   the   Navy  on   20  April   1942.     He  served with 
distinction   in   the   U.   S.   Third  Fleet   in  the  Pacific  Ocean 
during World War  II.69     After   leaving  the   service,   Ford 
returned   to  Grand Rapids,   and  joined  the   law   firm  of 
Butterfield,   Keeney,   and Amberg.     In   1948   in  Grand  Rapids 
Cerald  Ford   first  pursued   the   two most   lasting  loves   of 
his   life:     politics   and  Betty.      He  began  courting  Elizabeth 
66ibid.,   pp.    37-43. 
67who's  Who  in  American   Politics,   5th  cd.    (New  York: 
R.   R.   Bowk"er~Co. , T9T5J7~P-   31°- 
68 terHorst,   p.   44. 
69bud Vestal, Jerry Ford Up Close (New York:  Coward, 
McCann & Geoghegan, 19T4), pp. 67-71". 
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Bloomer Warren, a divorcee : id dancer, and they married in 
October, 1948.  The wedding had been delayed for several 
months as Gerald pitched in, with wife Betty at his side, 
campaigning for the local Congressional seat, from 
Michigan's Fifth District.  After a stiff battle in the 
Republican primary, Ford easily won the election over his 
Democratic opponent in this heavily Republican district. 
This election, in which Ford received over 60 percent of 
the popular vote, would be the closest race he would ever 
e for his Congressional seat.'' 
That Ford chose to run as a Republican is under- 
standable.  His father, owner of a small paint store, 
was a Republican businessman.  And his Fifth District had 
been heavily Republican since the time of the Civil War.72 
Throughout his political career, Ford's philosophies would 
remain almost exclusively consistent with those of the 
Republican party. 
Ford spend an uneventful first term in Congress in 
1949-1950, serving on the relatively minor Public. Works 
I mmittee.  At the start of his second term, in 1951, he 
?
0G 0 P  officials wore shocked and dismayed when, 
ir a special'eiection in early 1974 to fill Ford s vacated 
Congressional seat, the conservative Fifth District elected 
its first Democratic Congressman in nearly one hundred years 
7iPresident Ford:  The Man and His Record (Washing- 
ton :  Congressional Quarterly, 1974), p. 32. 
72vestal, p. 77. 
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landed  a   spot,  on   the  influential  House  Appropriations  Com- 
mittee.      Here  he  became well-versed   in  economics,   particu- 
larly military  spending,   as   he  also   sat  on  the Military 
Budget  Subcommittee.73     It was   in  these   early  years   of 
his   political   career  in Washington  that  Congressman  Ford 
developed   a   close  personal   friendship  and  political   affinity 
with   another  young  Rr  ublican  politician,   Richard  Nixon  of 
California,   who   rose   rapidly   from Congressman   to  Senator 
to Vice-President  by   1952.     The  decade of the  1950s was 
for Gerald  Ford,   however,   rather  uneventful.      He worked 
hard,   served his   district   satisfactorily,   as   evidenced by 
the overwhelming  reelections  he received  from them,   and 
rose  slowly  in  seniority  to become one of the  ranking 
Republicans   on   the  Appropriations   Committee  and  in   the 
House   of  Representatives.      His  highest  ambition,   it  seems, 
was   to be   elected  Speaker  of   the   House.7y     But   this   re- 
quired   a   Republican  majority   in   the  House;   one  of  Ford's 
constant   frustrations   as   Congressman  was   that   he  and  his 
fellow Republicans  were  usually   in  the minority,   having 
to  devote  more   time   to opposing  Democratic   legislation  than 
forwarding programs of their own.     Ford's   conscientious 
effort  as   Congressman  was   rewarded with  an honor  in   1961-- 
the  American  Political  Science  Association  gave him its 
distinguished   Congressional   service  award,   citing his   hard 
word  and  dedication.75 
73t.erHorst,   p.   59. 
7''lbid. ,   p.   56. 
75Pres ident   Ford:     The   Man   and   His  Record,   p.   28. 
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In   1963,   Ford was  elected House   Republican  Confer- 
ence  chairman,   reflecting his   growing  seniority  and  respect 
among his   peers.     Then  things  began   to  happen  for  Jerry 
Ford—as  biographer  J.   F.   terllorst  v;rites,   "Ford's   political 
star began   to  rise  on  the  national   horizon  in  1964."76 
Although well-known   and   respected in  Congress,   Ford had up 
until now remained  largely  unknown   outside  of his   own  Fifth 
District  of Michigan.     President  Lyndon  Johnson   appointed 
Ford  to   serve  on   the  Warren  Commission  in  1964,   investi- 
gating  the  assassination  of   former  President  John  Kenned;.. 
Based on   the   findings   of   the  commission,   Ford co-authored 
a  book published  in   1965,   entitled Portrait  of  an  Assassin-- 
a  book which would   later  bring  accusations   that   Ford had 
exploited his   place  on  the  Warren Commission   for  personal 
profit.'77     At   the  Republican  National   Convention  of  1964, 
Ford's name was  one  of several mentioned as  a potential 
Vice-Presidential,   or  even  Presidential,   nominee.     He 
sought neither  position.      The   nomination  of  Barry Goldwater 
for President  alienated many Republicans,  who  felt Gold- 
water was  too  conservative and hawkish.     Ford,  however, 
always a staunch party  loyalist,   supported Goldwater, 
making carefully worded St item* tits  that,  while not  totally 
agreeing with   the  Republican  nominee,   at   least  emphasized 
his  preference  over Lyndon Johnson,   the big-spending 
T\ 
76terlIorst,   p.   83. 
78terHorst,  p.   37. 
77lbid.,   pp.   82-83. 
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Dissension   that   had been  brewing  in   the  Republican 
ranks   in  Congress   for  some   time  broke   into   the  open  near 
the outset   of   the   89th  Congress.     A group of  younger,   more 
liberal   Republicans   called   for  an   election  to  replace 
House  Minority  Leader  Charles   Halleck.     The  new  choice   for 
Minority   Leader was  Congressman Gerald  Ford.     He  was  not 
elected  because  of  any   strong  political  views,   or because 
of any  great   political   power,   but  because he  was   almost 
universally   liked  and  respected,   a  man   that  most   Republi- 
cans   felt   they   could work with.'"     He  was  a  moderate 
Republican,  who would   follow party  views  to the hilt.     On 
4  January   1965,   Ford  resigned   from  the  Appropriations   Com- 
mittee  to  begin his  new  job  as  Minority Leader--the  job 
of organizing   the   vastly  outnumbered  House  Republicans 
in order   to  combat   the   flood  of  "Great   Society"   legisla- 
tion  President   Johnson  was   sending  to   Congress. 
The  battle   over   domestic   legislation  soon was 
overshadowed by growing dissatisfaction with  the  Vietnam 
War.     Lyndon  Johnson  continued   to   involve  greater  numbers 
of  troops   and  more  money   in  Southeast  Asia not    to  achieve 
O A 
military   victory,   but   to  achieve  a  stalemate. This 
policy   drew  criticism  from  those who wanted  peace   and  from 
those who wanted  full  military   commitment   to winning   the 
war.     Gere.Id Ford fell   in   the  latter  category.     Ford was 
a hawk  on   Vietnam;   he  was   "by   instinct   a  Cold Warrior  of 
79Cer Horst,   p.   92. BOVestal,   p.   137. 
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the Eisenhower-Dulles   school."° -    This means   that he,   like 
Eisehower  and Dulles in   the 1950s  perceived a monolithic 
nunist  bloc   that  posed  a world   threat,   and needed   to  be 
checked  at  any  place where   a  Communist  regime   threatened 
to  take  power.      Ford delivered  a major  address  on   the 
House  floor   in   1968  entitled,   "Why  Are We  Pulling  Our  Best 
Punches   i"i  Vietnam?"    This   speech  represented   the  views 
shared by  most  hawkish   Republicans.''     As   the   1968   elections 
coached,   the   unpopularity of  the Vietnam war and the 
co   responding  unpopularity   of  Lyndon  Johnson  gave   the 
Licans   some   solid   campaign   issues.     Then  Lyndon  John- 
son  surprised   the  nation   by  withdrawing his  name   from 
nomination for reelection.     Republicans  themselves were 
undecided between  advocating  Increased  military  involvement 
to  achieve  victory   in Vietnam,   or   taking  steps   to  withdraw 
troops  and   find   a  peaceful   solution.     This   issue  was   de- 
bated at  the  Republican  National Convention in  1968, 
where Gerald Ford was select-, d as permanent chairman of 
the  convention.      Ford's   old   friend  Richard Nixon  emerged 
as   the party nominee  for President.     Gerald Ford was one 
of  several   names   mentioned  as  a  possible  Vice-Presidential 
e.     Nixon,   however,   surprised   the   convention  and  the 
nation by   choosing Spiro Agnew as his  running mate.     As 
the campaign  progressed,   both Nixon  and Democratic nomii 
81terHorst,   p.   92. 82Vestal,   pp.   135-138. 
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Hubert  Humphrey  adopted moderate-liberal  stands  on  Vietnam; 
Nixon  promised  to   end   the war,   to  gain   "peace  with  honor." 
Ford  supported  Nixon  completely,   campaigning vigorously  for 
him across  the nation.     After Nixon's victory   in 1968, 
Gerald  Ford   returned   ■o  his   duties   as  House Minority  Lead- 
er,  now working with a Republican President.     The next 
few years   demonstrated  clearly   Fed's   consistently   conser- 
vative  voting  record,   and   steadfast   party   loyalty.      Through 
1971,   Ford voted  87  percent  of   the   time  with  the  prefer- 
ences  of  the  Conservative Coalition group.°3    He staunchly 
supported  the   President,   too,   throughout  the  Nixon  years. 
In  1973,   for   example,   although  Nixon's  popularity was 
waning,   Ford  supported  his  position  on over  80  percent  of 
Congressional   votes.84     Ford  was  occasionally  dismayed, 
however,   by  Nixon's   tendency   to   pull   surprise moves, 
major  policy   changes  made  without  any prior  consultation 
or  announcement   to  Republican  leaders.     This  happened with 
the wage-price   freeze  and  the   liberalized policy   towards 
the  People's   Republic  of  China.85     Nevertheless,   Ford 
defended  the  President   consistently. 
A move by Ford in  1970 presented what  is   perhaps   the 
darkest  blot   on  his   career.     He   demanded   impeachment   pro- 
ceedings   against   the   extreme   liberal   Supreme   Court  Justice 
William  0.   Douglas.     The   rather   flimsy  charges  Ford  made 
83 Ibid.,   p.   131. 
^President Ford;    The Man and His Record,  p.   27. 
85terHori ...  p.   129. 
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against   Douglas were never   substantiated,   and  the entire 
episode  was  seen  as  a  blatantly political  move  by Ford 
trade  as   a  retaliation   to   the  rejection by  Congress  of 
Nixon  Supreme   Court  nominees  Clement  Haynsworth  and 
Harold Carswell.86 
Despite   this   incident,   Ford  remained  in   the  early 
1970s  a well-liked Congressman respected by both Democrats 
and  Republicans.     He was  perceived as  a hard worker:      not 
a   flashy   showman  or  great  political   innovator,   but  a  man 
who would  get   things  done  and  who  did  his  job well  through 
sheer  effort  and  determination.87     By   1973  Gerald Ford had 
reached  the  summit  of  his   career--or   so  he   thought.     Little 
did  he  realize   that,  within   one  year's   span,   the  national 
government  would  be   turned  upside   down,   and  he,   Gerald  R. 
Foul,  would be  on top. 
On   October  10,   1973,   Vice-President  Spiro  Agnew  re- 
signed,   facing  possible  criminal   charges   concerning tax 
( .   ..ion.      Nixon's   choice   to   succeed  Agnew was  Gerald  Ford. 
On  November   1,   Congress  opened  hearings   on  the  qualifica- 
tions of Gerald Ford  for the Vice-Presidency—the  same 
day  that Nixon  appointed special Watergate prosecutor Leon 
orski   in  the midst  of  public   outcry  over  his   firing  of 
libald   Cox.     With Watergate   troubles   in the air,   the 
F.  -d  hearings  paid   far  more   attention   to  Ford's   Presidential 
86terHorst,  p.   125. 87ibid.,  p.   176. 
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qualifications   than  might   have been expected  under more 
normal circumstances.""    After a month of exhaustive 
hearings,   in .'.:       all  aspec.     of Ford's public and private 
life were   investigated,   he was   sworn  in on December  6, 
1973,   as   the   first  Vice-Pres. to  assume  that  office 
under   the   guidelines  of  the  25th Amendment.°9     Tne vote 
in  Congress  had been  overwhelmingly   in   favor  of  Ford, 
387-5   in   the House  of  Representatives   and  92-3  in   the 
Senate.™     His   best   qualification  at   the  time  seemed   to be 
his  impeccable  honesty,   a welcomed   contrast  to   the  image 
of  the  Nixon-Agnew administration. 
Ford  spent  much  of his   time  as   Vice-President   de- 
fending the  President,   and   supporting   the  Republican  party: 
...   he  had  assumed   a  niche   doubtlessly  undreamed 
of  by   the  authors  of  the  Constitution,   and  one   that 
was particularly appropriate to  the Watergate  era  of 
American  government:     that  of  chief  fundraiser  and 
guidon   for   the  Republican party   in   its  year  of  dis- 
tress .91 
Ford was  accused  of  "zig-zagging"   in  his   statements  on   the 
Watergate   scandal.9?    He was  certainly  in a difficult 
88The World Almanai Book_of Facts,   1975 ed. , 
s.v.   "Some Major Events   and  Trend's  of   1974,     p.   35. 
89section 2 of this  Amendment   states: 
Whenever   there   is   a  vacancy  in  the office  of  the 
Vice-President,   the President shall nominate a Vi.ce- 
President who shall   take office  upon confirmation  by 
a majority of both houses of Congress. 
D.   S.   Constitution.   Amendment  XXV,   Section  2. 
9°Pre.-ident   Ford:     The Man and His  Record,   p .   39. 
9iibid.,   p.   19. 92Ibid.,   p.   21. 
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position:     his   personal   friendship   and  clo:      po]    '     :al 
affinity  with  Nixon  and  his   strong   sense  of party   loyalty 
compelled  him  to   defend   the  President,   yet  he  became  in- 
creasingly aware   that Nixon was  being less  than candid 
both with himself and the nation,   and that Nixon was be- 
coming  less  and   less  able   to  effectively  perform President- 
ial duties because  of the Watergate scandal.     Yet Ford 
remained   loyal   to   the  end:      as   late  as  August  A,   1974, 
Ford  stated his   belief   that:  Nixon  was   innocent.93     The 
next   day,   August   5,   Nixon  released   the   fatal  missing  tapes, 
that were   virtually  an   admission  of  guilt  on his  part.      A 
Ford   transition   team of   Donald  Rumsfeld,   John  Marsh,   Rogers 
Morton,   and William Scranton  began  preparing his   staff  and 
office   for  the  Presidency,   knowing  that   the  end   for  Nixon 
was  near.94     Three   days   later,   August  9,   1974,   Richard 
Nixon  resigned.      Gerald   Rudolph  Ford,   by  succession, 
became   the   thirty-eighth   President  of  the  United  States. 
Declaring  in  a  speech  that   "our   long national   nightmare 
is  over,"95  Ford  began  his  new  job   as  President.     Within 
days  his   popularity  soared,   as  people welcomed  the   chai 
of   leadership.      In his   first   few   days  he  held meetings 
with   top   Cabinet   officials,   cabled   reassuring  messages   to 
93terHorst,   p.   182. 
9APresident J£rd^_jniejlan_andJiis_ Record,   p.   4. 
95Text  of   televised  speech  of  9  August   1974,   cited 
in  Ibid. ,   p.   1. 
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Moscow  and  Peking,   appointed nev;  staff memb.-cs,   and  began 
making important decisions  on a variety of  Issues.     One of 
his   first  majo<-   uecis: .>ns--to  grant   a   full pardon   to 
Richard Nixon   for  any Watergate-related   crimes — caused 
Ford's   popularity   to  plummet   almost  as  quickly  as   it  had 
risen.     Another  of his  first major decisions was  to 
initiate  a  clemency  program of  repatriation  for Vietnam 
war  evaders   and  deserters.     The  narrative  stops  here,   for 
it is   these  first few days  of the Ford administration with 
which   this   thesis   is   concerned. 
Certain  aspects  of Gerald  Ford's  background,   career, 
and personality are particularly  relevant  to this  study. 
These   are   the  elements   that  may  provide   the  greatest   in- 
sight   into why  Ford   dealt  with,   and  spoke  of   the  amnesty 
issue   the  way  he   did. 
First,   he  was   raised   in  a  disciplined,   hard-working 
middle-class   environment.      The  Fords were  a   large  family, 
and  the   paint   and  varnish   store   that  Gerald Ford,   Sr.,   ran 
cled  extra  help   from the  sons,   as  well  as  occasional 
outside   jobs   to  supplement   family   income.     Young Gerald 
worked  parttime  throughout  his  high  school  and  college  days. 
The   value   of  work   in   Gerald  Ford's  belief  system is 
indicated  by  his   insistence   that   deserters  and  evaders 
"work"   their  way  back   and  pay   for   their  mistakes,   rather 
than be   given   a  blanket  pardon with  no  string;;   attached. 
Ford's   religious   upbringing was   strong,   but  not   dogmatic. 
r*M£ft*flE2E6-.' 
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Still   a  regular  church-goer,   Ford  referred  to  God   in  his 
first   amnesty   remarks,   saying  that  justice  and mercy 
were  needed.^"     Ford's   upbringing  instilled  in him not 
only   these  Christian values   of hard work,   justice,   and 
mercy,   but   also   fairness   and  honesty.     All  biographies 
of  Ford,   and  most   evaluations  of him written by other 
political   figures   emphasize  his   complete  honesty  and 
candor,   and his   firm  sense  of  commitment.      If  Gerald  Ford 
makes   a promise,   Gerald  Ford will  fulfill   that promise. 
In  his   first  address   as   President,   Ford  said: 
In   all  my public  and private  acts   as  President,   I 
expect   to folio;; my   instincts   of  openness   and  candor 
with  full confidence   that  honesty   is  always  the best 
jolicy   in the   end."' 
J.   F.   terHorsL  characterizes  Ford  as   "decent, 
honest,   candid,   forthright,   trustworthy,   brave,   and  rev- 
erent—a  Boy  Scout   in  the Uhit.<>  House."98     It   is with 
these   qualities   of  openness   and bravery   that Gerald  Ford 
faced  the V.   F.   W.   convention   on  August   19,   1974  to  an- 
nounce   his   clemency plan   for   deserters   and  evaders. 
Gerald   Ford's views and    ctions  on the amnesty 
Issue  are more  difficult   to  explain   in   light  of his   poli- 
tical background and his   record.     The Grand Rapids   region 
96Qerald  R.   Ford,   "Cutting  the  Red Tape   for  Veterans; 
sly,"  VitalSpe^ches_of_the__Day_ 40   (15   September  1974), 
p.   707. 
9"Text   of  televised  speech,   cited  in  President  Ford: 
The Man and His Record,   p.   ?-. 
98 terHorst ,   p.   214. 
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of Michigan from which he hails has been for many years 
strongly Republican, and politically conservative. 
Throughout his public career he has followed the party 
line in most cases, a steady but moderate conservative. 
On economic issues, he has consistently opposed government 
spending.  His record on civil rights has been less than 
satisfactory to minority group leaders, but has followed 
Republican party line."  On foreign policy matters he 
has proved a hawk, advocating a firm, well-budgeted mili- 
tary.  The opposition of the Republican party to amnesty 
probably influenced Ford's decision not to grant any 
blanket amnesties or pardons, but only to allow case-by- 
case earned reentries.  Ford was consulted prior to his 
announcement by persons in the Republican party who favored 
allowing deserters and evaders to return.  Ford has said 
that his decisions were influenced by Melvin Laird, former 
Defense Secretary and a personal friend of Ford's.100 
The Washington Post reports that Laird, Defense Secretary 
James Scalesinger, and Senate Minority Leader Hugh Scott 
Of Pennsylvania had urged Ford to adopt a leniency policy. 
The day after his V. F. U. speech Ford told reporters that 
"five or six people in my cabinet, in my staff, and others 
101 
9?Ibid.,   p.   161. 
1°°"A  Sure  Touch   in  Ford's   Second Week,"  Time 
(A September  1974),  p.   12. 
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said  to me last week at   some point,   'We have   to do some- 
thing about   this.'"102 
Gerald   Ford has   always  maintained  a  sense   of 
responsibility   to  his   constituents.      One  of  the   few  times 
Ford  voted  against  a  Nixon bill   concerned  a  proposed mass 
transportation  package.      Ford's  Michigan  Fifth  District  has 
many  employees   of   large   automobile plants.     Since   a mass 
transporation  bill   stood   to  damage  the   interests   of many 
of his   voters,   Ford  opposed   the bill.      Ford's   voting 
record  in   Congress   shows   a  conscientious,   sincere   effort 
to  reflect   the   views  of   the  people   in  his   district.     J.   F. 
terHorst  offers   the  explanation  that   Ford's  clemency 
proposal  was  an  effort   to  reflect   a national   constituency: 
Ford's  willingness   to  propose   limited  amnesty   to   those 
who  resisted   service   during  the  Vietnam war  and his 
selection  of  Kelson  A.   Rockefeller  as  his   Vice 
Presidential  nominee   again  pleased   liberals  while 
outraging   the   conservatives   in   the   Republican  Party. 
Bv   h of   these  Presidential  decisions   indicate   Ford's 
awareness  of a national constituency that   is  less 
doctrinaire  and homogeneous   than  his  old  Fifth  District 
of  Michigan.      "His   constituency has   grown,   so  he  has 
grown,"  one  White  House  adviser has   remarked.      "His 
views   are  not   embalmed  in   formaldehyde."iUJ 
Gerald  Ford  has   said  that  his  heroes   arc  Dwight  Eisenhower, 
Harry  Truman,   and  Abraham Lincoln. 104 It is interesting 
to note that both Lincoln and Truman granted controversial 
but limited amnesties and pardons, and that Ford invoked 
102ibid., 10 August 1974, p. 8.    103terHorst, p. 216 
iO^lbid., p. 219. 
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their names in justifying his own measures.105 
Finally, the Ford family and home life have been 
a strong influence on Gerald For;1.  Gerald and Betty have 
four children:  Mike, born in 1950; Jack, born in 1952; 
Stove, born in 1956; and daughter Susan, born in 1957. 
They describe their family as "extremely close," 
and enjoy spending tine together.  Although his two 
older sons were of draft-eligible age during the Vietnam 
war, neither of them have served in the military.  Never- 
theless, Ford said that his thinking on amnesty was shaped 
partially by the views of his children. u' 
Based on the influences from his economic background, 
his religious and moral beliefs, his political philosophy, 
his personality traits, his close staff and advisers, and 
even his family, Gerald Ford made his decision to grant a 
limited, case-by-case amnesty to the deserters and evaders. 
Jing    i.er 
James Earl Carter, Jr., was born on October 1, 1924, 
in Plains, Georgia, in the rural southwestern part of the 
State where the Carter family has lived for over 200 years. 
He spent his childhood during the depression years on the 
^"Cutting the Red Tape for Veterans," p. 707. 
J-OSterHorst, p. 214. 
107"A Sure Touch in Ford's Second Week," p. 12. 
^ 
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family  farm which,   along with  l~iis   father'.'.- meager   trade 
business with   local   farmers,   provided   the  family's 
minimal   income.      The   Carters  were   poor--a  fact which 
candidate   Carter would  refer   to  more   than  once  during  the 
1976  campaign. Jimmy  Carter  acquired  an  early   interest 
in  politics   from his   father,   who  served  on  the  local 
county   school  board,   and was   elected  to  the Georgia  legis- 
lature  one  year before  his   death  in  1953.     Carter  has 
described  his   father  as   "conservative";   they  argued   fre- 
quently  over   racial   issues   during his   father's   last 
years.109     ms  mother was--and   still   is--a   strong   influence, 
too,   on  Jimmy   Carter.     A registered nurse,   she   instilled 
in  him humanitarian   ideals   and  many  of his  more  "progres- 
sive"  philosophies.110     He   attended  local  public   school, 
which  carried  him  through  the   eleventh  grade.     He   had 
already begun   seeking appointment   to  the   U.   S.   Naval 
Academy,   where  he  had  long wanted  to  study.     After  a  year 
at   Georgia Institute of Technology  In  1942-1943 where he 
Look preparatory   courses   for  Naval   school,111   he  received 
108see Jimmy  Carter,   Jimmy Carter in His Own Words, 
ed.  by Robert W.   Turner   (NewTork:     Eallantine  Books,   1976), 
pp.   14,   20. 
109"Jimmy   Carter:     A  Look  at  the Man  and What  He 
Stands  For,"   United States News and World Report,   19 July 
1976,   p.   19. 
l]r)lL  S.  News,  p.   19. 
Ulwho'a    ;: Politics,   5th ed.    (New "ork: 
R. R. . ,        )), p. rsoT 
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his appointment to Annapolis.  He graduated from the U. S. 
Naval Academy with a B. S. in 1946, finishing fifty-eighth 
in a class of 820.112  At. the Academy Carter studied 
astronomy, engineering, gunnery, and navigation, as well 
as Spanish and after-dinner speaking.  After graduation-- 
and after a trip home to marry Rosalynn Smith, his sweet- 
heart of several years--he worked for two years on as- 
signment on experimental radar/gunnery ships operating out 
of Norfolk, Virginia.  Son Jack Carter was born in 1947, 
while the Carters were living in Norfolk.  In 1943 Carter 
was selected for a special submarine research program 
under Admiral Hyman Rickover, and the Carters moved to 
New London, Connecticut, where Jimmy attended submarine 
school.  His first submarine assignment took them to 
Hawaii, where Chip Carter was born in 1950. A new assign- 
ment to an experimental nuclear submarine took the Carters 
back to Connecticut where a third son, Jeffrey, was born 
in 1951.  A final transfer moved the Carters to Schenectady, 
New York; he served here until 1953 when, after his father 
died, and against his wife's objections, he resigned his 
lieutenant'8 commission and returned to Georgia to take 
over the- family peanut and warehouse business.11'  (Over 
the years, this family business-co-run by Jimmy Carter 
L12jimmy Carter, Why Not tin- Best?  (New York 
Bantam Books, 1975), p. oT. 
H3u. S. News, p. 19. 
H ith his mother and his brother Billy--grew successful; 
their operation Is now valued in excess of one million 
dollars .*■*■ ')  Along with an increasingly successful 
business career, Carter developed an increasing interest 
in public affairs.  During the 1950s, he served on the 
local county school board; was president of the Georgia 
Planning Association; and served on county Library Board 
and Hospital Authority.^L5 
In 1962, in an election fraught with court challenges 
and accusations of fraud on both sides, Carter won the 
Democratic nomination for the local seat in the Georgia 
Senate. 1°  He won the subsequent election over his Repub- 
lican opponent.  That Carter ran as a Democrat is no sur- 
prise; in this rural region of the Deep South, few success- 
ful politicians have been anything but Democrats.  Also, 
his family reveals a strong Democrat influence.  Jimmy 
Carter has said, "I've always been a Democrat ever since 
I was eight years old.'  ' 
Carter made a campaign promise to read every bill 
that came before the legislature.  Although this was a 
ll'Ubid. l
15Why Not the Best?, pp. 87-33. 
H6Accusations again.st Carter were later dropped, 
and the local political leader whom Carter had accused of 
fraud, was later convicted in federal courts for fraud and 
for running an illegal liquor distribution business.  See 
Why Not the Best?, pp. 89-9 7. 
H7jinmy Carter in His Own Words, p. 26. 
aai*W-!*»ryM 
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Laborious   task,   since  more   than  2,500  bills  were   intro- 
duced  annually,   Carter  claims  he   faithfully  read   then 
1 "1 o 
all during his four years as Senator.  ° While in the 
Georgia Congres  he served on the appropriations com- 
mittee, where he developed an interest in budget and 
financial problems and in eliminating waste and stream- 
lining bureaucracy in state government.  He also 
res- rched and took interest in the areas of education, 
conservation, and mental health reform, and attempted 
to introduce legislation to establish uniform salaries 
for state officials.11^ 
The year 1966 was an important one for the Carters. 
A fourth child, daughter Amy, was born, and Jimmy Carter 
decided to seek the nomination for governor of Georgia. 
He campaigned vigorously, finishing third in a three- 
person race for the Democratic nomination, won by 
Lester Maddox.120 Then, no longer serving in the legis- 
lature and no longer needed at home to help with the 
family business, Carter spent the next four years cam- 
paigning for the 1970 governorship race.  With an efficient, 
well-planned staff effort that analyzed and systematically 
campaigned in every county in Georgia,121 Jimmy Carter 
118why Not the Best?, p. 98.    lWlbld.. pp. 99-102, 
120can    es '76 (Washington: Congressional Quart- 
erly, 1976T7"p. W". 
i^lwhy Not the Best?, p. 114. 
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won the nomination and then the general election for 
governor in 19 70. 
Political opponents of Carter have charged that he- 
ran a campaign in 1970 that, if it had not been overtly 
racist, had at least attempted to court the coiservativc, 
white segregationist vote.1-22  While Carter claims that 
the racist image was part of a smear campaign against 
him and was unsubstantiated,123 he did apparently make 
remarks that could be interpreted as being sympathetic 
towards white segregationist leaders and their philo- 
sophies.12^  His opponent, former Governor Sanders, ro- 
ceived 95 percent of the black vote in the election. 
Whatever his tactics may have been, Carter did win 
the election, and in his inaugural address in January, 
1971, spoke strongly against segregation and racial 
discrimination: 
122U. S. News, p. 20. 
123-piayboy Interview:  Jimmy Carter," Playboy, 
November, 1976, pp. 64, 66. 
12'fIn a speech at a fundraising dinner for the 
1970 catopaign of Lester Maddox for lieutenant governor, 
Carter said: 
Lester Maddox represents the essence of the Demo- 
cratic party.  He has compassion for the ordinary man 
I am proud to be on the ticket with him. 
Despite reports you have heard, there had never 
been any difference between us in the primary. 
Cited in Jimmy Carter In His Own Words, pp. 41-42. 
^Candidates '76, P- 29. 
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I  believe   I   know our  people   as  well  as   anyone. 
Based  on  this  knowledge  of Georgians,   north  and  south, 
urban  and  rural,   liberal  and  conservative,   I   say   to 
you  quite   frankly  that   the  time   for  racial  discrimi- 
nation   is  over.     Our  people  have  already made   this 
major  and  difficult   decision,   but we  cannot  under- 
estimate  the challenge  of hundreds  of minor decisions. 
.    .    .   No  poo-,   rural,   weak,   or black person  should 
ever  have   to bear  the  additional  burden of being  de- 
prived  of  the  opportunity  of  an  education,   a  job,   or 
simple  justice.    ...   As   governor,   I will  never  shirk 
this   responsibility.126 
Jimmy Carter's record as  governor shows some posi- 
tive  and  respected  achievements,   and  some   claims   of 
accomplishments   that  have been  disputed  and  challenged by 
Carter's   political  opponents.     He  appointed numerous 
blacks   to  state  boards  and   commissions  and,   in what 
Carter calls   "both a substantive and a symbolic gesture,' 
hung a  picture  of  Martin  Luther King,   Jr.,   in  a  gallery  of 
famous   Georgians   in   the   State   capitol.     A  1976  summary  of 
Carter's   four  years   as  Governor  states   that 
Carter   is   generally  given  high  marks   in   the   fields  of 
the environment,   upgrading State bond ratings  and 
improving mental-treatment   facilities,   prisons  and 
the  educational   system--and he   is  rated   impeccably 
honest.^28 
ther  evaluation of  his  record  as   governor  concluded: 
"As  a  governor,   Carter was   certainly   in  the   tradition  of 
19 0 
Southern progressives. 
126ji,r!my^r^rter_in Kis Own Words,   p.   104. 
127Why Not the Best?,  p.  123. 
128U.   s.  News,  pp.   20,   22.   . 
129Arthu    T.  Hadley,  The Invisible Primary  (Engle- 
wood Cliffs,   N.   J.:     Prentice-Hall,   Inc.,   19/(0,   p.   *"■ 
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Carter  has  cited  as   one  of  his   greatest   accomplish- 
ments   the  streamlining  of  State  bureaucracy,   reducing  the 
number  of  State   agencies   from  300   to   22.     According  to 
Carter,   this move  eliminate  1  much  duplication  and  saved 
considerable  sums  of  taxpayers'   money.^0     Yet   Ernest 
Davis,   the  State  Auditor  during  the  Carter  years,   claims 
that  his  own  records   show no  financial   savings  by  the 
Carter administration."1    xhe number of State  employees 
rose   24   percent   from 1970-1974,   and  the  budget   rose  nearly 
60 percent.   **      if   the claimed  savings   are  explained not 
as money   actually  saved  and  unused  but   rather  as  money 
redirected into  more efficient and more beneficial  chan- 
nels,   then Jimmy Carter's  assertions may be justifiable. 
Even while  presenting  reform bills  and new legis- 
lation  to the Georgia  Congress,   Jimmy  Carter began  to look 
to  the  national   political  scene.     He  nominated  Senator 
Henry  "Scoop"  Jackson  for   the  Presidency   at   the   Democratic 
National   Convention  in  1972.133    He chaired  the Campaign 
'74  Committee   for   the  National  Democratic  Party,   and  on 
December   12,   1974,   nearly  two  years  before   the  next 
Presidential   election,   Jimmy  Carter  announced his  candidacy 
13t>Why Not the Best?,  pp.   128-132. 
131U.   S.   News,   p.   20. 
132ibid. 
133Jiriffiiy  Carter in His Cnm Words ,   p.   54. 
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he  Presidency of the  United States. 134 His   campaign 
vigorous,   thorough,   systematic,   and well-organized. 
Jimny,  wife. Rosalynn,  his   sons,   and eventually even his 
mother,   "Hiss   Lillian,"  all   traveled  extensively,   giving 
speeches,   making  public  appearances,   seeking media   expo- 
sure.     Carter   progressed  from being one  of  the  lesser  known 
of  a   field  of  more   than   ten  Democratic  candidates   to be- 
Lng the  frontrunner by   late spring,   1976;   and  in July, 
1976,   Jimmy  Carter was  nominated  on  the   first ballot  at 
the   Democratic   National  Convention. 
Jimmy  Carter  retains   long-held,   deep-seated 
religious   belief?.     Raised  a  Southern  Baptist,   Carter has 
described  himself   as   a  "born-again"  Christian.     He was 
called  upon  more   than  once   during  the   1976  Presidential 
campaign   to explain his beliefs,   to allay  fears held by 
some   that   his   religion would   interfere with his  ability 
to  effectively   and  rationally   lead   the  country.      In 
an  interview of  March   16,   1976,   Carter  discussed  his   faith: 
I  was  quoted  as   saying  I was   "twice-born,"  but  the 
expression   I  use is   "born-again."    We believe  that   the 
first   time  we're  born  as   children,   it's  human   life 
given   to us;   and when  we  accept   Jesus   as   our   saviour 
it's   a new   life.     That's what   "born  again" means.      I 
was  baptized when   I was   eleven years   old.     I never did 
e  a personal  feeling of intimacy with Christ  until, 
I'd  say,   ten,   twelve  years   ago,   and  then   I  began   to 
see  and   it   changed  my  altitudes   dramatically. 
Question:     How might   your  religious  beliefs   guide 
your political  career? 
13AYh e  In visib1e Pr imary,   p.   4. 
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It   has   no  particular   significance.     It's   something 
that's with me   every day.*" 
One  other  passage--from the  notorious   Playboy 
interview  of  November,   1976--illustrates  both  public 
misgivings   about   Carter's  faith  and  his   interpretation  of 
that   faith: 
Playboy:     We'd   like   to  ask  you a  blunt  question: 
Isn't   it   just   these  views   about  what's  "sinful"   and 
what's   "immoral"   that  contribute   to  the   feeling  that 
you  might   get   a  call   from God,   or  get  inspired  and 
push   the wrong  button?     More   realistically,   wouldn't 
we   expect   a puritanical   tone   to  be  set  in   the  Uhi'. e 
House   if  you were   elected? 
Carter:     Harry  Truman was   a Baptist.     Some people 
get  very  abusive  about   the  Baptist   faith.      If  people 
want   to  know  about   it,   they  can  read  the  New  Testament. 
The  main   thing   is   that we   don't   think we're better   than 
anyone  else.     We  are   taught  not   to judge  other  people. 
But  as   to   some   of   the  behavior  you've mentioned   (extra- 
marital   six,   sodomy,   homosexuality,   drug  usage,   alcohol 
consumption),   I   can't   change   Che   teachings   of  Christ. 
I   can't   change   the   teachings   of  Christ!      1  believe   in 
them,   and  a  lot  of  people   in   this   country  do  as  well. 
...      I   think  we've   pursued   this   conversation  long 
enough--if  you  have  another  question   .   .    .   Look,   I   11 
try   to  express  my   views.      It   s  not  a  matter  of  con- 
demnation,   it's   not  a  matter  of  persecution.      I   ve 
been  a  governor   for  four  years.     Anybody  can  come  and 
look  at  my   record.      I   didn't   run  around  breaking down 
people's   doors   to   see   if  they were  fornicating.     This 
is   something  that's   ridiculous Aib 
A  review  of   the  biographical   information  on  Jimmy 
Carter   is  now  in  order   to   discern   the   major  influences   that 
might  have   affected  his  dealings  with   the  amnesty   issue. 
First,   Carter  grew  up   in  a   rural   area   in   the   South,   in  a 
poor family,   with many black as well  as whi • e   friends, 
135jimmy Carter in His Own Words,  p.   79. 
136p!ayboy,  pp.   69-70. 
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most of whom were also poor.  He referred to these men in 
his amnesty remarks to the American Legion on August 24, 
1976.^7  Carter believe: that for many young men who 
fought in Vietnam, the alternatives of running to Canada 
or Sweden simply did not exist.  The alternative of going 
loo 
to  college   to  avoid  the  draft was  not   possible.XJO     So 
these men went   to  Vietnam,   even  though  many of  them did  not 
believe   in  the war.139     After  calling   these men   the nation's 
"greatest   unsung heroes,"'^10  Carter went  on,   in  both  the 
American Legion   remarks   and   in   the  Playboy  interview,   to 
deny  any  comparison between   the   "heroic"  acts   of  those who 
served and  the  actions  of   those  who   fled  or  illegally  avoid- 
ed  the war.143 
One  of  those  young men who went   to  Vietnam was 
Carter's  son Jack.     He speaks  in the American Legion ad- 
dress  of his   son's  negative   feelings   towards   the war,   and 
of   the negative   experiences   Jack  went   through both  during 
and  after   the war,   when  he  returned  to   the  United  States. 
Carter  emphasizes   the  point   that  soldiers   returning  from 
previous  ware,  were   treated with  honor  and  respect;   soldiers 
uming   from Vietnam were  treated with  scorn  and  even 
contempt. 142 
137See Appendix,   "Remarks by Jimmy Carter  to the 
cican Legion," 24 August   197 6,   p.   4. 
138ibid. 139Ibid. 
140Ibid. 
14lTbid.,   and  Plajrbqy_,   PP-   73-74. 
^"Remarks by Jimmy Carter to the American Legion," 
P.   1. 
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Jimmy Carter's  amnesty beliefs grow out of his 
perception  of   the  Vietnam  conflict.     To his  view,   it  was 
a bad war   that  caused  much   strife  and bitterness   in   the 
United  States.     All  young men   facing  the   draft had  to 
respond  to   the   situation  as  best   they  could.     Some  chose 
to  go  ahead  and  fight,   which  Carter  believes was   the  most 
honorable  option;   others   chose  to  avoid   fighting,   legally 
or   illegally.     The   almost  hopeless  dilemma   in which  these 
men were   caught  justifies   forgiveness   of  their  actions, 
if  those   actions   violated   the   lav;. 
Politically,   Carter's  background  has  been   that   of 
a Denocral--a  Southern  Democrat.     The  Democratic  Party   is 
Often  associated with   liberal  policies,   and big  government 
Spending   programs.      Southern Democrats,   however,   are 
characterized as more  conservative,   especially on  social 
race-related  issues,   and  on  defense  and   foreign  policy 
matter:,.      Carter   tends   to   fall   in   the  middle;   he   once 
described himself as  "'fairly liberal'   on  civil rights, 
pnri.-.l   justice,   and   the  environment,   and   'quite  consorva- 
tive'   on  balanced budgets   and  long-range  planning. 
These  labels   are   tentative  at   best;   Carter  himself has 
given  contradictory  descriptions  of his   political   philoso- 
phies.1^     But   his  Democratic  Party  affiliation  has 
1A3jimny   Carter   in His  Own Wo_rds,   pp.   31-32. 
l**In the 19 70 governor's race in Georgia, Carter 
described himself as "the only true conservative in the 
rate.     Ibid.,   p.   32. 
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certainly influenced his political outlook; and on the is- 
sue of amnesty or pardons, the Democratic party has been 
liberal.  The 1972 Democratic party platform advocated 
allowing those who left the country to avoid the draft to 
return without punishment. 1*5  "j"ne 197& Democratic party 
platform was consistent with Carter's own views that 
evaders should be granted blanket pardons, and deserters 
should be considered on a case-by-case basis.11" 
Another major influence on Carter's amnesty beliefs 
is his own military experience.  In his eleven year Naval 
career Carter never saw actual combat; yet his experiences 
gave him a perception of deserters, and the effects that 
a desertion can have on others who do not desert.  He views 
participation in the military as a commitment that brings 
men into a sort of mutual dependency.  Because de- 
sertion destroys that mutual dependency, Carter has ad- 
vocated granting pardons for deserters only on a case-by- 
case basis . -1 '' 
Jimmy Carter's religious beliefs have also shaped 
his amnesty views.  In a news conference of July 27, 1976, 
Carter discussed civil disobedience and Christianity, 
concepts that would bear directly on his feelings about 
ity: 
145The Gallup Opinion Index, July 1972, p. 17. 
146congres8ional Qu   rly Weekly Report, 19 June 
1976, p. 153: 
^playboy, p. 73. 
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The  Bible   teaches   that   in   that  case   (when  a person 
declares   he  cannot  obey  a   law because   of his   religious 
beliefs)   that   the  citizen has  to suffer the consequences 
of the  law. 
We  are   supposed  to have  a  responsibility  as  citizens 
to make  sure   that  the  law,   the  government,   the  public 
authorities   do  provide   for  honesty,   for  concern,   for 
equality of opportunity,   for  love. 
So  we  have  a   responsibility  to   try   to  shape  the 
government   so  that  it does  exemplify the teachings  of 
God;   to obey  the   government  anu--if at  times   the 
government,   because  of  an   inadequate  influence  of  our- 
selves,   violates,    in  our  opinion,   the   rule  of   God- 
that  we're?   supposed  to  accept   the   punishment  administer- 
ed to us  by the   state.l^o 
Jinny  Carter  believes   that   those  who willfully   break  civil 
law  should be   prepared  to  accept   the  punishment.     Yet   if 
the  government   is  being  less   than   fully  just,   and   can  be 
corrected,   then   it   should be   altered.      This  belief   is 
consistent  with  Carter's   expressed  feelings  and  intentions 
concerning  amnesty  and  pardon. 
Carter  has  emphasized  that  his   faith  professes   to 
be nonjudgmental,   that   is,   not   to  assume  that   a  "saved" 
or  right   individual   is   any better   than  another who   is  not 
"saved"  or   is   morally   or  ethically  "wrong."    This   attitude 
is  reflected   in  his   distinction of  amnesty   from pardon. 
Amnesty,   to  Carter,   implies   a moral  judgment;   pardon, 
which  he   advocates,   makes  no  judgment,   but   merely   removes 
the offense.1^9 
p. 4. 
148Jlmmy C<       ! i Own Words, p. 82. 
^"Remarks by Jimmy Carter to the American Legion," 
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These,   then,   are   the   chief  influences   on  Jimny 
Carter's  decisions  concerning the amnesty issue--his 
regional  and  economic  background,   his  political  affiliation, 
his ov/n military   experience,   his   son's military experience, 
and his   strong religious beliefs.     From these,   Jimmy 
Carter  evolved  an  attitude   towards   this   issue   that  re- 
mained  consistent   throughout   the   1976  Presidential 
campaign. 
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CHAPTER III 
RHETORICAL CRITICISM 
Introduction 
On August 19, 1974, Gerald Ford delivered his major 
address on the amnesty issue to a national convention of 
the Veterans of Foreign Wars.  In this address he announced 
his clemency program, which was initiated in September, 
1974.  Amnesty became an issue of primary importance again 
during the 1976 Presidential campaign.  The Democratic 
party platform advocated a broader program than that 
Ford had provided.  Then on August 24, 1976, Democratic 
Presidential nominee Jimmy Carter delivered his major 
amnesty address to a national convention of the American 
Legion.  Although the pardon plan he advocated in this 
speech was a restatement from a previously issued policy 
paper, this address attracted much publicity.  A rebuttal 
to Carter's comments was offered the following day at the. 
same convention by Gerald Ford's Vice-Presidential nominee, 
lator Robert Dole.  Ford himself remained silent on the 
matter.  Carter discussed amnesty again in the Playboy 
interview of November, 1976.  Then both candidates ad- 
d the amnesty issue in the first of three televised 
debates, in September, 1976. 
80 
A  cursory  examination  of  the   two major  amnesty 
addresser;--Ford's speech  to the V.   F.   W.   announcing his 
leniency  program,   and Carter's   speech  to  the American 
on  advocati   g blanket  pardons   for  draft  evaders- 
suggests   some   striking   similarities   in   the  setting,   the 
content   and   format  of  the   speeches,   and   in   the  effects 
these speeches had on  the   images  of the speakers.     The 
bulk of   this   chapter  is   devoted   to  examining  these   two 
speeches   separately,   then   comparing and  contrasting   them. 
Other   remarks  made by Ford  and  Carter  prior   to  and 
subsequent  to   these addresses will  also be  examined, 
particularly   the   Presidential   debate  remarks.     This 
chapter   includes   discussion  of   the   li:. :   of  argument  employ- 
ed by  the   speakers,   their  word  choice,   and   the  effects  of 
their  remarks   especially   as   those  remarks  were  channeled 
through   various  mass media   to  a  nationwide   audience. 
A Note  on  Textual  Accuracy   of   the  Speeches 
Fortunately,   good  transcriptions   of   the  Ford-Carter 
amnesty  remarks   are  available.     Ford's   address   to  the 
V.   F.   W.   is  reprinted  in   its  entirely  in   Vital  Speeches 
of 'y,1   and   the  portion  of  that  address   specifically 
concerned with  amnesty  is   reprinted   in   the   New York  Times 
of  August   20,    1974.2     Only  one   sentence   differs  between 
^Gerald  R     Ford,   "Cutting   the  Red  Tape   for  Veterans; 
esty,"   Vitf ;   S]       shes   vr  ; ••.'•__Day 40   (15  September   1974 Amn 
708! 
) 
•':..;  York  Times,   20   August   1974,   p.   18. 
the   two  texts.      In   the Vital  Speeches  version,   the  sen- 
o  reads,   "As   1   reject ty,   so   I  reject   revenge:." 
In  the  New York  Tint:?;   version,   the  sentence  reads,   "I 
reject amnesty,   and I   reject revenge."    This  slight 
difference  is attributable  to on-the-spot changes   in   the 
made  by   the   speaker.      Otherwise,   the  two  scripts   are 
exactly alike.     The disputed sentence  is cited  in both 
the Christ:'an Science Mon'tor-   and  the Washington Postr* 
as,   "I reject amnesty,   and   I reject  revenge."    This ver- 
sion  of  this   sentence will   be  used.      Further  verifica- 
tion  of   textual   accuracy  is provided  by  excerpts  of  the 
amnesty-related  remarks   reprinted   in   the Washington  Post-* 
the Greensboro Daily News.6 
There   is  some evidence  that  Ford departed from his 
•ed text,   or   that  the whole passage on amnesty : 
have been   an   insertion.     / i  article  in  Time  states   that 
"...   Ford   departed  from his  bland prepared  text  and 
declared  that   'unconditional, blanket  amnesty for anyone 
who  illegally  evaded  or  fled military  service   is  wrong."7 
3christianScic-r.ce Monitor,   21 August  1974,   p.   E. 
^Washington Post,   21 August   1974,   p.   5. 
5lbid.,   20 August   1974,  pp.   1,   8. 
^Greensboro Daily Hew; ,   20 August  1975,   p.    L. 
7"A Sure  Touch  in Ford's Second Week," Tine,   2 
-,   1974,   p.   11. 
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An advanced text of the speech distributed to newspersons 
did not contain the amnesty statement."  The Greensboro 
Daily News reported that "Ford apparently drafted his re- 
marks oil amnesty en route to Chicago, inserting them 
D his prepared text."-'  Even if Ford did depart from 
his prepared text, however, the copies of what he did 
say arc accurate, and the public speaker is certainly to 
be held as accountable for unprepared remarks as he is 
for prepared remarks. 
The only complete copy of Carter's American Legion 
address was provided by local Democratic headquarters. 
This is one of a series of speeches and policy statements 
reprinted as part of the Carter campaign.  Parts of the 
same speech—especially the amnesty remarks--are quoted 
extensively in the Hew York Times.10 There are no dis- 
pancies between passages quoted in both sources, and 
there is, no substantial evidence to cast doubt upon the 
authenticity of the transcript provided by the Democratic 
headquarters. 
How much of these speeches Ford and Carter author- 
ed themselves and how much was created by "ghost writers" 
not known.  In discussing the part of his address on 
^Washington Post, 20 August 1974, p. 1. 
^Greensboro Dally Hews, 20 August 1974, p. 1. 
lONew York Times, 25 August 1976, p. 22. 
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amnesty   that  was   added  later  to   the   rest  of   the   speech, 
Gerald  Ford  said,   "We  carefully  chose  our words."11 
(emphasis  mine)      If  he  indeed wrote   this   section  on   the 
plane   to   Chicago,   then  someone--an  adviser  or  a   speech- 
writer--was   there  with him.     The  wording of   this   section 
resembles   that  of  the  rest  of  the  speech  closely   enough 
to  assume   at   least   some  common   authorship.     However,   even 
if Ford  and  Carter  relied heavily  upon  ghost-writers,   as 
political   figures   they  must  be  held  accountable   for   their 
public utterances.     When  they deliver an  address, without 
citing anyone   else  as   the  author  of  that   address,   then   it 
can be  assumed   tha;  at   least   the   ideas,   if not  the words 
used   to  express   those   ideas,   are   theirs. 
Transcripts   of  remarks   from  the  Presidential  debates 
were prepared by  the  author,   from audio copies of those 
debates.      Excerpts   of  comments  by  Robert   Dole,   represent- 
ing  the  Republican   team,   arc  printed   in  the   New York 
Times."     Further   discussion of  amnesty by Jimmy   Carter 
is  printed  verbatim  in  Playboy.1^     Ail  of   these  copies  of 
statements   are   assumed  to  be  accurate. 
1 Washington Post,   20 August  1974,   p.   8. 
12Hew York Times,   26 August   197 6,   p.   22. 
^"Playboy  Interview:     Jimmy Carter,"  Playboy, 
November   1976,   pp.    73-74. 
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Ford's   Remarks   to   the  V.   F.   W. 
August 19. "1975 
Bad: ;  and Setting 
The   occasion was   the   7!ith  annual  convention of   the 
erans  of  Foreign Wars.      The audience   consisted  almost 
exclusively  of war  veterans  and  their wives.     Certain 
beliefs   are  recurrent   among many  members   of  the   V.   F.   W. 
First:   is  a   strong  sense  of  military  patriotism.      Members 
of  the  V.   F.   W.   have  as  their  common bond  their  experience 
in  one  or  another  of America's  military   conflicts.     Persons 
who  fight   in wars,   who  see  death  and  injury  and  combat 
first-hand,   understandably  seek  reinforcement  of   the  notion 
that  their  efforts  were  important,   that   their  cause was 
right, and that   their  nation   is  worth   fighting  and  dying  for. 
Conventions   of  veterans  serve   to  provide   this   reinforcement. 
The  patriotism  of   V.   F.   W.   members   is   associated  with  a 
belief  in  the  military   strength of   the  United States.     This 
leads   to   a   second   common  belief,   which  is  that   the   United 
States   should  remain   the  strongest   nation  on earth   in 
Llitary  capacity.      Special   attention   is   devoted   to  the 
Soviet  Union,   who   from  1945   until   almost   the  present has 
been  considered   the  chief  rival   and  enemy  of  the  United 
States.     V.   F.   W.   members   tend toward a hawkish approach 
to  foreign  relations,   coupled with   a  strong  sense  of 
patriotism  and belief  in  American  principles.     The  members 
of this organization have  a dim view of Vietnam deserters 
and  evaders.      One  year  prior   to  Ford's   address,   the  V.   F.   W. 
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had  ad   itcd   a   resolution  endorsing President  Nixon's 
strong stand   against  amnesty.   ^ 
Gerald  Ford     occupied  a   unique  position  in  the 
political  arena     as   he  addressed  the  veterans  on  August 
19,   1974.     Less   than  one  year hefore,   he  had been minority 
leader of  the  House  of Representatives,   a  respected  Re- 
publican,   secure  in  his   position.     When  Spiro  Agnew  resign- 
ed under  pressure,   President  Nixon  appointed  Ford  to   the 
Vice-Presidency.     Then  on  August   9,   1974,   Richard Nixon 
resigned   under  pressure,   and  Gerald Ford was  elevated   to 
the  Presidency,   having never  been  a  candidate   in  an   elec- 
tion   for  either  of  the  two highest   offices   in  the  country. 
Ford1.:"   political   viev;s  were  generally known,   an:! 
consistent.      A  conservative  Republican,   he  held  common 
beliefs with   the  V.   F.   U.   members   about   the  need   for 
strong  defense   and  a   tough  foreign  policy.     Ford's  pre- 
vious   statements on amnesty had attracted little  atten- 
tion,   as   they   tended   to   follow  the  Nixon  policy   com- 
pletely.     For   example,   in  a press   conference  on  December   6, 
1973,   the  day   Ford war;  sworn   in   as   Vice-President,   he   said: 
".   .    .   you don't   downgrade   the   2,500,000  who  served  in 
Vietnam by changing the  status  of  those who  decided to 
leave   the  country  and  violate   the   law."15     This  statement 
14:icw  York Times,   20  August   19/4,   p.   18. 
l5Gerald Ford, press conference of 6 December 1973, 
cI'ed in President Ford: The Han and HisRecord (Washing- 
ton,  D.  c".":  Congressional quarterly,   19/■'<),  p.  55. 
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is similar to comments made by Nixon on the possiblity of 
amnesty. 
Certainly   a  part   of  the   stature   and  ethos  of   the 
President  stems   from his  having  received  the  endorsement 
of a plurality  or  majority  of  voters   In  an  election. 
Gerald  Ford,   still  unproven  and  untested,   needed  to 
establish his   credibility  as  Chief Executive.     The   like- 
lihood was   great   that   this   speech,   one   of  Ford's   first 
as  President,   would  attract  national  press   coverage  and 
attention.     The   importance  of  Ford's   remarks  and   ti 
reception  given  Ford by   the  V.   F.  W.   convention would  go 
far beyond   the   immediate  audience and  occasion. 
Ford  mode   a  triumphant  entry   into  Chicago,   riding 
in  a  .motorcade   from O'Hare  Airport  to   Downtown,   past 
thousands  of  cheering people/6     His   initial  reception  by 
the  V.   F.   W.   audience was   vociferous,   and  quite  positive. 
Hpr. wan   a   Republican  President,   an  honest,   likeable  man, 
who agreed with  their views  on many  issues.     Little  in 
his  previous   statements   could  have prepared   the  veterans 
for  the   comments   in   the   speech   that   followed. 
The Speech 
Ford began his address with statements to increase 
his identification with the audience.  He spoke of the 
16Washlngton Post, 20 August 19 74, p. 3. 
17Ibid. 
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site of the convention,   Chicago,   complimented Mayor Daley, 
and mentioned  that   wife  Betty  had  been  born   in  Chicago. 
He then spoke  of his own membership  in the V.   F.  W.,   the 
American   Legion,   and AMVF.TS.     Ford  announced  that  in his 
speech he  would  talk  about   the  "work   facing  veterans— 
and  all  Americans--the   issuer,  of world peace   and  national 
unity."     The   first   section   of his   speech  dealt     with  pos- 
itive moves   for veterans--including the appointment of a 
new and  apparently  popular  man,   Dick  Roudebush,   as 
administrator of  the Veterans Administration18—and 
included statements   stressing Ford's concern  for the 
plight  of  the  veterans.     After  stating  that   veterans   should 
be   treated   as   individuals   rather  than  as   "numbers   in  a 
computer"   (always   a  good  appeal   to   an American  audience), 
that  the  V.   A.   should have   the best  of   technological 
facilities,   that V.   A.   hospitals will provide higher 
quality  service,   and  that   overall  V.   A.   management  will 
be   improved  and  streamlined,   the  President  expressed  the 
belief  that   veterans  of   different  wars  should not  receive 
different   treatment.     The  mention  of Vietnam provided  a 
transition   into   the  heart  of Ford's   speech,   a  discussion 
of  the   controversial   amnesty  issue. 
Ford began his remarks on  this  subject by  reiterat- 
ing his  previous   strong  opposition   to  blanket   unconditional 
18"A  Sure  Touch  in  Ford's   Second Week,"  p.   11 
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amnesty:  "It is wrong."  The audience responded to this 
statement with strong applause.*9  When the ovation faded, 
he continued:  "Yet, in my first words as President of all 
the people, I acknowledged a Power, higher than the people, 
Who commands not only righteousness but love, not only 
justice but mercy."  Here are appeals to Christian, moral, 
and religious beliefs of the audience for love and mercy 
commanded by God.  Ford then suggested historical prece- 
dent and justifications for his position by contrasting 
his situation as President to  'nose of Lyndon Jonhson 
and Richard Nixon, and by suggesting similarities with 
the situation encountered by Presidents Lincoln and 
Truman following wars.  Then, in a series of parallel 
sentence structures, Ford expressed both some of the 
factors in his background influencing his decision on 
amnesty and the philosophic bases for his decisions.  Now 
that he had justified and defended his decisions on 
amnesty, Ford finally announced just what those decisions 
were—that he had requested research and recommendations 
from the Attorney General and Secretary of Defense on the 
50,000 deserters and evaders still at large, charged, 
or convicted.  Ford stated that "There are differences" 
in the categories, and that every case would not be 
treated the same way.  Throughout this portion of his 
19Ncw York Times, 20 August 1974, p. 1. 
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speech, the audience was unusually quiet.  Applause was 
restrained during subsequent parts of the address.'^ 
In an ambiguous remark, Ford said that he had 
found Chat few of the cases related directly to Vietnam. 
Perhaps by this he meant that few of the deserters and 
certainly none of the evaders actually went to Vietnam. 
However, the majority of violators broke the law rather 
than go to Vietnam, so in another sense most of the cases 
were directly related to Vietnam.  Whatever the actual 
meaning, the probable intent was to separate in the 
veterans' minds the amnesty issue from the strong emotional 
feelings and memories associated with the Vietnam conflict. 
The President continued to work on the audience's 
sense of compassion and forgiveness, stressing that all 
American men forced to live abroad are "casualties" for 
America.  He now arrived at the key statement of his 
address:  "I want them to come home if they want to work 
their way back."  He would allow deserters and evaders 
to return, but not without some kind of compensation on 
their part for their "mistakes." 
This was followed by a change of tack, as he spoke 
of having recently awarded fourteen Congressional Medals 
of Honor posthumously for veterans' bravery.  The men 
were very young, he said, who died; so were those who 
20ibid., p. 18. 
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"committed the supreme   folly  of  shirking  their  duty  at 
expense of others. . . . The glory and agony of 
war arc experienced by the young, who sometimes make 
mistakes;   these  young  should  have  another  opportunity." 
Then without  pausing  for a reaction,   Ford 
presented  a   further   appeal   to   the  veterans:     as   older 
and wiser  men who have  gone   through   the  experience  of 
war   themselves,   they  should  show  understanding  of  the 
feelings   and   the  mistakes  of  youth,   and  help  carry  out 
his   leniency proposal.     The   President   referred   to  "jus- 
tice,"  "leniency,"  and  a  "new  atmosphere  of  hope,   hard 
work,   and mutual   trust"  as   positive  qualities   to be 
demonstrated by  all   good Americans.     Returning  to 
historical   justifications,   he  again   compared  himself 
to Lincoln  and  Truman.     The   statement   "As   I  reject 
(ty,   so   T  reject   revenge," with  its  parallel   struc- 
ture,   presented Ford's  position as one of moderation 
between two  undesirable extremes.     Ford ended the 
remarks  on   this   subject with  compliments  and   tributes 
to  the   audience  members   and  appeal  to   their   feelings  of 
good ,   mercy,   and   forgiveness.     He  again  spoke of   the 
"casualties"--referring to deserters  and evadcrs-and 
the need  to   end  the bitterness  of a past war. 
Ford   turned   immediately   to  re-discussing  the 
problems   of   discrimination  against  veterans,   and  the 
need     ..   veterans benefits.     Then his  focus  shifted 
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briefly   to   inflation,   peace,   and   international  relation;.. 
He  ended   the   address  with  rather  traditional   phrases  of 
hope  and  faith   in  the  future   greatness  of America. 
Strategies  and Tactics 
Gerald  Ford's   chief  rhetorical  objectives   for 
this   speaking  situation were   (1)   to  present  his   initial 
clemency  action   to an  audience  potentially hostile   to 
such  an   Idea,   and   (?.)   to   establish  his  ethos   to   the  nation 
as  an  effective   leader  and  President. 
Only   two  specific  proposals  were mentioned  in   this 
speech.      The   first was  appointment   of  Dick  Roudebush 
Administrator  of   the   Veterans   Administration.      Since 
Roudebush     had  already been  deputy  administrator,   this 
could  hardly  have  been  a   surprise  move.     In  fact,   the 
text  of   the   speech   indicates   that   the   audience  antici- 
pated  Ford   in  mid-sentence  announcing  this  appointment 
The other  major  announcement   concerned  amnesty.      Other- 
wise,   the   speech  was  mostly noncommittal  general   policy 
statements.      The   clemency   discussion was   specific  and 
lengthy.      Since  potential   amnesty  or   clemency   for  de- 
serters and  evaders does not.  directly affect veterans— 
those  who  desert   do not  join   the  V.   F.   W.—and  does  not 
21 
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really concern future foreign policy or defense commit- 
ments, it stands out noticeably in the context of the 
sneech. The clemency proposal was the only part of the 
speech that promised to be unpopular with the audience. 
The V. F. W. convention delegates had rejected any form 
of leniency one year ago, and they were not likely to 
be receptive  to leniency now. 
How  did  Gerald  Ford present   this   idea  to  this 
audience--what rhetorical  tactics  did he use to broach 
a  controversial   subject   to an   unrcceptive  audience?     And 
at  the  same   time,   how did he   attempt   to  reinforce  his 
own  ethos? 
He began the clemency discussion by denying blanket 
amnesty.  This is important to understanding his strategy 
in attempting to win the V. F. W. members over to his 
plan.  The phrase "unconditional blanket amnesty" tends 
to evoke strong negative responses from many people, 
especially an audience of veterans.  The Christian_Cen- 
tury, a magazine editorially in favor of amnesty, dis- 
cusses this tactic: 
(Ford) surrounded the specific announcement (of 
clemency) with a reiteration of his opposition_to 
unconditional blanket, amnesty.  With this qua, idea- 
tion, he lapsed into the political rhetoric of his 
predecessor.  The term "unconditional blanket amnesty 
is a code phrase used by politicians to express dis- 
gust over unpatriotic men who refused to do their 
duty and fight."  Mr. Ford makes no reference to the 
position of those who support amnesty; namely  that 
the war in Indochina was illegal and that, with 
varying degrees of commitment, many of the men who 
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evaded the draft or deserted military services were 
doinj' so out of a conviction that the war was 
wrong.**- 
Although the Christian Century is admittedly biased 
on this issue, there is much validity to their editorial 
Interpretation.  "Unconditional blanket amnesty" had 
been referred to by Nixon previously; Ford used this 
phrase, then quickly assured the audience that he would 
have no part of such an idea.  He the  went on, to the 
dismay of most of the veterans, to announce that he would 
attempt some sort of reconciliation for the evaders and 
deserters.  Ford attempted to soften the impact, of an 
unpopular move by contrasting his alternative with the 
even less acceptable "unconditional blanket amnesty." 
Part; of the President's strategy was to deal with the 
gatlve connotations of this phrase; to steadfastly 
avoid any reference to his proposal as being "uncondi- 
tional," "blanket," or "amnesty"; and to take pains to 
disassociate his proposal completely from those terms 
and their connotations. 
The Christian Century editorial is also valid in 
Stating that President Ford made no mention of any of 
the arguments usually given by those in favor of amnesty, 
based on his previous statements, one can surmise that 
aid Ford did not agree with most of the arguments in 
22"Mr. Ford's Cautious Reconciling Step," Christj 
■■. ,   A September 1974, p. 811. 
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r of amnesty that implied anything but wrongdoing on 
the part of the resisters.  Even if Ford had held those 
belief;;, he would have been unwise to espouse such views 
in front of the veterans.  He was proposing a bold and 
somewhat drastic change.  To make that change more 
palatable, he had to doctor it with as much reactionary 
rhetoric against the connotations of such a change as 
possible. 
Ford's refusal of amnesty, then is attributable to 
both his personal beliefs on the matter and a rhetorical 
tactic.  "Amnesty" is a loaded word: 
It is a sad commentary on recent American leadership 
that the audience of veterans Mr. Ford chose as his 
forum would not have been as emotionally hostile to 
ev 
sub 
southern politicians once used the word "nigger" to 
inflame fears and prejudices of southern whites. 
Amnesty as an issue has not been discussed or even 
probed sei Lously; it has been exploited for political 
purposes.  We are assuming Mr. Ford knows this and 
is endeavoring to meet the public at the point to 
it has been led bv this political exploitation.- 
which 
A Washington  Post  editorial     furthers   the   idea   that 
Ford  sought   to   avoid both   the  realities  and  the.  semantic 
connotations   of amnesty: 
Perhaps   the   first   thing  for  all  of   us   to  do  about 
tbe   so-called   amnesty   issue,   now  that   President  toid 
has had the  courage  to raise  it before a  veterans 
convention   in   the  first days of his presidency,   is  to 
re< that   amnesty   is not   the  issue.   .   .   . 
23ibid. 
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Wc should begin by counting ourselves amonf, the 
contributors to confusion in this respect; in this 
newspaper as well as in others a need for compression 
leads to the use of catchwords that can gel seriously 
in the way of constructive debate on sensitive is- 
sues . . .Mr. Ford did not propose "amnesty" .... 
But President. Ford did something else; he dared to 
venture out into the dangerous middle ground between 
"granting oblivion, or a general pardon," on the one 
hand, and, on the other, a harsh refusal to do any- 
thing about the problem of the Vietnam exiles other 
than to confront them v/ith the full force of the 
law.24 
Another Ford tactic was to ask the veterans to 
accept his proposals on moral and religious grounds.  He 
spoke of a "Power, higher than the people" who commands 
titeousness, justice, mercy, and compassion.  He asked 
the veterans for their understanding; he asked that any 
American who had ever sought goodness, mercy, or for- 
giveness, to extend those same qualities to the evaders 
and deserters.  Such language gives the audience an 
implicit choice:  either to be God-like, forgiving and 
merciful, and accept the proposed plan; or, by opposing 
the plan, to go against the will of God.  The religious 
and moral references are best understood since the 
amnesty issue, more so than many other political issues, 
has tended to be phrased in judgmental, moral terms of 
"right" and "wrong."  Gerald Ford used the tactic of 
implying that the "right" moral choice for the audience 
to make was to agree with him.  The moral overtones of his 
^Washington Post, 22 August 1974, p. 20. 
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comments  were   discussed   in  an  editorial   in  the  Christian 
Science Moniti 
If  there   is   any  issue  on  which  a  president  can 
puhlicly  invoke  divine guidance without false piety-- 
it   is  amnesty.     The   feelings  on all   sides  are so 
linked with  people's   concepts  of   righteousness   that 
President  Ford was  on  the best  possible  ground   in 
introducing  the subject by acknowledging "a Power 
higher   Chan   the   people,   who   commands   not  only  right- 
eousness  but   love,  not.  only  justice  but  mercy.    . 
On  such  a   foundation  Mr.   Ford  could boldly   tell   a 
veterans'   audience what   they  didn't  want  to  hear-- 
"I am throwing the weight of my presidency into  the 
scales   of  justice  on   the   side  of   leniency."^-' 
The  structure  of   the  speech  offers   a  clue   to  another 
of Ford's   tactics.     The meat   of the speech—the  leniency 
discussion--is   sandwiched between  pieces   of material   sure 
to be  acceptable  and pleasing  to   the  V.   F.   U.     This 
format  suggests   the   standard  speech  organization  of 
introduction,   body,   and   conclusion;   yet  within   the body 
itself  the  same   format  is   followed.     This   is best   illus- 
trated by  a  word-count  analysis.     The  entire  address  is 
approximately  2400 words.     The amnesty-related remarks 
begin about   700 words   into  the  speech  or  one-third of 
the way   through.      The  amnesty   remarks   last   through  640 
words,   or   slightly more   than   one-fourth  of  the   speech. 
The  remainder  of   the   speech,   some   1000 words,   is   devoted 
to general  non-amnesty material. 
Ford  prefaced   the   amnesty   remarks  with  statements 
praising   the  veterans   and  discussing his   administration's 
25christian Science Monitor,   21 August   1974,   p.   E. 
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interest in the needs of veterans.  Ideally this tactic 
should have the audience members recept ive to the speaker 
and agreeing with him as he moves into the more objection- 
able material.  Then, after the controversial information 
is presented, the speaker retreats to positive and less 
disputable material, to soften the Impact of that which 
is unpleasant.  Thus, the V. F. W. members should have 
left with some of the harsh impact of Ford's contrary 
amnesty views negated by the more acceptable views that 
followed.  Maybe the audience would not be completely 
enthusiastic about Ford, but perhaps they would not be 
quite as adamantly opposed to his ideas on leniency. 
An examination of transitions within this address 
lends credibility to the idea that the amnesty-related 
arks were added to an already prepared speech.  The 
passag. • immediately preceding and following the section 
on amnesty have a continuity of thought, from discussing 
different treatment of veterans from different wars to 
mentioning the new V. F. W. commander-in-chief, a veteran 
of the Korean war, to discussing specifically the plight 
of the Vietnam veterans.  Assuming, then, that Ford did 
add the amnesty remarks at a later point, the sandwiching 
ect Of placing those comments in the middle offers a 
reasonable explanation for the ordering he used. 
Gerald Ford also attempted to create a more positive 
imagi for himsel  through this speech.  He sought to 
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strengthen his  ethos   as  President  by   (a)   delineating   the 
philosophies  and policies he   Intended to  follow,   and 
(b)   demonstrating  that  he  possessed  the   qualities  of   a 
good  President:      experience,   wisdom,   strength,   and 
decisiveness. 
The  first   tactic--enumer(-ting  his  beliefs   and 
intended  actions—was   especially   important  since  he  had 
not  previously   done   so   in  an  election  campaign  context. 
He announced  the  appointment  of the new V.   A.   administra- 
tor.     He  announced  his  upcoming  plan  of   leniency   for 
Vietnam war  resisters.     He   talked  about  V.   A.   hospitals 
and  unemployed  veterans.     He  mentioned other  items  of 
interest   to  this   audience,   including  the  national   economy, 
and  foreign  policy.      Except   for   the  passages  on   the  V.   A. 
administrator  and  leniency,   he was   seldom  specific  about 
policies;   he was   specific,   however,   on  the  direction   that 
defense  and   foreign   relations  would  take   under  him. 
During  the   amnesty  discussion,   Ford  referred  to  the 
aspects  of  his  background  that   led  him to  make  his   deci- 
sion.     This   served  a   dual  purpose:     besides  justifying 
his  proposal,   it   demonstrated  that  he  has   the  experience 
and  education   to  make   Presidential   decisions,   having been 
a  lawyer,   a naval   reservist,   a  Congressman,   House  Minority 
ider,   and  Vice-President.     The  language  of  this   part   of 
the  speech   is   clear,   strong,   and  decisive — the  veterans 
ht  not   like   it,   but  Ford would  pursue his   leniency   idea 
anyway. 
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The  very   fact   that  Ford  chose   to   discuss   amnesty 
at   this  early  point   in his   tenure  as   President  and  to 
this   particular  audience   is  a  tactic,   showing  a  tough- 
but-fair   leader,   not   afraid  of being  unpopular   for doing 
what  he  thinks   is   right.      So  while attempting  through 
this   speech   to   initiate  genuine  clemency  action,   Ford 
also  attempted  to   show that  he  as   President  merited  the 
confidence  and   trust   of  the  nation  in  hiin. 
Carter's  Remarks   to  the American Legion 
August.   24,   197~6~ 
ground  and  Setting 
On   August   24,   1976,   Jimmy  Carter,   the  Democratic 
party  nominee   for  President,   addressed  the American  Legion 
National  Convention  in Seattle,   Washington.     The  Legion 
is  an  organization  of  war   veterans,  mostly older  men. 
The,-   tend   to  hold   the   cluster   of  attitudes associated 
with veterans:     hawkish military  views,   belief  in a 
strong national   defense with  a  generous  budget,   and 
conservative  views  on   economic  and social  issues.     To 
this   group  Jimmy   Carter was  essentially  a mystery  candi- 
,      Although  he  had  already  received  the   Democratic 
nomination   for  President,    this  was his   first  major  campaign 
address   since   the   convention,     lie was   viewed  by  many   per- 
sons   as  being  "wishy-washy-  or  vague  on   the major   issues; 
his  political   beliefs   were,   to many  voters,   a  question 
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Carter's   views   on  amnesty  prior  to   this  address 
had not  been widely  publicized.     He  issued  a  position 
paper on  amnesty  and  pardon  on  January  26,   1976.   °     His 
views  coincided  closely with   those written   into   the 
Democratic   party  platform of   1976.     The  platform  sup- 
ported  "full   and  complete   pardon  for   those who  are   in 
legal or   financial   jeopardy  because  of  their peaceful 
opposition   to   the  Vietnam War,   with  deserters   to  be 
considered  on  a   case-by-case  basis."27     Still,   the 
ionnaires  knew  little  about  Jimmy  Carter's  views  on 
any   subject,   much   less   amnesty. 
Concerning  Carter's   qualifications   for  President, 
several   doubts  had been widely  published  in national media: 
First,   it  was  held  that  he was  not   knowledgeable 
enough.      Carter  had   served   in   the  Georgia   legislature, 
and  as  Governor  of  Georgia.     He  had no  political  experience 
in Washington.     He   is  not  a  lawyer,   as   most  nationally 
elected  officials   are.      Particularly  in  defense   and  foreign 
policy,   areas  of  great concern   to the Legionnaires,   his 
(     . rience  and knowledge were  considered limited. 
Second,   many   persons   feared   that his   strong   funda- 
mtalist   religious  beliefs  would  have   an   adverse  bearing 
26s.'     Appendix 
27"s of   the   1976   Democratic  Party  Platform," 
LonaJ   Quarterly Weekly Report,   19 June   19/0.  p. 
1 i .:•. 
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ou his  performance  as  President.'-"     Any candidate   for 
political office who speaks  of  the love of God and of 
sins   and of   righteousness   and  salvation  is   due   to  be 
skeptically  regarded by  many  Americans.     This  aspect  of 
Carter's belief system may not have bothered members  of 
the American  Legion  as  much  as   it  might other groups   of 
voters. 
The   third  chief   doubt   concerned Carter's   indeci- 
sivenees on issues .     In  attempting  to   appeal   to  as many 
voters  as  possible,   Jimmy  Carter  tended  to  rephrase  his 
statements   to  suit  each  particular  audience he   faced. -J 
This,   coupled with  his  perceived habit  of  fence-straddling 
on  certain   issues,30  brought   accusations  that he was   "two- 
faced"  and   inconsistent.     These were   some  important  parts 
of  Jimmy  Carter's   image  as  he   faced  the Legionnaires   in 
late  August.      He  had   to   disassociate  himself   from  the 
28See  excerpts   from Playboy interview,  supra, 
Chapter II. 
29in  an  interview,   Carter  discussed his  use  of 
adaptive   language: 
There   are   some   groups with whom  I   feel  perfectly   at 
home,   and   there'are   some   that   I   don|t       But   in  general, 
I'm able   to  accommodate   different  kinds  of  groups 
Lrly well,   and  that's  one of the  things  I  ve 
always   tried  to do in a speech:     to figure out in my 
own mind   the  compatibilities  between me  and   them.     But 
I'm not  always  successful. 
' .    •   Tines,   10 June  1976,   p.   18. 
30Por   instance,   Carter said he was opposed to abor- 
tions,   but  opposed   to   laws   outlawing  portions.     While 
positions   such as   this  arc not  logically ^consistent, 
•  en   create  an   impression  of  logical   ■.consistency, 
fence  straddling,   or  fuzziness  or-   the  issi    \. 
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negative   qualities   attributed  to him  through  general  press 
treatment ;   he  had  to  create  an  ethos  with a  still  largely 
noncomniitt.ed  audience. 
ech 
Carter   faced  the  American  Legion   audience wearing 
what   they  were  wearing:     an  American  Legion  cap.     This 
readily  recognizable  symbol  began   the  identification with 
the  audience   for  Carter before he  ever   said  a word.     His 
opening  statements   did  more   to  establish him as   "one  of 
then";   not a   strange southerner,  but a man among "my 
fellow  Legionnaires."     He  stated  that  '.ic  wanted   to  dis- 
cuss   items   of   interest   to  "us   as  veterans and  as   Ameri- 
cans."     He  mentioned   the  military   tradition   in  his   family 
and  his  own  military  experience.     This   experience  includes 
having worked  under  Admiral   Hyman Rickover,   and  Carter 
stated   that   he   learned  good   qualities   from Rickover   that 
he  has  put.   into  his  business   and  political  careers.     This 
was  fo,lowed  by   a  mention  of  his   son  Jack,  who  served  in 
:.      Jack  Carter  had been  treated with  scorn  and 
derision because  he was  part   of   the  Vietnam war;    this 
reception   at  home,   which  many  vets   in  the audience  had 
also  experienced,   was,   Carter  reminded  them,   quite  dif- 
ferent   from  the   attitudes   following previous wars.     The 
bitterness   following  Vietnam was   to  Carter  "nothing  less 
than  an  American   tragedy."     He  did not   say  the war  itself 
<        a   tragedy,   but   that   the  reception veterans  received 
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and the national mood  following Vietnam were  a tragedy. 
Then  Carter  spoke  about  patriotism:     what   it  used  to  mean, 
what   it  should  mean,   and what   it  means   to  many people 
today.     He   stated  that  one  of  his  goals  as  President  would 
be   to  restore  national  pride  and  patriotism. 
As  a   transition   into  the body  of  the   speech,   Carter 
said: 
I  did not   cone  here just   to  get  your  vote  or  endorse- 
ment,   nor  just   to  make   a  good   impression  on  you.      I 
come  here  as   a  nominee   for  President who  has   spent 
full   time   the   last  20  months   learning  about  this 
country—what   it  is   and what   it  ought   to  be. 
Perhaps   this   is  not   a  strikingly  original   statement   for 
a man   seeking  political   office   (I'm not just  here  be- 
cause   I  want   your  vote   .    .    .").     Yet   it  is   an  attempt   to 
disavow the   image of Carter  the vote-hungry hack who will 
say  anything  to win  a  vote,   and  to  demonstrate  a  Jimmy 
Carter who   is  knowledgeable   and who has  learned much  about 
this   country. 
Carter   said he  would   talk  about   some   "tough  de- 
cisions"   facing  Americans.     He  outlined his   priorities 
for   the  military  and   foreign  relations.     Military   strength 
would be   ensured  by   commitment   to  necessary  expenditures, 
elimination  of waste   and  duplication,   and  a  constant   search 
for  peaceful   relations.      In   the   future,   the  U.   S.   would 
avoid   involvements   in   the   internal  affairs   of  other 
countries.     Commitments  abroad   in   general  will  be  more 
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cautious.      Carter  advocated  constant  alertness   of  compara- 
tive military  capacity,   and  maintaining  a  rough  balance 
of power  with  the  U.   S.   S.   R.     The  words   "national   secur- 
ity,"   said  Carter,   have   fallen   into  disrespect,   and need 
to be given  a new and valid meaning for Americans. 
After  discussing   these  topics,   Jimmy Carter  moved 
on  to  a   subject  which  he would bring up   at  other   times 
during  the   1976   campaign:     that   the  strongest  defense 
•s   from  a   secure  home   front,   that  solving  domestic 
social   and economic problems would be the chief  step in 
ping America   strong abroad.      He   spoke   in abstractions 
of  the need   for patriotism and trust,  and more concretely 
cf  policy   guidelines,   with  an  effectively  self-conscious 
transition between  these  areas: 
I  recognize,   of  course,   as  you  do,   that   it   is  not 
enough   for  the  President   to   talk  about  patriotism 
and  national   security.     He  must   take  positive,   ag- 
gressive  action  to  ensure   that  our  defense  estab- 
lishment   is worthy of national respect.     That calls 
for   leadership,   and  that  calls   for management. 
Carter   spoke  of priorities   in budgeting   and  foreign  aid, 
re. valuation  of military  programs,   and  some  specific 
suggestions   for wiys   to  save  money without  losing neces- 
sary military  services.     Then  came  Pentagon budgeting 
and National  Guard priorities-Carter mentioned   that as 
Governor   of Georgia   he had  attended   Guard  training  ses- 
si on;;  every   S 
International   terrorism was   the next  subject   for 
discussion;   Carter's   expressed  intention   to  take   steps 
10: 
Lnst   tcrriorism  undoubtedly was   aggreeable   to   the 
audience. 
Now   the   Democratic   candidate began  bringing his 
comments   closer   to home   for  the American Legionnaires. 
He  lamented   the  plight   of   the  returning Vietnam veteran, 
and  the  problems  of   the  Veterans'   Administration  and 
federal  government bureaucracy  in helping the veterans. 
He  listed  a  series   of   facts,   statistics,   and widely 
accepted  generalizations  about   the  present  conditions  of 
these  problems.     Then he  drew  the  conclusion  for   the 
a   Hence,   to   leave no doubt:     "The reason for this dismal 
record   is   clear:     it   is   a   failure  of  leadership."     He  cited 
some  controversial  vetoes   and budget  cuts   of  the  Ford 
administration  that might have  adversely affected veterans, 
especially  Vietnam  vets. 
He  made   certain   the   contrast  between   the  current 
leadership   and  himself,   the   challenger,   was  evident.      If 
he   is    ■lected,   "the  American  veteran,   of  all  ages,   of  all 
wars,   is   going   to have   a   friend,   a   comrade  and  a   firm ally 
ii    the White  House."     The   implication  of   this   statement 
was   that,   they  had no   friend,   comrade  or  ally   in   the White 
House  at   that   time. 
Carter  had now  presented his   best  punches,   the 
material  most   likely   to  meet   the  approval   of  the  audience 
a,  • create  in   their minds  a   favorable impression of him. 
th   this   done,   he   shifted   course  and began   to   discuss 
i stj . 
He assumed a softer, more serious tone o say, 
"I would like to speak for a moment about the single 
hardest decision I have had to make during the campaign. 
That was on the issue of amnesty."  Up to this point the 
Legionnaires had consistently cheered and applauded his 
speech.  But now they grew quiet as Carter began to talk 
about this controversial topic.  He spoke of the men he 
knew who went to Vietnam:  that they were poor and un- 
educated, that they did not even know about the possi- 
bility of evading the draft or running away.  Many of 
them, he said, were wounded or killed.  Many were treated 
with ..difference upon returning to America.  He com- 
pleted this brief tribute to Vietnam veterans--many of 
when were in this audience--with, "The Vietnam veterans 
are our nation's greatest unsung heroes." Yet the 
audience surely knew that something less pleasing to them 
V«a about to follow as he stated that he could never 
equate the action of draft evaders with the bravery of 
the Vietnam veterans; "But I think it is time for the 
damage, hatred, and divisiveness of the Vietnam war to 
be over. . . ." 
The New York Times describes the next critical 
moments of the speech: 
A spirited applause rose from ^/^^ ^Lt"' 
tinned as an underscore for ^!? ^™ ^%?y." 
^^^StSraatS; carers &- 
to  grant:   a  blanket  pardon. 
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Cries   of   "IIo!      Mo!     No!" erupted from  the  audience 
of  more   than   15,000  Legionnaires  and   their wives,   and 
ended  only  after  the  organization's  national   com- 
i tnder,   Harry G.   Wiles,   gaveled the audience  to 
silence.31 
Some  audience members  responded with applause 
rather  than  boos.J"-  but   the  predominant rnood was   one  of 
disapproval.     The   candidate   stood  silently while   the  boos 
continued,   Chen   smiled,   as  he  did  often  in  tense  or  un- 
E; or table moments   during the campaign. 
Carter  resumed  his   speech with  a  distinction 
between   "amnesty"  and   "pardon":     "Amnesty  means  that  what 
you did  is  right.     A pardon means  that what  you did— 
right  or  wrong--is   forgiven." 
He   also  distinguished between  those who  violated 
ective  Service  laws—draft  evaders--and deserters. 
The  former  group would receive  blanket  pardons;   the  latter 
group would  be  handled  on  a  case-by-case  basis   in  mili- 
tary courts.     He  spoke of the need  to forget   the differences 
ami problems   of Vietnam,   to   "bind up our wounds."     Ser- 
a,   he  said,   best  understand  the need   for  peace, 
and  for   strength   to  ensure  peace.     He  implied  here  that 
jsty   is   a  necessary  step   to  achieving national   unity 
and strength,   and that  the veterans   should know that more 
3lNew York Times,  25 August 1976,  pp.   1,  18. 
32According to the Washington Post,  25 August  1976, 
p.   1,   "The only discernible applausi  carni from the upper 
t of   the  Seattle  Coliseum where  several  hundred  young 
>parently not Legion members,  had gathered. 
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than anyone else.  He reminded them again that he too is 
a veteran, a former submarine officer.  He digressed, 
relating how he had been at sea in 1945 when the first 
atom bomb was dropped, and how neither he nor any of 
the others he worked with had even comprehended the sig- 
nificance of it.  Now, years later, we have forgotten 
how terrible and awesome nuclear warfare really is.  We 
cannot comprehend the vastness of a truly global war. 
Carter then tied this back into the mainstream of his 
speech:  In a world of nuclear power, using "little wars"-- 
i.e., Vietnari--to prevent bigger ones is dangerous.  This 
closing passage of Carter's address went beyond amnesty, 
or any other specific policy, and ended with generalities 
about the current loss of trust and confidence in govern- 
ment.  But, he said, there is no one in this audience who 
does not want to heal wounds and restore the greatness of 
the nation.  He, Jimmy Carter, hoped to play a part in 
that effort. 
''"egies and Tactics 
Jimmy  Carter  hoped   to  gain   the   support  of   the 
American  Legion with   this   address,   and,   more  importantly, 
to  strengthen  his   Image   to   a national  audience  through 
secondhand  accounts   of  the   speech.     The  strategics  he 
Loyed   to achieve   these  immediate  and long-term 
Objec   i      y,   included   (1)   To  overcome   some  of   the  negative 
aspects   of his   image   as   created   in  media  treatment; 
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(2)   To  dis. uss   amnesty   in   such  a way  that,   if his   con- 
troversial  views   on  this   subject  did not  strengthen  his 
support,   at  least   those views would not prove detrimental 
to him;   (3)   To  outline   the  other  policies,   programs,   and 
beliefs   that  would  guide  him if he  were  elected  President; 
and   (4)   To  demonstrate   that   the  present   administration-- 
his  opponent   in   the  election--was   inadequate  and merited 
replacing. 
As  previously  discussed,   Carter was  still  regarded 
as  something  of  an  unknown   figure,   even  though he had 
alreadj   swept   the  Democratic  party  convention  and  had been 
ca  paigning vigorously.     Doubts had been widely circulated 
that:   Carter was  not  sufficiently  educated  about  Washington 
and  international   politics   to  run  the  country.     He  gave 
brief  but   intelligent   discussions  about   comparative  mili- 
tary  strength  of   the  U.   S.   and  the  U.   S.   S.   R.,   and  NATO 
and  the Warsaw  Pact;   he   listed  very  specific  proposals   for 
budget  cuts   in  certain wasteful areas within the Defense 
d< .artment budget;   and he  talked in  specifics about  the 
current   problems with job   training and education for 
veterans.     Overall,   the  speech  covered  a wide  range   of 
subjects  of   interest  to   the  Legionnaires;   on  most  of   the 
issues,   candidate   Carter  showed  that  he  had  done  his 
well.     He  also   sought  to  combat  his   image  of 
be   tig vague and wishy-washy.     On most  issues he gave  clear 
Kits   Of   intention   and  policy.      In  fact,   Carter war, 
110 
perhaps   too  clear  when he  was  booed  for  stating  that  he 
would pardon evaders. 
Doubt  had  been  expressed  about  Carter's   strong 
religious   convictions;   that,   as  a fundamentalist 
Southern  Baptist,   he might  act  irrationally,   or   let 
religion   interfere  with  the  running of  the  country. 
Whether  or  not  Mr.   Carter  was   aware  of  this  aspect  of  his 
image  is not known;   it  is   interesting to note,   though, 
that   this   speech   is   entirely  secular,  without  a  single 
religious   reference.     The   closest   to  religion  he   approached 
in  this   talk was   his   discussion  of patriotism and   faith 
in  the  country.      If  Christian  beliefs   indeed hold   a  great 
influence   over  Carter's   though  processes   and  values,   they 
do not always   appear   in  the wording of his  speeches. 
Carter  needed  to be  very  careful  in  the way he 
approached   the  topic  of amnesty,   since  this  stood   to be 
the most   unpopular  of his   policy   statements.     He  prefaced 
the pardon  discussion  by   saying that   this  was   the   "single 
hardest decision"   he had made  during the campaign.     This 
made him appear  quite   serious,   and  also  implied  that 
whatever   followed  would be,   while  perhaps   displeasing,   at 
least well   thought-out  and   sincere.     What   did  follow was 
first  a  reminder   to   the audience   that  he had  not   forgotten 
the  role  of  the  Vietnam veterans-"!  could never  equate 
What   they   (Vietnam veterans)   have   done  with   those  who 
left   this   country   to  avoid   the  draff--md  then  the  state- 
ment of policy. 
Ill 
Carter  made   two  clear  sets  of  distinctions   in   this 
policy.      First,   he  stated his  opposition  to  amnesty,   but 
his   intention  of  granting  a  pardon.     He  told  the  audience 
that,   to  him,   amnesty   implies  that  what  the  violator  did 
is right;   pardon means   that   the  violator is   forgiven,   and 
no judgment   of  right   or  wrong  is  made.     This   distinction 
apparently  made   little   impression on   the Legionnaires; 
any  form  of  leniency,   it   seems,   was   objectionable  to 
them.     Because  this   distinction   is   central   to   the  Carter 
policy  on   this   issue,   and  because  this   is  the   statement 
that  produced   the  most  overt  negative  reaction   from  the 
Legionnaires,   the amnesty-pardon  sentence merits   further 
discussion.      The   distinctions  provided  by  Carter  are  not 
consistent  with   the  historical  and  legal  applications  of 
the terms  amnesty and pardon.33     Consensus among both 
conservatives   and   liberals   is   that  Carter  created his 
own  definitions.     A Washington  Post   editorial,   discussing 
the  distinction, said "One  can  question whether  Mr.   Carter, 
by  this  word  juggling,   was  not   trying  to  simply  evade  the 
harsh  political  overtones  of   the  word   'amnesty.' 
33As   discussed   supra,   in  Chapter   II,   P
arJ°n*      ,n, 
usually are  granted to individuals;   amnesties,   to 8™^; 
Pardon frequently refers  to the waiving of P^3Jment  fo1 
an  already   convicted   criminal;   amnesty_frequently  pro- 
mises  absolution  prior   to   trial  or punishment        In  con- 
fusing  the  legal  meanings of  the   terms,   however    Carter 
is  certainly  not  without  precedent.     See  Chapter   ,1, 
history  of  amnesty. 
3Aibid.,   26 August   1976,   pp.   1,   18. 
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The  Greensboro  Daily   News   called  the  distinction  "a   trifle 
contrived."35     Both  of   these   editorials   favored  Carter's 
proposal.     Speaking   for  the   opposition,   Robert  Dole, 
addressing the same American Legion convention the next 
day,   said  that  a   speaker,   "v.'hoevcr he was,   had  provided 
his  own  definitions"   for amnesty  and  pardon.3^     Finally, 
an  editorial   in   the  Christian  Science Monitor  denied  the 
validity  of  Carter's   distinctions: 
Jimmy   Carter  apparently was  well  prepared   to 
clarify   things   for  booing  American Legionnaires  by 
drawing  a  distinction  between  "amnesty"   and  the 
"blanket   pardon"  he  proposes   for  Vietnam draft  evaders. 
But   his   venture   into  semantics   confused   the  issue.3'' 
But   for  Carter  himself,   the   amnesty-pardon  differentiation 
was  irn;      I in   emphasizing that he was  implying no 
moral  judgment   of   the   acts  of  war resistors,   but:  would 
simply  absolve   their   crimes,   never  attempting  to  determine 
whether  they  were   right  or wrong. 
Carter's   second major  distinction  was  between 
evaders  and   deserters.      Since   some  deserters  might  have 
endangered  their   fellow  soldiers  on  the battlefield  or 
deserted   for  other   than  political  or moral  reasons,   their 
cases  would be  handled   individually.     He  then   said  that, 
whatever  reasons   for  disagreement   there were   in   I960, 
35Greensboro Daily News,  26 August  1976,  p.  E. 
36R0bert Dole,   cited  in Hew York Times,   26 August 
1976,   p.   22. 
37Christian Science Monitor,   26 August   1976,   p.   E. 
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now they should be forgotten and we should move on 
to a "rebirth of patriotism." This implies that there is 
no longer any reason not to allow evaders to return 
unpunished.  For the United States to remain strong in 
the world, "We must bind up our wounds."  This binding 
and healing must be done by allowing evaders and deserters 
to return.  Since all the audience members would want the 
United States to be strong, then, by his reasoning, they 
should see that the pardon is necessary.  Carter empha- 
sized that they of all people should understand that; 
"• iose who most want peace, and who best understand the 
need for strength as a prerequisite for peace, are our 
past and present servicemen and families." Therefore the 
audience members, all servicemen present and past, should 
also best understand that strength and peace depend upon 
ling, and that the healing process depends upon letting 
exiled and imprisoned Americans return to the mainstream 
of society. 
At   this   juncture  Carter   left   the  amnesty  discussion 
hanging and went   into his  story about   being  in  the  Navy 
at   the   time   of  the   first  atom bomb.     He  did not  mention 
■       deserters   or  evaders   in   this  speech  again. 
Another  of  Carter's   strategies  was   to  clearly 
enumerate  his  beliefs  and  planned  policies  on   certain 
issues.     The  speech ranged from generalities  and philosophy 
Of  foreign  policy  and  defense   to  specific   statements   about 
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selected  subjects.     The  issues  were   those  thought   to  be 
most   important   to  veterans:     military   strength,   future 
policy  on   foreign  military   involvements,   the  Soviet  Union, 
NATO,   government budgeting  and   spending,   foreign  aid, 
education  and  job   training   for   servicemen  and  veterans, 
the National   Guard,   and  amnesty.     Probably  the  amnesty- 
pardon  issue  was  not   the  only  one  on which  Carter's 
views  conflicted with  some  members   of  the  audience.     His 
mentioning  of  budget   cuts,   of  eliminating  some   "unneces- 
sary" weapons   systems,   and  of  streamlining  the  Defense 
Department  may  well  have  threatened  or   displeased  some  of 
the  Legionnaires.     Yet   in  all  of  these   selected  areas-- 
primarily  areas   of  defense   and   foreign   policy--Jimmy 
Carter  clearly  stated what   his  attitudes were  and what  his 
policies  would be. 
As   the   challenger  in   this  election,   Jimmy  Carter 
needed  to  demonstrate   that   Gerald  Ford  was  not  an  adequate 
President,   and   that   Carter  would be  preferable.     Yet  his 
attacks  on his   opponent   had   to be  cautious  and  tactful; 
both he and  Ford   sought  to   avoid  the mudslinging  image 
that  has  been   applied   to  previous  candidates.     The  majority 
of Carter's   speech was   devoted to talking about  his   own 
beliefs  and   intentions.     But  when  he  discussed   "the  poor 
"     ird  of  government  bureaucracy"   in  helping  veterans  with 
jo!..,  and  education,   he went   on   to blame   present  problems 
on a   failure  of   leadership,   without   ever naming Gerald  Ford. 
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He   then  reinforced   the  contrast  between  candidates  by 
mentioning  again what his   attitude  as  President would 
be   towards   veterans.     The   one   subject   area he  chose  to 
attack  tbe  present   administration  on   is  an area  sensitive 
to many  veterans,   and  an  area  in which his  criticisms 
would be  shared by   many  persons   in   the  audience.      It   is 
also an  area  of  domestic   policy  rather  than   foreign 
policy.     So  Carter  only  devoted  one  passage  of his   address 
to an  outright   criticism of his  opponent;   that   criticism 
concerned  a   subject   of  great  importance  to  this  audience 
and  a  subject  on which  the   admininstration had  drawn 
previous   fire. 
Cqmpari_son  and  Contrast 
On  August   19,   1974,   President  Ccrald Ford  gave  a 
speech  outlining his   controversial  views  on  leniency 
.  war  resistors  and   deserters.     Almost   exactly   two 
years  later,   on  August  24,   1976,   Presidential   candidate 
Jimmy Carter gave a speech outlining his  controversial 
views   towards   deserters   and  evaders.     The  similarities 
and  differences   in   their   settings,   in   the  speakers' 
respective   images,   and  in   the way  Ford  and  Carter   each 
approached   a  discussion  of   this   issue   is   the  subject   of 
section. 
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ing 
The  audiences   of   those   two  speeches were  remarkably 
similar.     Both  the  Veterans  of   Foreign Wars  and   the 
American  Legion  are   organizations  of military  personnel, 
mostly  retired.     Many  of  the members  are  older men;   many 
veterans   are   members   of  both organizations.     The   two 
groups   tend   to hold   the   same  basic  set  of political  be- 
liefs  as   discussed  earlier   in   this  chapter.     Both  groups 
Btood  strongly  opposed   to  any  kind  of  leniency  for  those 
who  deserted   or   evaded   the  draft  during  the  Vietnam 
conflict.     Ford  and  Carter   each  made   their   first   policy 
statements  about   leniency  to  the  national  conventions  of 
veterans,   where  opposition   to  any  such  idea would be 
strong.     Gerald  Ford   stated  after  his   speech that  he 
intentionally  chose   this   audience,   whom he  expected   to 
be unreceptlve,   to  test  out his   leniency ideas   first. 
H*  f-nl,1   ronnrtors   that   bo h*<]   discussed  leniency 
with  five  or  six people in  the Cabinet    in my staff 
and others who had   said to me last week that   at  some 
point  we  have   to   do   something  about   this. P    The more   1   thought  of  it,   the more  I  fought  that 
the  riRht audience would be  an audience that might 
be difficult rather  than some handpicked audience 
it's better  to  talk  to people who have some under 
standing.      It  would  have  been  a  little  cowardice 
[sic],   I   think,   if   I'd picked  an  audience  that was 
ecstatic.38 
If   Ford's   comments  are  accepted as  a   genuine 
expression of his motivation-and there  is no reason to 
38New  York  Times,   20  August  197A,   p.   18. 
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believe otherwise--then he chose an audience for announc- 
ing his clemency proposal the group most strongly opposed 
to any  form of amnesty or  lessening of penalties. 
Jimmy   Carter,   too,   expected  disapproval   from his 
audi ence: 
The  protest   to his  Legion   speech  did not   come  as 
a  surprise   to  the  Democratic  Presidential   nominee. 
In  the   last  week,   while working  on   the   speech,   he  had 
frequently  suggested   to  aides   that   it  would  not  play 
well  here   today.      "But   I  want   to  meet   it head   on," 
one aide  quoted him as saying.3° 
Another  quoted   comment  presents   Carter  as  having delib- 
erately  chosen   this   audience   for  this  speech:      "...   he 
said   to  another   assistant working  on   the  speech:      'I want 
a confrontation  with   that  organization.1     He  got  it."1 
The   two   addresses   wore  delivered  two  years   apart 
from each  other.     This   time   lapse   is  most   important   in 
the  change  of  the   status   of  amnesty  as  an   issue.     In 
19/4  amnesty  was   actively  debated by  many  people.     Con- 
gressional   hearings  had   considered  the  issue,   and 
numerous  Congressional bills  had been written offering 
amnesty-related  measures.     Meanwhile,   Richard Nixon  had 
Steadfastly  refused  any  sort  of  amnesty  or   clemency.      It 
was very much an alive and active issue in August,   1974. 
Rut   out  of  Ford's  speech   came  his   clemency  plan.     The 
plan was   controversial  and unpopular  with many  persons  on 
39ibid.,   25 August   1974,   p.   1. 
40john Osborne,   "Glimpses  of Jimmy," The  Hew 
Republic.   13 September  1976,   p.   10. 
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boih sides of  the amnesty   issue;   yet   through  the plan an 
estimated 25,000  out:  of  125,000  eligible  resisters  and 
evaders  returned.'^    Despite  the unpopularity of the plan, 
many  people  approved  of  it   after   it was   terminated.   L     To 
Gerald For;'.,   as well a:;  to many others,   amnesty became 
a  closed   issue.      The   debate  on  amnesty   lessened.     The 
bitterness  of   the  Vietnam war  receded  two years  more   from 
memory.     Yet  many   thousand  of  men  remained  in exile  out 
of  the   country,   or  continued  to   suffer  jail   sentences  or 
other  repercussions   in  America.      But   the   two  ytars' 
lapse between   Ford's   speech  and  Carter's   speech  had  seen 
sty  go  from  a  major  issue   to  an  issue   that,   while 
still  important,   had been   forgotten  or  dismissed by  most 
people. 
Image  and  Ethos 
The   two  years'   lapse  between  these   speeches   was 
Significant   in  one  other way.     Although   1974 was  not:  a 
presidential   election  year,   1976  was.     The  demands   on   a 
just-appointed  President   are   different  from those  on  a 
candidate   seeking  the  office.     Gerald  Ford  and Jimmy 
Carter   faced   their   respective  audiences   from different 
roles  and  with  different   images;   yet   they  sought   to 
establish   a  similar type of ethos with their audiences. 
Mine Gallup Opinion  Index,   October,   1975,   p.   24. 
'^ lbid. 
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Ford  had   to   divorce  his   image   from  that  of  Richard  Nixon 
and the Watergate  administration.     Beyond that,  he needed 
to establish  his   own  credibility as   Chief  Executive.     He 
made  statements   during his   speech  to  show his   experience 
and knowledge;   to   show his   good judgment;   and  to  show his 
firmness   and   strength of  character  as  a  decision-maker. 
A secondary   task   in  creating his   image was   for Ford  to 
outline  the  philosophies   and  actions   that would characterize 
him as  President.      The  very   fact  that  he would make   an  ef- 
fort   to  outline  policies   clearly would  serve   to  reinforce 
a more  positive  iniagc. 
Jimmy   Carter  had   to  contrast  his   image  with   that 
of  the  incumbent   administration.     He  needed   to  establish 
his  own  credibility  as  a   contender  for   the  Presidency. 
He made   statements   during his  speech   to  show his knowledge 
and experience,  which  had been  questioned before;   to  show 
his  good  judgment;   and  to  show his  decisiveness  and   firm- 
ness,  which  also had been  questioned  before.     Like  Ford, 
Carter  also outlined  the  philosophies   and actions   that 
would  characterize  him as  President. 
One  must  not  overlook   the  obvious   in  this   compari- 
son:    Gerald Ford was not  a candidate for the  Presidency 
when  he  delivered   this   speech   in   1974.     He was   President. 
It   can be   safely  assumed,   however,   that   his   strength  and 
popularity  as   President  was   less   than  solid.      Certain 
aspects  of  Ford's   position  during  that   crucial  week   in 
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ist, 1974, have no recent historical precedent:  Ford 
suddenly found himself succeeding as President the man 
had appc nted him as Vice-President, in an administra- 
tion steeped in controversy.  His role was dissimilar from 
of a candidate in that he already was President, even 
though he had never been elected; few persons would ser- 
iously challenge his Constitutional claim to the office. 
Yet his performance in those first few days would signi- 
ficantly determine his stature and effectiveness as 
Ldent for the two years to come.  He had not gone 
through the process of campaigning as a candidate for one 
of the two highest offices—a process that gives the 
public a thorough, if somewhat distorted, view of the 
men seeking offices.  Without this, Ford was not as well 
known to the public as he might have been.  In this respect 
his situation as a speaker is analogous to that of candi- 
date Carter;  facing the veterans' audience, still largely 
an unknown.  Ford and Carter each had large parts of 
their image yet to be established; they each needed to 
establish those images positively to accomplish their 
r» pective political purposes. 
For t   two speakers, the reinforcement of a 
suitable image was more important than the revelation of 
specific intentions concerning amnesty or anything else 
discussed in these speeches. 
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Candidate  preference,   however,   does not  depend  as 
much  on  issue  differences  as   it   does  on  image pro- 
lection.     The   citizen will   ultimately  be presented 
with  a  decision  making  alternative,   not necessarily 
amongst  promises   and  aspirations,  but  rather,   between 
candidates'   personalities  and performances. >3 
Some   issues,   then,   become  important  chiefly  in 
how they  affect   the   image of  the  speaker.     With   this   in 
mind,   it   is   important   to  examine   the  significance of Ford 
and Carter both  selecting amnesty  as  an  issue  to  discuss 
in  these  speeches. 
Lie Selection 
Despite  the  inclusion  of  other material,   the  most 
important—and most controversial-thrust of each speech 
WPS on amnesty.     Why   did  they want to deal with  the amnesty 
problem?     Each man could have  conceivably  ignored or 
avoided the subject without  serious  repercussions.     For 
Gerald  Ford,   reasons  both moral  and  political  can be  sug- 
gested.     Moral reasons include his own beliefs in the 
validity  of   the   solution he   suggested.     The  justice  and 
mercy  be   expressed  are  tempered by his   conviction  that 
evaders   and deserters were  fundamentally wrong,   and should 
somehow atone   /or their mistak   ,.     Thus he  formulated the 
plan  t0  have  violators work   their way back,  without  having 
to serve jail  terms  or stand  trial.     Politically  this was 
«Alan M.   Rubin,   "The   1960 Kennedy-Hi^on «g£-» 
ates:     Implications   for a Strategy of C°'™,^^™  J' 
the Modern Presidential Campaign," paper,   The Lnrvers..ty 
of I!1Lnois,   1972,   p.   1. 
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one of  several  moves  made  by  Ford   that  provided  a  sharp 
contrast  between  his  administration  and  that  of  Richard 
Nixon.     He   stood  to  benefit  by  making that  contrast  clear. 
He hoped his   policy would be  an  effective  compromise be- 
tween  extremes  on  a  divisive  issue,   that   liberals  seeking 
full  amnesty  and  conservatives   disapproving of  any   form 
of  leniency would both be  appeased.     Ford had been  advised 
by  members  of his   staff   that he would need  to  deal  with 
the  amnesty   problem before   long.^     Thus,   it  became  poli- 
tically  expedient   for him to  attempt   to  solve   it  as  quickly 
and peacefully  as  possible.     Amnesty was  a  suitable  choice 
as   an  issue  and  a  speech  topic   to  improve Gerald  Ford's 
ethos. 
For  Carter,   too,   a  combination  of  ethical  and poli- 
tical  reasons  can be   inferred  for  his  decision  to  discuss 
amnesty.     Moral  beliefs   led him to  elaborate   a  distinction 
between   treatment   for  deserters   and  evaders,   as   the nature 
of  the  two  acts   are   different.     He  advocated blanket  par- 
don  for evaders,   since  their actions were based on their 
beliefs;   and  case-by-case  examination  of  deserters,   since 
some of  them might have deserted out  of moral  conviction, 
and  some  out   of   simple  cowardice.     An  important  political 
motivation  for  Carter   to  present  amnesty  views   is   that 
those  views   appeared  in   the  Democratic  party  platform;   as 
^New York Times,   20 August  1974,   p.   18. 
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party nominee,   he was   also  party  spokesperson.     Also, 
amnesty  was   a   sore  spot  of  the  Ford  administration, 
since many  persons  were  dissatisfied with Ford's   leniency 
program.     For  Jimmy  Carter,   too,   amnesty was  a  good 
choice  of  issues   to  improve  certain   factors  influencing 
his ethos.'*5 
Organization  and  Terminology 
Beyond  the  external  and  motivational  similarities 
in these   two  rhetorical   situations,   there  are  some  in- 
ternal   similarities   in   the  speeches   themselves.     Given 
comparable  rhetorical   goals,   Gerald  Ford  and Jimmy  Carter 
used  some  common  methods  of  organization,  word  choice, 
and  lines  of  argument,   especially  in  discussing  amnesty. 
The  organization   of  the   speeches   is   comparable. 
Both begin with   traditional  introducLory material,   then 
progress   to   discussion of a variety of related topics: 
The  Veterans'   Administration,   the Defense  Department, 
foreign  policy,   foreign  aid,   etc.     In each  speech, 
amnesty   is  not   even mentioned  until   at  least  halfway 
through   the   address.46     And  in   each  case,   the  amnesty 
^specifically,   by hitting a hostile audience 
head-on with   an  emotion-laden  issue,   ^ter  SLU 
tract much publicity and improve his    mge ^ ^™s or 
strength   of  conviction,   willingness   to  face  adversity, 
and decisiveness of belief and action. 
46In   the  Carter   address,   which runs   a  length  of 
approximately  3,800  word,,   the   J^esty remarks     c fg 
only 380 words  or one-tenth of  the  total, 
nal one-fourth of  the  speech. 
124 
discussion  is   followed by  more  general  material,   and 
traditional  conclusory material.      The passages  on  amnesty 
were  clearly   the  most   disputable  passages   in  these  speeches. 
Both of  the  speakers  knew  this when   they  prepared  the 
speeches.     So   they  sought   to  lessen   the  potentially nega- 
tive  impact  of  amnesty  comments  by  surrounding  them with 
statements   likely   to  evoke  positive   responses  from  the 
audiences.     Then,   after bringing  in   the  contested  amnesty 
material,   the   speakers  again  moved  to more  general, 
palatable  material  to   soften   the  impact  of  the amnesty 
statements . 
The  issue   to which  both  speakers  addressed  their 
remarks   is  usually  referred  to as   "amnesty."    Yet  both 
men specifically   stated  their  opposition  to  amnesty.     Am- 
nesty  is  but  one   of  several ways   a  President   can  change 
the status  of  those accused of breaking the  law.     There 
are also  "pardon," "clemency," and "leniency."    The 
terms have   distinct  legal  and historical  meanings; 
however,   the various meanings  and applications of  these 
terms  are   frequently   interchanged  or   confused.     The  nega- 
tive connotations   of  "unconditional  blanket  amnesty" 
have already been  discussed.     Ford  steadfastly avoided 
any association of  this  phrase with his   plan,   and made  a 
point  of  reject- g  this  notion.     Nor  did  Ford  call his 
Plan a  "pardon"  or  "clemency."    HOW  did he  describe  his 
intended actions?     These words and phrases appeared 
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in references   to  his  plan  and  ideas:      "love,"  "nercy," 
"to bind  up  the  nation's wounds,"   "to  deal with  the  dif- 
ferent kinds  of  cases," "should have a second chance," 
"leniency,"  "earned  re-entry,"  "rehabilitating all  the 
casualties of the   tragic past."    Gerald Ford was careful 
to  avoid  labeling his   intended program with  any   title  or 
phrase  that would  carry negative   implications. 
Mr.   Carter was  not   so  careful.     He  too  stated his 
opposition  to blanket  amnesty,  but   then  declared himself 
in  favor  of  a  "blanket  pardon."    The  Legionnaires  did not 
wait   for  Carter   to   clear  up   this   distinction,   but  rather 
began  immediately  providing  him with  explicit  negative 
feedback--they booed.     This   is one key difference in the 
two speeches.     Ford  said only   that  he   intended  to make 
some  sort  of  reconciliation   step  involving work  assign- 
ments;   Carter  announced  specifically blanket  pardons   for 
evaders,   and   individual   case   consideration  for deserters. 
A  recurring  set  of  images   in  both  speeches 
characterize  the   leniency measures  as healing,  ending 
suffering,   closing wounds,   and  rehabilitating  the  injured 
or  lost-images   that  suggest   an American  body politic   that 
needs   to  be  cleansed  once  and   for  all   of   the   internal 
disorders   created  by  its   involvement  in the  Vietnam 
conflict.     Ford  refers   to:      "the urgent problem of how  to 
bind  up   the  nation's  wounds,"   "all,   in  a  sense,   are 
casualties,"   "the  agony  of   the  young,"   "the rebuilding of 
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peace," "a new atmosphere," "to join in rehabilitaing all 
the casualties of the tragic conflict of the past." 
Jimmy Carter, too, speaks of the need to "bind up 
our wounds"--the implication being that Ford's attempt to 
"bind up our wounds" had failed. 
. . . time for the damage, hatred and divisiveness 
of the Vietnam war to be over ... we can come 
together and seek a rebirth of patriotism ... we 
must bind up our w ands.  We simply cannot afford to 
let them fester any longer . . . our attention must 
turn to rebuilding . . . the need for strength as a 
prerequisite for peace. 
The major thrust of Carter's reasoning in his 
amnesty-related remarks is "forgive and forget"; that 
whatever happened due to Vietnam is in the past, and old 
injuries must be reconciled as we look to the future.  The 
major thrust of Ford's reasoning is that the violators 
were young men who made mistakes, and that those who made 
the right choices in the same situation, the veterans, 
should forgive the violators.  Ford's reasoning is con- 
sistent with his policies.  Carter's reasoning is con- 
sistent with his definition of "pardon"; that no attempt 
is made to judge the draft evaders, or place guilt.  He 
did not attempt, as Ford did, to include directly the 
veterans in the leniency action and reasoning.  Ford 
asked the audience to "join in rehabilitating all the 
casualties," implying that they had a role in the rebuild- 
Ing.  Carter merely stated his position, gave his reason- 
in , then said that veterans more than anyone else would 
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understand  the need   for  such  a move.     He  did  not   elabo- 
rate  further. 
Effects 
Any  attempt   to  gauge   the  effects  of a  modern 
public  communication  must  consider both  the  immediate 
audience   effect  and  the  effect  upon  the national   audience 
present   through  the  mass  media.     Today,   most  political 
persuasion  is  achieved  through  television,   radio,   and  the 
printed media.     The media image of a political  figure is 
of primary   importance   if  that   figure   is   to  succeed.     In 
this  section   the  immediate  effects  of  the  two  addresses 
by Ford  and Carter will  be  discussed briefly;   then will 
follow a  more   in-depth  analysis  of  the  effects beyond 
the V.   F.   W.   and American  Legion  conventions.     Since  both 
of  these   speeches were   followed by  subsequent  discourses 
on amnesty,   the   long-term effects  will  be  best  explained 
after brief  digressions   to  consider  other  discourses. 
Short-Term Effects 
Some  of   the  responses  of  the  immediate  audiences 
have been  noted.     As   Gerald  Ford  launched   into his 
announcements   about  his   leniency  proposals,   the  veterans 
were  described  as  sitting  in  "shocked   silence";*?   subse- 
quent  applause  was   "restrained."**     Until   the  leniency 
47-A Sure Touch in Ford's  Second Week," p.   U. 
48H«, York Times,   20  August  1974,   p.   18. 
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remarks   the  audience  had been strongly enthusiastic;   past 
that  point,   they  were  only  politely  receptive.     The 
Veterans  of  Foreign  Wars  were not persuaded by  the  Presi- 
dents  arguments.      Two  days   later   the   convention  adopted 
this  resolution: 
We  sustain  total   ODOosition   to  general  and selective 
amnesty  for   draft dodgers and military deserters  and 
(believe)   that   they  should be  required to  stand  trial 
.   .   .   and   .    .    .   pay   such  penalties  as  laws  prescribed5 
The rest  of  Ford's   address was well received;   only 
with  the  amnesty-related  remarks   did Gerald Ford   fail   to 
win  total  agreement   from  the  V.   F.  W.   audience. 
The  most  obvious   and  immediate  of  responses   to 
Carter's   speech was   the   chorus  of  boos  that   interrupted 
him.     But  besides  his   comments  on  amnesty  and pardon, 
most  of his  address  was  well   received by   the  Legionnaire;;. 
They  gave   the   candidate  a  standing ovation at  the  end  of 
his  address.50     Later,   Harry Wiles,   the American  Legion 
National  Commander,   said   "I   think  the  Legion  agrees with 
half of what  Mr.   Carter  said."51     The  majority  of   this 
audience was  not   convinced by  Carter's  arguments   about 
amnesty and pardon;   however,   his willingness   to face  the 
controversy  seems   to  have  made  an  impression with   some 
American  Legion members: 
A9"Amnesty:     President Fans a »urn^f/DebaC?A" 
P. S. News and World Report,   2  September   1974,   p.   16. 
SOTlme,   6  September 197 6,   p.   10. 
51Hew York Times,   25 August 1976,   p.  1. 
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But  the  Legionnaires   oppose both amnesty  and par- 
don.     Moreover,   many  of  them see no difference  between 
them.     Nevertheless,   there were  those  in  the audience 
of  15,000   at  the   Seattle  Center  Coliseum who  said  that 
they  admired Mr.   Carter   for   taking a  stand  that  he 
knew would be  unpopular.^2 
Ford,   Amnesty,   and  Richard Nixon: 
Effects,   August-SeptembeY 1974 
The nationwide  ramifications  of Gerald Ford's  speech 
are  evident   in   two  directions:     the  effect  of his  speech 
on  the amnesty   issue,   and  the  effect  of his   speech  on his 
image  as   President. 
Debate  on  the  amnesty   issue,   which had  diminished 
under  Richard  Nixon,   was   re-opened by  this  address. 
Articles  reviewing  the  facts   and   the  arguments  pro  and  con 
appeared   in numerous   periodicals   afterwards.      In his   speech 
Ford  indicated   that   the  final  plan would reflect   the  con- 
sensus  opinion  concerning  a  solution   to the  amnesty  issue; 
yet  it was  apparent  in his  speech  that,  whatever,   public 
opinion might  be,   the   solution would  entail   resisters work- 
ing  their way  back,   without  serving prison  terms.     This 
solution,   presented  in complete  form some  weeks   later, 
proved  to be   acceptable   to  some,   and objectionable   to many. 
If Gerald  Ford's   intention was  merely  to re-open  the  de- 
bate  on  amnesty   so  that  he   could   get  "the   full   spectrum 
of American  opinion  on   this  controversial   question," 
52Ibid.,   26 August  1976,   p.   23. 
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then he  certainly  succeeded.     If his   intent was,  however, 
to  gain  public   approval   for  his  plan,   then he  was  not 
entirely  successful.     Some   liberal  elements  such as   the 
Christian Century and Senator George McGovern expressed 
cautious   approval  of Ford's   proposal.53    Yet   the majority 
of  those  favoring  unconditional  amnesty  disapproved;   and, 
perhaps  most  importantly,   the 
majority of   the   draft  resisters  and deserters  inter- 
viewed  by  Time   correspondents  said  that  they would 
accept  nothing   less   than  unconditional  amnesty,   ex- 
plaining  that  any hing   less  would  imply wrongdoing 
on their part.54 
On the other side of the issue, conservatives, and 
particularly veterans' organizations, continued to oppose 
any  form of   leniency.55 
As  a  booster   to his   ethos   as   President,    this  ad- 
dress was   strikingly  successful   for Gerald  Ford.     It 
demonstrated,   perhaps more   than  any  other  action during 
his   first  few days   in office,   the welcome  change of policy 
from the  Nixon  administration  to  the  Ford administration.56 
It  also  demonstrated Ford's   own  abilities  as  a   decision 
maker  and  a   leader.      The  Christian  Century  said  of  the 
53See "Mr Ford's  Cautious  Reconciling Step," p. 
811,   and New York  Times,   20  August  1974,   p.   1. 
5'*"A  Sure  Touch  in Ford's  Second Week,"  p.   11. 
^Washington   Post,   26 August  1974,  p.   1. 
5°See   "Amnesty:     President  Fans   a  Burning Debate," 
and New York  Times,    20  August  1974,   p.    13. 
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leniency remarks:     "Those are  the words of a leader."5' 
The  V.   F.   W.   speech  along with  other  Ford actions   pro- 
duced  an  effective   first  ten  days  in  office: 
The  activity was   calculated  to  project  an  image 
of a  Chief  Executive who was   firmly   in  command  and 
to  diminish whatever  doubts  might   still  linger  over 
the   transition  from Richard  Nixon   to a new  and  un- 
tested  President.     Much  as  Lyndon  Johnson  did  in  the 
week  after  John  F.   Kennedy's  assassination,   Ford was 
reaching out   for  a national   consensus,   a  show  of 
bipartisan  support--and he was   doing  it with a  sure 
touch.     Declared  Democratic  Senator  Edward  Kennedy 
of  Ford's   first   days   as   President:     "It's  bee1]™ 
excellent.      I  don't   think he's  missed a  beat."38 
In articles running on two consecutive days,   the 
Christian  Science  Monitor  expressed  similar  reactions: 
"After  only   11   days   as   President,  Gerald  Ford  is  showing 
a willingness   to   face   up   quickly  to  divisive  issues   in 
the  U.   S.   and   to  making  initial  moves   toward  solving 
them."58     In  the   second  article,   it  was   argued  "More 
importantly he acted on his   inaugural promises of 
reconciliation by promptly  • ldressing this divisive issue, 
showing  a  sensitivity   to   it  and  to  its  human  factors 
which had been  mist,   ag  in   the  Nixon White House." 
Gerald Ford's   tactic of presenting his leniency 
proposal   to  an  audience  of veterans   made  some  impression: 
57"Mr.   Ford's   Cautious   Reconciling Step,"  p.   811. 
58-A  Sure  Touch   in  Ford's   Second Week,"  p.   11. 
59christian  Science Monito_r,   20 August  19 74,   p.   1. 
60ibid.,   21  August   1974,   p.   #. 
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Perhaps the most remarkable fact about President 
Ford's Chicago statement on amnesty was not what he 
said but where he said it. 
Veterans'   conventions,  not entirely without  prompting 
on  their   part,   have   come  to  be  viewed by  politicians 
as   forums   for  saber-rattling and jingoism.     Ue   do  not 
recall   that   a  major  political  figure  has  risen   to 
statesmanlike  utterance  before  a veterans'   conven- 
tion  since  Adlai  Stevenson,   22  years   ago  this  month, 
reminded  the  American Legion--then  deeply  embroiled 
in  domestic   Red-hunting--that "patriotism  is  not  the 
fear of  something;   it  is the love of something.   ..." 
The   important  thing  is   that   President  Ford has  had 
the  moral  courage  to  take his  case  to  the   toughest, 
not   the   easiest,   audience;   and  that  he  is  not  just 
mouthing  the   language  of  reconciliation but  trying 
to effect it.61 
Not  everyone  was   pleased with Gerald  Ford's  amnesty- 
related  speech  and proposals.     According  to  a  summary  of 
responses   in   the  Washington  Post,   conservative  Republi- 
cans,   along with veterans'   groups,   saw this  as   a  shift 
by Ford  away   from his  own  conservative principles. 
One bitter  Republican  official, who warned  that 
concern  al:     it   amnesty  for Vietnam-era  deserters   and 
draft  dodc    trs  was  not   limited  to   "a  few bomb-throwing 
idiots on the  right" but extended far over  into tne 
party  center,   said  that  Mr.   Ford's  suggestion  for 
conditional   amnesty   in a  speech  to  the Veterans   of 
Foreipn Wars   had   "put  Republican  candidates  on  the 
defensive   for  no   reason. •62 
The majority  of  reactions   to  Ford's  proposals were  posi- 
tive,  however. 
The  immediate,   nationwide   effects   of  Ford's  V.   F.   W. 
address  were   greater  on  Gerald Ford himself  than  on  the 
amnesty  issue   itself.     The nation  seemed not   so much 
6lGreeiisboro  Daily  News,   22 August   1974,   p.   6. 
67-WashlnEton Post,   26 August 1974,   p.   8. 
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concerned with what Ford proposed to do about the war 
resisters,   as   that he proposed to do anything about  them 
at all.     A National  Observer  reporter,   after  interviewing 
people   in   the  Washington,   D.   C.   area,  wrote,   "People  here 
seem  to  care   far  less   about  amnesty  as  an issue  that  they 
do about  the President's   compassionate approach to it." 
The  Ford  V.   F.   VJ.   speech and  leniency  proposal 
capped  off  an   enormously   successful   first  ten  days  in 
office.     But  the   tremendous  ethos-strengthening  that 
resulted  from  the   leniency move may well  have been a 
result  of   fortunate   timing as  well  as  anything  else. 
Ford was perceived  as   honest   and believable,   a welcomed 
relief   from Richard  Nixon.     His  popularity would have 
remained higher  than Nixon's had he even simply sat in 
the White  House  and done  nothing.     As   it was,   he made 
some bold,   decisive  moves   that  disassociated  him from 
the Nixon  administration   and   established Gerald Ford 
as  a  strong personality of his  own.     With  the  amnesty 
issue,   Richard  Nixon paved  the way   for  Ford   to  gain  from 
his  policy   announcements.     Nixon  refused  to   consider 
amnesty.     Ford's  program,   limited as  it was,  was seen as 
a step  forward   from the Nixon policy.     Even those who did 
not  like  the  specifics  of  Ford's  proposal  understood   it 
63-Amnesty:     A  Calm After  the  Storr,,"  National 
Observer,   31 August  1974,   p.   1. 
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as an attempt  to do something about  the problem of the 
war resisters,   and appreciated that attempt. 
J.   F.   terHorst,   in  his  biography  of Gerald  Ford, 
writes, 
It was   the  contrast with  Nixon  that made  Ford  so 
initially  attractive  as   a  President;   one wonders what 
the  national  judgment would  have  been  if  Ford had 
followed  an  Eisenhower  or John Kennedy.b* 
This   is  the  key   to   the  success   of   the V.   F.   W. 
speech   in  creating  a positive  image   for Gerald Ford. 
At another   time,   under   different   circumstances,   the  same 
speech and policy might have attracted little attention, 
or might  have  done   far  less   for  Ford's  ethos.     But   in 
the  context  of  Richard  Nixon,   with his Watergate   troubles 
and his   absolute   shunning  of  any  form of   leniency  for 
war  resisters,   "nice  guy"  Gerald  Ford,  with his mild  pro- 
gran of   leniency  and his  blunt,   direct,   and  trustworthy 
style of politics,   appeared,   if not  great,   then  at   least 
superior  to  his  predecessor. 
Events   of   the next   few weeks   showed that  Gerald 
Ford's  tremendous  popularity was  short-lived.     Ford 
started his   administration with  a  "honeymoon" with  Con- 
gress.     Whereas  Nixon had   tended  to be  noncommunicative 
with  Congressional   leaders,   Ford  held   several meetings 
with  them  in  his   first   few  days   in office.     In  these 
meetings,   in  his   selection  of  Nelson  Rockefeller  as  his 
64j.  F.   terHorst, geraldFord nnA the Future of 
the Presidency   (New York:     JoseinToT^klTPublisning 
liorapany,   Inc.,   1974),   p.   215. 
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choice  for Vice-President,   in his  clemency proposal,   in 
his general willingness   to listen to advisors,   to accept 
new input,   to   deal  with pressing problems,  Ford had  come 
to be highly  regarded by  Congress,   the national  press, 
and the nation.     But  all  this  changed with the   issuance 
of one brief  document   on  Sunday,   September 8,   1974--the 
pardon  of  Richard  Nixon  for  any Watergate-related crimes. 
Public  reaction was   immediate  and adverse;  within  days, 
Ford's  popularity  ratings  had dropped  significantly.65 
65In August   1974,   71  percent   of  the  American public 
had thought  Ford was  doing a  good job.     Three months   later 
only 43  percent  approved his   conduct   in  office,   39  percent 
disapproved,   and   13  percent  were  undecided.     Arthur T. 
Kadley,   The  Invisible   Primary   (Englewood  Cliffs,   New Jer- 
sey:     Prentice-Hall,   Inc.,   1976),  p.   170. 
Columnist  Mary McGrory,   as cited  in  terHorst,   pp. 
238-239,   interprets   Ford's   sudden  drop  in popularity  as 
the awakening  of  a  national  prass  and public   thai: had been 
lulled  into  expecting  greatness   from Ford: 
...  And what made him think he could get away 
with   it   (the  pardon  of  Richard  Nixon)?     Here  the  press 
must step   forward with bowed head      Reading his notices 
for the  first month  in office,   Ford learned that he 
was   irresistible,      invulnerable,   and  invincible.     The 
Washington  press   corps   lost   its  head °Y" Ge^%Ss A thousand  reporters were  turned  overnight  into   flacks 
for  Jerry  Ford.     They  raved  about  his  decency,   his 
smile,   his   English muffins,   his peachy dancing. 
'in   their  lust * for'decent   leadership!.they went  all 
out,   promising  themselves  and  their reader     a  rose 
garden.     Thev joyfully chronicled the °ve,rtu"s  C° 
the  Vietnam exiles,   the blacks     the women       They bab 
bled  about   fresh winds  and  total   change       They  forgot 
to   impeacri  Justice   wim-cu-i w.   »~-e „,-jori^   ao his   unbecoming  performance  as vice  president  as 
"^perhaps*did*US  all  a  favor  by  slapping us  all 
awake that   Sunday morning. 
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So the  great   ethos   boost  Gerald  Ford had  gained  from his 
V.  F.  W.   speech was   in  effect  nullified by  the  Nixon 
pardon.     Meanwhile,   the amnesty issue receded,   as  the 
clemency board began   their   investigations   and began 
drafting proposals   for  a  specific  plan—actions   that were 
necessary,   but  not  particularly  newsworthy. 
Ford^s__Remarks   Announcing  tne 
Clemency  Program,   September   15,   1974 
Eight   days after the  pardon of  Richard Nixon,   Ford 
faced television cameras with a brief statement outlining 
the plan  for   "reconciliation"  of  evaders  and deserters.66 
He reiterated basic   facts:      that he  had   instructed  the 
Attorney  General  and  Secretary  of Defense   to  research  the 
status  of  resisters,   and  that  he had announced at  the 
August  19   V.   F.   W.   convention his   intention of  giving  the 
resisters   a  chance   to  return.     He  repeated  language  used 
in the August   19   speech:     "bind up  the Nation's wounds," 
"throw  the  weight  of  my  Presidency  into   the  scales  of 
justice  on   the   side   of  leniency,"  "my  predecessors   .   .    . 
Harry Truman  and Abraham Lincoln."    He  stated  that his 
objective was   to  make   the penalties  meted  out   fit   the 
seriousness  of   the   crimes   committed.     He   announced  the 
establishment  of a Clemency Review Board,   and briefly 
discussed  the  plan  of  requiring  alternative  service   for 
66See appendix. 
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returning war  resisters.     He  closed  by  saying, 
My sincere hope  is  that this   is a constructive 
step   toward   a  calmer  and cooler  appreciation of our 
individual  rights  and  responsibilities  and  our 
common  purpose  as  a nation whose  future  is  always 
more  important   than its past. 
He then   signed  the  Executive order,   and  the  address  was 
over. 
This   speech  offered  little  that  was  new  or  dif- 
ferent from the  V.   F.  W.   address.     Ford simply restated 
the  arguments,   and   discussed  in  practical   terms  what  the 
plan would  entail.      Little   attempt  at  persuasion  is  evi- 
dent  in   this   talk;   not   surprisingly,   little  persuasion 
was  achieved  because  of  this   talk.     The  amnesty-related 
remarks  of  one month  ago had  created a big news   splash. 
With a newly  approached  subject,   Ford had  surprised   the 
nation;   he had addressed  a  hostile  audience,   and  the 
contrast   to  Richard  Nixon was  pleasing  to  newspersons  and 
citizens   alike.      But  now  the  newness  and  surprise  of  the 
issue had  faded.     While   the   first  address  had  impressed 
people with   the   fact   that   Ford was  doing  something  about 
the war  resisters,   this   second  talk  had merely  to  present 
the  specific  plan.     The  plan,   attempting a  compromise  on 
a highly  polarizing   issue,   was,   like  many   compromises,   not 
initially well  received  by   the majority  of  either  advo- 
cates of  total amnesty or those opposed to any form of 
amesty.     Finally,   in   the wake of  the Nixon  pardon,   this 
second announcement   inevitably  invited  comparisons  between 
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the  full   and  complete  pardon  granted  to  Nixon,  wlio had 
never been brought   to   trial,   and  the  very  limited 
clemency  offered   to   the resisters,   many  of whom had 
already served jail   sentences or had lived in exile  for 
years.     Ford  attempted   to   deny  comparisons  between  the 
two acts: 
The  only  connection between  the  two  cases  is   the 
effort   that   I  made   in   the  one   to heal  the wounds 
involving  the   charges   against  Mr.   Nixon  and my  honest 
and  conscientious  effort  to heal   the wounds   for  those 
who  have  deserted military  service or   dodged  the 
draft.     That's   the  only  connection between  the   two.0' 
Yet   the   comparisons  were made,   and  the  limited 
clemency  of war  resisters   did  not   appear  quite  so  generous 
by  contrast.     For   all  of  these  reasons-the   lack  of any 
new persuasive  effort by Ford,   the   loss  of newness  or 
shock value   of   the  announcements,   the  specific nature  of 
the plans   given  in  the   talk,   and  the  shadow of  the  Richard 
Nixon pardon-the   second  Ford   talk  on  clemency,   given  to 
a nationwide  television  audience,   had an   insignificant 
effect  on  either   the  ethos   of  Ford   or  on  public  opinion 
concerning   the  amnesty   issue.     And   the  great   ethos  boost 
Ford had  gained   from his  V.   F.   W.   speech,   negated  by 
the Nixon pardon,   was temporary,   and did not reemerge 
with the September  16  clemency announcement. 
67cerald   Ford,   cited  in Wa^hJngton_Post,   17 
September   1974,   p.   11. 
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Jimmy  Carter  and  Amnesty: 
Effects.   August-November  1976 
Jimmy Carter's   American  Legion  address  of August 
Ik    1976,  had   little  immediate  effect  upon  the  amnesty 
issue.      Carter was   only  a  Presidential   candidate when he 
delivered  this   address.     Ford  implemented his  decision 
soon after he   spoke  about   them whereas   Carter,   for the 
time being,   could only state future intentions.     Also,   the 
two years'   lapse  and  the  Ford  leniency  program had made 
amnesty a less  volatile issue.     Finally,   Carter's pro- 
posed  pardon  for  evaders   stood   to  affect   only  a  minority 
of  the  violators —about   12,000  of  an  estimated  106,000 
men.68     For  all  of   these  reasons,   his  remarks  produced 
no immediate  change   in   the  status   of  the  amnesty  issue  or 
in the  amount   of   debate   concerning amnesty.     However, 
Carter was  probably  not  overly  concerned with  stirring up 
debate  on  amnesty.     He   did not   say  that,   if  elected,   he 
would  seek out   public   opinion on   amnesty,   or  accept new 
input  on  his   decision;   he  simply  said  that he would  grant 
the pardons. 
In  a  Presidential   campaign,   issues   do  not  become 
major  focal  points   of  discussion  unless  more   than one 
candidate  chooses   to  deal with  them.     Gerald  Ford  gave 
no response whatsoever   to  Carter's  American  Legion address. 
With Ford's   consistent   silence  on   the amnesty  issue,   and 
68New York Times,   28 August   1976,   p.   20. 
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the exclusion  of  any  mention  of  amnesty  from the  1976 
Republican Party Platform,   the Republicans  tried to 
minimize the importance of the amnesty issue,   to treat 
it as  a  closed,   finished  matter.     The  one  noticeable 
response  came   in  Robert  Dole's   speech   to  the American 
Legion.     This   speech merits  a  brief digression,   since 
Dole,   as  Ford's   choice   for  Vice-President,   presumably 
would not  have made   statements   that  did not  represent 
in  substance  the  views  of  Ford;   and since  Dole's  response 
influenced  the effects of Carter's address. 
Robert Dole:     August   25,   1976 
The   next  day  after  Carter was booed  by  the  American 
Legion  for   advocating blanket  pardons   for  draft  evaders, 
Robert  Dole,   addressed   the   same  American Legion  National 
Convention.     Dole   did not  name  Carter,   but   said  that  a 
speaker,   "whoever he  was,   had  provided his   own  defini- 
tions"  for  amnesty  and  pardon. 69     Dole  said he  had 
checked Webster's Ne« "™-ld Dictionary and found no such 
distinction.      "It  defines   amnesty  as  a  general  pardon." 
Dole received  a  loud,   standing ovation  from the  Legion- 
naires when  he   declared: 
69ibid.,   26 August   1976,   p.   22. 
70ibid.     Note  that    while Carter's definition^ ^ 
may have been  of his  own  invention.   Dole  s   c than 
those definitions are no more historicaUX  ^ n 
Carter's.      Sec   supra,   history of  amnesty,   Chapter 
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Let   there  be   no  confusion  as  to  President  Ford's 
position  on   this   issue.     It  is  unequivocal,   and 
applies   equally   to  draft  evaders  and deserters,  no 
blanket  pardon,   no  blanket  amnesty,   no blanket 
clemency. '-*• 
Dole   continued,   attacking  Carter  and praising  the 
Ford clemency  program: 
Today,   we  have  those who would  signal weakness  and 
generate  strife  by  declaring  that  those who   served 
this  nation   in her  armed  forces  deserve no  greater 
consideration   than   those who  turned  their backs  and 
scurried away. 
President  Ford extended   the hand  of mercy  to  tnose 
who  fled America when   she needed  their  service.     He 
offered  them a  chance   to  earn  clemency,   and  I  say 
earn  clemency,   by  proving  their  right  to  resume  their 
place  in  this  nation.     The  offer was  extended  to  draft 
evaders  and  deserters   alike,   on a  case-by-case basis. 
Some  accepted.      Some   19,000.     Some  refused.     Some 
80,000  or  90,000.     As   far  as  I know,   the  effort  is 
finished.72 
In  the   absence  of  comments  by  Ford,   these  remarks 
stand as   representative  of  the  Republican ticket.     Besides 
winning  the  overwhelming  support  of the  Legionnaires, 
Dole's   comments   accomplished  little  else,  receiving  far 
less  publicity   than had  Carter's  remarks of  the  previous 
day.     The  negative,   vindictive  tone of  Dole's  remarks 
invited   criticism of  him as   a  "hatchet  man,"  doing Ford's 
dirty  political  work.     For  example,   an  editorial   in   the 
Washington Post   stated: 
The Republican  vice-presidential  nominee     Mr    Dole, 
followed  Mr.   Carter   to   the  American  Legion pod.um 
yesterday  and  gave  a   tough politicalspeech  intended 
apparently   to   convey  that,   whereas  nr. 
7lNew  York  Times,   26  August   1976,   p.   22. 
72lbid. 
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both   thoughtful  and  firm  in his  past  approach  to 
this  matter,   the  Democratic  nominee   is  being casual 
and weak.     Mr.   Dole  contrived  this  impression by 
means  of  a   combination of nuance,   misstatement   and 
sloganeering  that,   one  hopes,   will not  be his  regular 
campaign  style.      In  fact,   the  spirit  in which Mr. 
Carter would  advance beyond  the  Ford position  to 
offer  pardon  to  draft-law  evaders   is  quite  the  spirit 
in which Mr.   Ford  pardoned his  predecessor  in  the 
White House.'-' 
Except   for   the  Presidential  debates,   this  Dole 
response  was  the  closest  the  Ford  team came  to  entering 
the  discussion  on  amnesty   during  the  1976  campaign. 
At  this  point   in  Jimmy  Carter's  Presidential 
campaign,   regeneration  of   the  amnesty-pardon  controversy 
was not   important;   what was   important was  that his   Ameri- 
C      Legion  speech be  successful  in  improving his   image. 
irently  it was   successful.     The American Legion  address 
came  after  three  days  of  campaigning on  the West  Coast, 
where   the  Democratic  nominee  had met  large,   enthusiastic 
crowds,   and had been well  received.     At   this  early point 
in  the campaign,   with  the  election  still more   than   two 
months away,   any negative effects  of Carter's pardon 
views  on   the  public  might   fade  by  election  day.     The 
York  Times   reports   that  this was   the  thinking of  the 
Carter  staff: 
There was  evidently some  thought in the ^inds °f 
Carter  aides   that  perhaps  by  "ising  the  ques 
amnesty at  this  point,   its  iW^f/^^SLtely 
segments of the country could be dealt W1™    aipn 74 and perhaps   put  behind  in  the  Democrats     campaign. 
73washington Post,   26 August 1976,  p.   14. 
74Hew York  Times,   25  August   19 76,   p.   18. 
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What would  remain  in   the   voters'   minds,   after  the  speci- 
fics of Carter's   amnesty  views  faded,  would be  an   image 
of a  tough  candidate,   unafraid of  controversy. 
Carter   supporters   and amnesty advocates were 
pleased by  the   fact  that   Carter  faced a hostile audience 
to discuss  an   unpopular belief.     The New  York Times 
editorial   staff,   admittedly   in  favor of amnesty,  wrote 
this   two  days   after  the  speech: 
It   took  the kind of  forthrightness   that  is   in 
short  supply   in  contemporary  American  politics   for 
Jimmy  Carter   to  tell   an American Legion audience  in 
Seattle   that,   if  elected he would grant  a blanket( 
pardon  to  Vietnam  draft  evaders.   .   .    .Mr.   Carter  s 
stand on  the  issue of amnesty coincides with our 
views.     What  matters  more,   however,   in  anticipation 
of  the  Presidential  election  campaign,   is   the   clear 
implication   that Mr.   Carter intends   to  speak out  on 
controversial   issues,   even  at   the  risk of  displeasing 
special   interests   in   direct  confrontation.     It  Presi- 
dent  Ford   is  prepared   to  adopt   a  similar  course,   tne 
campaign could become a reaffirmation  of democracy in 
action.^5 
Even more   interesting are the reactions of  the 
members  of   the   Southern  Governors'   Conference.     One would 
expect  Carter   supporters   to   interpret his   pardon  speech 
as a  commendable  gesture,   but what  about   conservative 
Southerners,   some  of whom were  cool   towards  Carter  and 
many of whom were  cool   towards  amnesty?     Governor   Cliff 
Finch of Mississippi  said   that  constituents  of  his   state 
probably opposed  Carter  on  draft  evaders,   but would vote 
for  the  "total   man";   and  that   they   saw Carter  as  a 
75ibid.,   26 August   1976,   p.   32. 
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"conservative  with   some  progressive  ideas."    Governor 
David Pryor of Arkansas  indicated ttv C the pardon stand 
was  unpopular  in  Arkansas,   but  that   the  South would 
understand  that  Carter  "took  a hard and unpopular  stand." 
Southerners   disagree,   "but   they  admire  his  courage and 
in  the  South  courage  is  pretty big."76 
An  article  by  John  Osborne   in  the  New Republic 
suggests   that   Jimmy  Carter  deliberately  presented his 
pardon  statement   to   the American  Legion  audience   for 
precisely   this  kind of   image-building: 
Several   assistants who  participated  in  researching and 
preparing  the   speech  said afterward  that  the  pardon 
vs.   amnesty  reference   to  Vietnam era  draft  dodgers 
and  deserters  was   almost   an  afterthought and was never 
intended  either  to bring  on  the  confrontation  it  did 
or  to  overshadow  the  substantive  proposals   for de- 
fense  economies,   military  pension  improvements  and 
the  like   that   took  up  more words   and  time  than the 
pardon  passage  did.     These assistants  evidently 
'didn't Low  that  the passage in question was designed 
However  intentional  or  unintentional   the  amnesty 
remarks may have been,   both  those  remarks  and the audience 
response   to  those  remarks  made national  headlines   for 
Carter,   and  served   to   improve his   image with  regards   to 
the qualities   of   firmness,   decisiveness,   strength,   and 
willingness   to   face  controversy.     His  amnesty-related 
remarks,   made  to a different audience, would have pro- 
duced  a  far  less   significant  effect.     John  Osbome  states: 
76ibid., 31 August 1976, p. 16- 
77()sborrie, p. If. 
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Carter had been saying much the same  thing for 
months.      It  was   the  hostile  reaction,   not   the 
statement,   that  made   the  news  as  he  must  have 
known   it would.'" 
Jimmy  Carter  employed his   rhetoric  on  amnesty  success- 
fully by  careful  audience  selection.     As   a Presidential 
candidate,   he needed publicity,   and he needed  to have a 
positive  image  of  himself presented  in  the media.     The 
choice  of  the American  Legion  National   Convention  audience 
for his   amnesty   remarks   contributed  to both of  those 
objectives.      Carter's   amnesty  discourse had  a noticeable 
effect  upon  his   national   image  as  presented  in  the  media. 
As the   1976  campaign  progressed,   amnesty was   treated  in 
two more  situations:     the  Playboy   interview,   and  the Ford- 
Carter debate. 
"Lusting vs.   Amnesty":     The  Playboy 
Interview,   November,   1976. 
The  November,   1976,   issue  of Playboy magazine, 
containing  a   lengthy  interview with  Jimmy  Carter,   hit  the 
newsstands   days  before   the   1976  Presidential  elections. 
In it,   Carter  answered  questions  on  a wide  range  of  sub- 
jects,   including his  own  image,   his  record,   the press, 
religion,   abortion,   drug usage,   adultery,   homosexuality, 
the Supreme  Court,   Vietnam,   amnesty,   Communism,   Bob  Dylan, 
and his  Baptist   teachings.     The   final  passage  in  the 
in which  Carter  said,   "I've   looked on  a  lot of women with 
78ibid. 
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lust,"7^  attracted  much  adverse  publicity  for  the  Demo- 
cratic  candidate.     His   comments   on  sin and adultery, 
misquoted  and  taken  out  of  context,   overshadowed  the wide- 
ranging moral  and  philosophic  discussion  in  the  rest  of 
the Interview.     His answers  to questions about amnesty 
restated his   previous   arguments:      that  deserters,   due   to 
the nature  of   the  offense,   should be  dealt with  separately; 
that amnesty  and  pardon  are  distinct;   and  that  he   implied 
no judgment,   but merely forgetting of the offenses."^ 
The amnesty  remarks,   in   the  context  of  the  religious  and 
moral beliefs   espoused  throughout   the  Playboy  interview, 
are consistent  with  Carter's   interpretation of  Baptist 
doctrine.     Except   for  the  "lusting  after women" passage, 
little  attention  was   paid  to  the   substance  of  the   rest 
of this  interview.     So because the  amnesty remarks were 
overshadowed by much more   controversial  statements  which 
received national  media  attention,   and because  the  amnesty 
remarks  offered no  new  arguments,   but  merely restated 
previous  arguments,   their  effects  were  insignificant  on 
the amnesty   issue  or  Carter. 
The_Ford-Carter  Debate,   September   23,   1976 
Amnesty was   one  of  numerous   issues   discussed   in 
the first  of  three   televised  debates  held between  Ford 
7^Playboy,   p.   06. 
o^See  Appendix 
U7 
and Carter,   sponsored by  the League  of Women  Voters.81 
The format  consisted  of  question-and-answer between each 
candidate  and a  panel  of newspersons,   with  little  oppor- 
tunity  for  direct   confrontation  between  the  two  candi- 
dates.     Frank  Reynolds   first  questioned Gerald Ford, 
reminding him that  only  a minority of eligible men had 
taken advantage  of  the  Ford  clemency program,   and  com- 
paring the  clemency with   the pardon of Richard Nixon. 
Ford  replied  that  his  program gave all men a   chance  to 
earn their way back,   that fourteen or fifteen thousand 
had done   so,   and  that he was  opposed  to  across-the- 
board pardons  for  evaders  or deserters.     He  then  explained 
his  rationale   for  the Nixon  pardon.     Reynolds  pressed  the 
point,   asking whether  Ford  didn't  think  that   the  90,000 
remaining resisters  had not  suffered  enough.     Ford 
answered   that  Jimmy   Carter would   give  blanket  pardons   to 
evaders,   and  that   Ford  didn't  agree with  that.     He  repeated 
that his program had lasted amply long,   that all men had 
had an opportunity   to  voluntarily  clear  their names,   and 
that he didn't believe anything further should be done. 
Then   it  was   candidate  Carter's  turn  to  speak.     He 
began by   saying   that   Ford  could  not  easily explain  the 
difference between the Nixon pardon and his attitude 
towards   amnesty.      Then,   although  no one  at  the  debate  had 
accused  Carter  of  advocating amnesty,   he  defended himself 
SlSee  Appendix. 
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by saying,   "As   a matter  of  fact,   I   don't  advocate  amnesty. 
I advocate  pardons."     Here  Carter  repeated his   amnesty- 
pardon  distinction,   emphasizing  that  he would  forgive 
draft  evaders,   right  or wrong.     He  said  that Ford's 
program had  excused  three  times   as  many deserters  as 
evaders.     Shifting  into   less  specific   statements,   Carter 
expressed  the need  to   "heal  our  country  after  the  Vietnam 
War."    He  added  that what  people  are  interested  in  is  not 
amnesty or pardon,   but whether the justice system is  fair. 
He  spoke briefly  about   "white-collar  crime"--an  oblique 
reference  to   the Watergate,   i.e.,   Republican,   administra- 
tion—then  said he hoped to help make the justice  system 
fair and hoped   to  help  end  the  divisiveness  of  the  Vietnam 
war.    At   the  end of  this   digression,   a new question was 
asked,   and   the  amnesty  subject was   closed. 
The  political  debate  is   an honored  tradition  in 
the  United  States.     Here,   face-to-face,   candidates   can 
no longer   talk   in  circles  and  avoid each other,   but  must 
face the  issues   and  the  opponents.     Stanley   Kelley  indi- 
cates  that   Presidential  political   debates  can have  a 
clarifying effect: 
It   (the debating situation)   led the candidates   to 
state  their  positions with  greater  clarity  and  in 
more specific terms.     It led each to acknowledge the 
other's  position.      It  reduced  distortion  in  accounts 
of party records and party policies. 
82stanley Kelley,   Jr.,   PoliticiLCanE^5£i-nn Problems   in  Creating  an  InformiTT^ecgraErWshington, 
VTCT:     The  Brookings   lnstitutionrT5F0)TP-   $9. 
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The   Ford-Carter  debate   produced  no  new or  signi- 
ficant  statement  by  either  speaker  on   the amnesty  issue. 
Ford  stated  that,   as   far  as  he was   concernad,   the  effort 
had already been   made  and   the   issue was  closed.     Carter 
after  taking a  couple  of  mild  jabs  at  Ford,   paraphrased 
his  same  standard  pardon  policy  statement.     The  debate 
situation  failed   to  produce  any  lively  interchange,   or 
in-depth  discussion  of  reasoning or belief.     This   failure 
is  partly  attributable  to   the  format--as  mentioned before, 
the candidates  did not  really  debate each other,  but 
rather  answered  interviewers'   questions.     But  perhaps 
equally   important   is   that,   although  their plans  differed 
in specifics,   Jimmy Carter and Gerald Ford had expressed 
similar  sentiments   on  amnesty,   and had  expressed  those 
sentiments   in  remarkably  similar  language.     Beyond   the 
fact  that  one  plan had been Ford's   and   the other  plan 
was Carter's,   they  really  had   little  to  debate  about. 
Each man   stated his  position,   briefly  criticized his 
opponent,   and   stopped.     An  editorial  printed one month 
earlier had predicted this   effect of the amnesty issue: 
Because Gov.   Carter  and President Ford find 
themselves   in   principle,   if not   in  detail,   on   the 
same   side  of   the  issue,   the pardon  plan  shouldn  t  ^ 
become  a  major  bone  of  contention  in  the  campaign. 
An  in-depth  discussion  of  the effects  of  the 
Presidential  debates   is  beyond  the   scope  of  this  thesis. 
83creensboro   Daily  News,   26  August   1976,   p.   4. 
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In evaluating  the  importance  of  the  comments   on  amnesty 
in this   debate,   however,   certain  pieces  of evidence  are 
worth noting.     The   first   debate was  viewed by  an esti- 
mated  100,000,000  people.84     A Gallup  Poll  survey  indi- 
cated  that  38  percent   of   those who watched the  debate 
believed Gerald  Ford won;   25  percent  thought  Carter won.85 
Another  survey   taken by   the polling   firm of Yankelovich, 
Skelly and White  presents an interesting paradox.    While 
voters were  more   impressed overall by  Ford's  performance 
in the   first   debate — 41  percent  to  28  percent--more 
voters actually agreed with Carter's stand on  the  issues 
than Ford's--by  44  percent   to  40  percent.86     Considering 
the closeness  of   these   results,   and  the  conflicting nature 
of some of  the  figures ;   and  considering that   the  amnesty- 
Nixon  pardon  question was  but  one  of  twelve  sets  of ques- 
tions   in   the   first  of  three   debates,   it   La   difficult  to 
conclude  anything  other  than  that,   despite  the   large 
audience,   the   amnesty  remarks   in  this   context  had a negli- 
gible  effect   on  the  respective   images  or political  success 
of Ford or  Carter.     This   debate was   the  first   (and only) 
time during  the   1976  Presidential  campaign   that   the  two 
candidates  spoke   face   to   face  about   the amnesty  issue. 
84Newsweek,   4  October   1976,   p.   23. 
85lbid.(   p.   27.      Of  the  other  37  percent,   29  per- 
cent  said neither   candidate,   and 8  percent were  unsure. 
86Daniel  Yankelovich,   "What   the Voters Want," 
ggwjtepublic■   23 October  1976,   p.   16. 
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Neither  of  them said  anything  new  or   substantially  dif- 
ferent  from  their  previous   statements.     The  debate  format 
in this   instance,   provided viewers with  a review  of the 
candidates'   stand on  the   issue,   rather  than a  debate or 
discussion of  that   issue. 
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CHAPTER  IV 
CONCLUSIONS,   RHETORICAL  EVALUATIONS 
As  stated   in   Chapter  I,   this   thesis   is  adhering 
to the  four-step  approach   to  rhetorical   criticism,   as 
outlined by  Robert  Cathcart:     description,   analysis, 
interpretation,   and  evaluation.     The process  will be 
completed  in   this   final   chapter.     In order   to  finish 
the  steps  of   interpretation  and  evaluation,   several  as- 
pects  of  this   study  require  discussion:     a  summary of 
some of  the   trends  in   the  rhetoric  of Ford  and Carter  on 
amnesty;   some  overall  conclusions   concerning   the  effects 
of their  rhetoric;   and,   finally,   a rhetorical  evaluation 
by artistic  and  ethical   standards. 
Trends   in   the  Rhetoric  of Amnesty 
Cerald  Ford's   address   to   the Veterans   of  Foreign 
Wars  remains   his  basic   position   statement  on  amnesty. 
All of his other discussions as  President  simply restated 
or defended  this  fundamental  statement.     In   it he expressed, 
in simple,   direct   language,   his   opposition  to   full  amnesty, 
his belief that  evaders  and deserters made a serious mis- 
take,   and his   belief   that   they  should be   forgiven only   if 
they are willing  to work  for   forgiveness  and   fulfill   their 
obligations.     His  was   a  compromise  position  on  a  divisive, 
Polarizing  issue.     This   attempt   at  compromise  and 
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reconciliation,   expressed  in  terms  of  forgiveness  and 
healing,   had  been  urged  upon  Ford by  both  family  and 
political   advisors.     Uith his  background of conser- 
vatism,   of hard work,   of  extreme   loyalty,   and  of 
strongly-held beliefs about America and the role she 
should play   in   the world,   Gerald  Ford  could not  under- 
stand  desertion  and  draft  dodging as  anything but 
mistakes,   as   letting  the   country  down  in  its   time  of 
need.     He   did understand,   though,   that  the Vietnam war 
forced many men   into  difficult  choices;   it was  a    war 
that had pleased  nobody,   neither   those who wanted no 
war,  nor  those,   like  Ford,   who  had wanted  fuller  commit- 
ment  to  the war.      Still,   to  Ford,   the  military  is  a 
responsibility,   and   those  who  shirk  their  responsibility 
could not   expect   to  be  absolved  of that  responsibility 
completely.     His   clemency  proposal was  seen as niggling 
by sone,   as  cheap,   as   less   than was  needed.     A great 
many exiles  refused  to  return  under  a program  that 
implied  their  guilt.     But   in  his   circumstances,  with 
his personal  and political values,   the clemency proposal 
was the most Gerald Ford  could offer.     He presented 
the proposal   first   in  front  of  an  audience  that  had  much 
in common with  him--military  experience,   conservative 
views,   belief   in  a  strong  national  defense and national 
security.      Strong   opposition  to  any  form of  leniency 
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for deserters  and   draft  dodgers  was   an   integral  part  of 
the belief  cluster   of  this   audience.     It was  the   toughest 
audience  Ford  could  have   faced   for  his  remarks--and 
precisely   for  that   reason,   he  faced  them.     He  gave  a 
speech  to   them much  as   one   father  would  address  a  group 
of fathers,   asking  them  to  excuse   their   sons'   misbehavior. 
His speech  told   them  that   they,   the  older men,   knew bet- 
ter;  but   they  should not   forget  that  youth  is   a  difficult 
time,   that  we  all  make mistakes,   that  the  young deserve 
a second  chance.     And  in   this  vein,   with mercy  and  com- 
passion,   they,   the  Veterans,   should  allow the  prodigal 
children  to  corne  home--not   free  of  charge,   but  under a 
program of  alternative   service.     The  rhetoric   in  this 
discourse   is   directe     towards  a more  conservative 
constituency—it   is   tough   language,   saying,   "We're  right 
and  they're wrong,   but  let's   let  them come back anyway." 
It is  the  kind of  rhetoric   that  might  appease  conserva- 
tives  and hawks,   and might   take  away  the   sting of  Ford's 
decision.      Presenting his   plan  as   the  golden mean,   he 
told them that amnesty is wrong—which brought cheers-- 
but that  revenge  is   equally wrong.     This  middle  ground, 
he hoped   to  convince   them,   might not be  popular,   but  it 
was  the best  course   in  this   situation. 
Like  Gerald  Ford,   Jimmy  Carter evolved one basic 
policy statement  on  the  amnesty  issue.     He  drafted  it 
early  in  his   campaign;   the   January,   1976  position  paper 
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outlined  the   arguments   that   he would  employ  throughout 
the  rest  of  the  campaign.     However,   his   amnesty position 
attracted   little  attention  until he  created a  large- 
scale media  event  by  speaking  about  amnesty  to  a hostile 
audience,   the  American  Legion  convention.     He  said  little 
that was  new;   but  he   spoke   to  a  group  that  booed him,   and 
thus  drew national  headlines.     He  told  then  that  this was 
the hardest  decision  he  had  made.     He  told  them that   tho:5e 
who did  fight   in Vietnam,   even  though  the cause was 
doubtable,   deserve  honor  and  respect.     But  to  refer   to 
their honor  as   a basis   for  denying  leniency  to   those who 
chose not   to   fight   is  wrong,   and  does  nothing  to  solve 
America's  problems.     He  said  he would  grant  blanket  par- 
dons,   not   amnesties,   to  evaders,  not  deserters.     These 
distinctions were  based  on his  own beliefs  that  the 
grants  should  be  made  without  passing judgment  and  that 
draft  evasion   is  more  clearly  an  act  of moral  conscience 
than  desertion.     His   decision  came   from influences  of   the 
people he  grew  up with,   his  military  experiences,  his   sons, 
and his  religious   doctrine.      Jimmy  Carter could easily 
have minimized  amnesty   in   the   1976  campaign.     But he 
chose  to  pursue   it,   and,   in   fact,  made a  major  issue  out 
of  it.     He  minced  no words   in   telling  the  Legionnaires 
what he  intended to do.     He explained his policy and gave 
his  reasons.     He  made  no  great  attempt   to persuade  them 
to  agree with  him;   instead,   he  seemed  to be  telling  them 
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that  they  could  make   their  own   decisions  about  amnesty. 
He simply  let them know what he was going to do—whether 
they  supported him or not.     Like  Ford,   Carter  filled his 
speech with  images  of healing wounds,   ending  suffering, 
and rebuilding.      Although he  personally  did  not  agree 
with evasion and  desertion,   he   stressed  that  he—and 
the audience —should not  be judging  the  motives  of others; 
but in a   spirit   of  healing  and   forgetting  the past,   they 
should overlook   the   draft  crimes.     Carter's  amnesty  re- 
marks,   like   the   rest  of  his  American Legion  speech,   were 
direct,  precise,   and specific,   mixing philosophy and 
policy,   ethics   and  politics. 
Carter  revealed   the   same   approaches  to his   other 
brief  discourses   on  amnesty—the  Playboy  interview and 
the debates.     He made  little attempt to be persuasive with 
his remarks;   rather,   believing in the ethical validity of 
his position,   he   expressed   it   straightforwardly,   and  let 
his audiences  accept   or  reject   that  position. 
Effects   of  the  Rhetoric of Amnesty 
In   Chapter   III were  reported specific   effects  of 
the discourses  by  Ford and  Carter  and reactions  to  those 
discourses  that represent  the public response.    It now 
remains  to   examine   the  effects   in  a broader  scope,   over 
a longer period of time.     In this  section,   too, we must 
add some  new history,   for  the amnesty  issue  did not  end 
With these   specific   discourses. 
157 
The   issue  of  the  Vietnam war  deserters  and  evaders 
exploded into  national  prominence with Gerald Ford's 
address   to   the   V.   F.   W.   on  August   19,   1974.     Ford's plan, 
the earned  reentry  of  resisters,   pleased  few people,  but 
appeased many.      More   importantly,   it  provided  several 
days of  excellent   press   for  President  Gerald Ford,   at  a 
time when popular   support was  badly  needed.     When Richard 
Nixon  resigned,   his   popularity  rating was  one  of  the 
lowest   ever  for  a  President.     At  least   for his   first  few 
days in   office,   Gerald  Ford had nowhere  to  go but  up. 
He took   the  initiative,   spoke  of honesty and of  looking 
ahead,   and,   with  the  clemency  speech  and other  major 
actions,   gave  the   impression  of  a progressive,   highly 
responsive  and   responsible  Chief Executive.     The  amnesty- 
related   moves,   as  much  as   anything  else,   fostered  this 
impression. 
But   those  turbulent  months  of  summer  and  autumn 
1977 saw events   and  issues  of national prominence rise 
and fall   in  rapid  succession,   as   one  surprise   followed 
on the heels  of   another.     For  a   few  short weeks,   events 
worked for Gerald Ford.     Then,  with the pardon of Richard 
Nixon,  Ford's  ethos   began  to  crumble;   in  the  remaining 
two years  of  his   administration,   he never regained  the 
Popularity he had had those   few weeks, before the "honey- 
noon" was over. 
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The  announcement  establishing  the  Presidential 
Clemency  Board on  September  16,   1974,   made   far  less  national 
impact  than had  the  previous   V.   F.   W.   speech.     The  Septem- 
ber  16 announcement   fell   in  the  shadow of  the  Nixon par- 
don,   and  suffered  by  comparisons   to  it.     Soon  after  the 
actual  program began  operation,   it became  apparent   that 
the great  majority  of  deserters  and  evaders  were not 
returning.     The  program became  more  and more a  political 
embarrassment   to   Ford.     Persons   favoring a broader  amnesty 
blamed the heavily judgmental  tones of the program for 
preventing  the  majority  of  the  resisters  from returning. 
Persons  opposed  to  amnesty  perceived  the program as  an 
unwise move  on  Ford's  part   that  not  only was   failing,   but 
was allowing  the  draft  dodgers  and deserters   to  add  insult 
to injury by  rejecting  it.     At  the  end  of  the Clemency 
Board's  charter,   Ford  granted  two  one-month  extensions, 
although  the board members  had  recommended  a  six-month 
extension.     Jack Anderson posits   that   the  President's 
reluctance  to   continue  the  program was  because  of  the 
political  embarrassment  it  had  caused: 
The  President,   under   increasing  fire   from the  right 
wing of  his   own  party,   had  become  uneasy  over  the 
clemency  program.     He wanted  to wind it   up,   according 
to White House   sources,   with  a  report  that would 
appease  its   conservative  critics. 
Ijack Anderson, "The Clemency Board: 'A Bureau- 
cratic Vietnam,'" Washington Post, 30 Hay 1-J/b, sec. o, 
P-  7. 
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At  the  program's   termination,   21,000   out  of over   100,000 
eligible  men had  applied.2     Former  Senator Charles 
Goodell,   head  of  the  Clemency  Board,   termed  the program 
a "mixed  success."J     A Gallup  Opinion  Poll  taken  in 
August,   1975,   showed  that   47   percent   of   those   surveyed 
approved  of  Ford's  earned  reentry  program;   18   percent 
advocated  granting  pardons without  alternative  service; 
and  24  percent   advocated  no pardons  under any   circum- 
stances.'*     Still,   many  individuals  continued   to call   for 
a broader  amnesty,   especially  as   the   1976  Presidential 
campaign  approached.5 
The uncomfortableness Ford experienced   from the 
way  the  clemency  program  turned out  may well  explain 
why  the  Republican  Party   sought  to make  amnesty a non- 
issue  in   the   1976   campaign.     Ford and  the Republicans 
had nothing  to   gain by bringing up  amnesty,   and every- 
thing to lose.     He  certainly could not advocate any new 
or broader  program;   therefore,   to  discuss  the   problem 
at all would  mean   defending what  had  already been  done. 
Knowing the criticism the  program had brought   from both 
left and right,   Ford tried to avoid that criticism by 
^ioid. 
The Ch 
3Cited in Parade,   10 August 1975. 
4The  Gallup   Opinion   Index,   October  1975,   p.   26. 
5 For example,   see  "A More Inclusive Amnesty," 
ristian Century,   5 May 1976,   p.   Ml- 
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treating  the  issue   as   finished.     But   like  the  Nixon par- 
don,   the  clemency   issue was   still  volatile  enough  to be 
exploited by  Democrats   in   1976. 
A man named  Fritz  Efaw  attended  the  Democratic 
National  Convention  in  New  York as  an  alternate  delegate 
from Democrats  Abroad,   representing members  of  the  party 
in Europe.      Efaw's   appearance was  largely  symbolic,   for 
he had been   living   in  exile  in  Europe   for  the  last  seven 
years  as   a   draft  evader.     By  a  court  order  Efaw was   al- 
lowed  to  attend  the  convention before   facing  arrest  and 
trial.     Efaw's   appearance  attracted new publicity  to 
the amnesty   issue.      The  Democratic  Platform Committee 
debated long over the amnesty plank,   and finally struck 
a compromise  position,   closely   in  agreement with  that  of 
nominee Jimmy Carter.6    When Carter began full-time 
campaigning,   nearly a month later,   one of his  first major 
addresses was  the  American   Legion  speech. 
Carter's  August   24  speech  served  to  strengthen his 
image  as   a  Presidential  candidate.     Ordinarily,   being 
booed heavily  during  a   speech would not  create  good 
publicity.      Yet  his   position on  the  Vietnam evaders   and 
deserters  was  moderate  enough  that   it  was not  generally 
interpreted   as  radical   or  extreme.     Instead,   the national 
media presented it  as  a moral  stand on a difficult ques 
tion.     That the American Legion  is  perceived as  holding 
Nummary  of   the  Efaw   incident  cited  in  The_New 
Republic,   24 July 1976,   p.   10. 
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extremist  views   on   this   situation made Carter's  stand 
appear both  more  mainstream and more  courageous.     Jimmy 
Carter created  the  media  event  by presenting the  right 
speech to  the  right  audience   to  create  a   furor;   the mass 
media responded  by  playing  up  that  event,   and   interpreting 
it  in Carter's   favor,   thereby making   it  the right  speech 
to  the right  audience  at  the  right  time. 
The  contemporary  Presidential   campaign  places   the 
major candidates   under  grueling,   constant  media  exposure 
for months.      Inevitably,   mistakes  are  made,  or  the wrong 
things  are  said,   and  the  media  seizes  upon  and publicizes 
these  for much   the  same   reason  they publicize   controversial 
events  like  Carter's  American  Legion  appearance.     The 
August  24  speech,   coming as   it  did early   in the post- 
convention  campaign,   had  less  of  a  long-term effect  as 
other media   events  on  the  campaign  trail  arose.     In both 
Carter's   Playboy   interview and  in  the  Ford-Carter  debates, 
discussions   of  subjects   other  than  amnesty  created  great 
furor.     Carter's   discussion  of  lust and morality was 
played up  as  a  political   error;   Gerald  Ford's  comment 
about  the  freedom of  the  Polish people  in   the  second  de- 
bate was   also   called  a  tactical  blunder.     The   long-term 
effect- of  these  and  similar  statements   is   to produce  a 
cacophony  of   input   that   the   voters  must  filter.     The 
media praises,   criticizes,   interprets,   and  discusses 
candidates  extensively,   perhaps   to  the  point of  information 
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overload  for   those who  attempt   to   follow  the   entire  cam- 
paign.     The  effect  of  one  particular  discourse,   such  as 
Carter's  American  Legion  address,   diminishes   after  a 
period of   time   that   sees  new  discourses  and  events  of 
comparable  significance   to  the media  image  of  the  speaker. 
It is  highly   improbable,   then,   that Jimmy  Carter's 
rhetoric  on amnesty won him the  election,   or   that  Ford's 
silence on  the   issue   cost  him the  election.     The more 
plausible   interpretation  is   that,   for  a  short  duration of 
time,   Carter's   rhetoric  on  amnesty  significantly  streng- 
thened his   ethos  as  presented  in  the  national media. 
While   the   strengthening  effect  of  that  particular  issue 
diminished,   it  provided  a base   for  building other  issues 
whose   treatment   could  enhance   the  candidate's   image.     For 
Gerald  Ford,   the  cumulative  effect  of  his   rhetoric on 
amnesty was  nullified by  other  events   during his  Presi- 
dency.     During  the   1976  campaign,   amnesty  had  negligible 
effects  on  Ford.     Had  Ford become   outspoken  on  this   issue, 
or had  Carter   continued  to  stress   the  differences  between 
his views   and   Ford's   so  that  a  greater  series   of amnesty- 
related discourses had received national publicity through- 
out the campaign,   the   general  effects  of  this   one   issue 
might  have  proved much  more  substantial. 
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Recent  Deve 1 oproents : 
December, "1976-- January,   1977 
On  Sunday,   December  26,   1976,   Senator Philip Hart 
of Michigan  died.      President  Gerald  Ford  telephoned Hart's 
widow,   offered  his   condolences,   and asked  if  there was 
anything  he   could  do.      "Well,  yes,"  Mrs.   Hart  replied, 
"There  is   just  one   thing  I wish  you would  do and  that  is 
to give amnesty  to   the Vietnam protestors,   deserters and 
draft evaders."     She  explained  that   that was  "the  last 
thing Phil   in his   last  weeks wished he  could have gotten 
through."^    Ford  told her he would consider the matter. 
When asked  the  next   day   if  he was  serious   about  recon- 
sidering his   former  stance,   Ford replied,   "Oh,  no.     1 
just said  at   the   request  of  her   (Mrs.   Hart)   that   I would 
look  into   it."8     On  his   final day  in office,   January  20, 
1977, Ford refused to reconsider for the final time. 
Jimmy  Carter  had  promised that he would  grant 
blanket  pardons   to  draft  evaders  his   first  week   in office. 
In his  first  executive order on his  first  day in office, 
Carter did just   that.10     Like the  Ford clemency  action of 
two years  before,   Carter's  measure  was  a middle  ground 
between blanket   amnesty   for  all war  registers  and  denial 
7Cited  in  Greensboro  Record,   27  December 1976,   p.   1. 
8lbid.,   28  December  1976,   p.   1. 
9Greensboro  Daily  News,   20 January   1977, p.   1. 
lOGreensboro   Record,   21  January  197 7,   p. 1. 
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of any  leniency.      Like  Ford's  program,   it  pleased neither 
side.11     Carter's  avowed   intention with  the  pardon was 
to "get  Vietnam behind  us,"   to  settle   the  issue  once  and 
for all.     But   his  pardon  did more   to  stir up  the  issue 
anew than to  finish  it.12     No figures are yet available 
as to  how  many men will   return  to America or have  records 
cleared because  of  the  Carter pardon.      It  is  evident, 
though,   that   thousands  of men are  still  paying  the  penalty 
of opposition to   the Vietnam war.     As  long as these men 
remain  estranged,   and  as   long as   there  exists  a  large 
group  of people who  oppose  amnesty  and  pardon  for  these 
men,   this   issue will   remain   fresh and vital   in  the  minds 
of many  American   citizens. 
Rhetorical  Evaluation 
The preceding section has considered the  effects 
of the  discourses   of  Ford  and Carter  on   amnesty.     The 
final  task  now  is   to  evaluate  those  discourses.     This 
evaluation will   focus   primarily  upon  the  two major 
addresses--Ford  to  the  Veterans  of Foreign Wars,   and 
Carter   to  the  American  Legion,   for  these  are   the  most 
complete  discussions  of  this   issue.     Also,   the  remarkable 
similarity  between   these   speeches,   as   discussed   in  Chapter 
III, invites comparative  evaluation of the respective 
styles  and   approaches   of  the   speakers. 
uSee Creensboro Daily News,   22 January 1977,   p.   1. 
^For  example,   see   "Amnesty  Verdict Won't  Quell 
Debate," National Observer,   22 January  1977,   p.   -3. 
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The   language  of   Gerald  Ford's   speech  is  direct,   yet 
sometimes  ponderous   and  trite,   with  some  rather  forced 
transitional  phrases: 
.   .    .   the  issues  of world  peace and national  unity. 
Speaking  of  national  unity,   let me  quickly  point 
ou 
Leg 
t  that  I am also a pro 
ion  and  the  AMVETS.13 
c 
ud member or  the  American 
But   the   speech  is  honest  and undeceptive,  with 
no attempt  to  shade  or  mask  the  proposals   in any way. 
One may also note here  that Ford did exactly as he said 
he would  in  this   address--he  fulfilled his  promises. 
The  organization  of Ford's  V.   F.   W.   address   is 
not readily  apparent.     The   topic  sentence  loosely  describes 
the subject as  "the work facing veterans" and "the issues 
of national  unity   and world  peace."    Conventional  public 
speaking wisdom recommends   a  clear   topic  statement  and 
evident  organization  and  transitions.     Yet   in  this 
situation  such  clarity was not  necessary.     This  address 
represented a new Chief Executive telling an audience 
what his  policies   and philosophies would  be  on subjects 
that most  concerned   them.     A conventional   truth of 
speechmaking   is   that  audiences   like  to hear  speeches  on 
subjects which they perceive as  relevant  to their own 
needs  and  interests.     The   items  discussed  in  this   speech, 
from specific  veterans-related  business  to  general   foreign 
Policy and economic policy,  were matters of importance to 
"Gerald  R.   Ford,   "Cutting  the  Red *%•****' 
erans;   Amnesty,"   Vital  Speeches   gf_the_Day_ 40   (lb   Septem 
ber  1974):     706. 
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V.   F.   W.   members.     With   the   tendency  of   the  veterans   to 
compare  draft  evaders  and deserters   to  those who  fought 
in  Vietnam,   the   issue  of  amnesty,   too,  was  of significant 
importance  to  then.      Overall,   the   loose   organization  of 
moving  from point   to  point  in  the  address was workable, 
considering  the number of subjects discussed,   and consid- 
ering  that  all  of   the  topics  were  significant   to   the  vet- 
erans.     Had  Ford  consciously  made  more  noticeable  tran- 
sitions  and  organizational points,   the  address would have 
come  across   even  more  stilted and ponderous   than   it   did. 
Furthermore,   especially concerning the  leniency proposals, 
if Ford  had  stated  earlier  in  the  address  clearly what  his 
reasoning was   leading  to,   the negative  reaction might well 
have been  greater   than  it was.     John  Wilson  and  Carroll 
Arnold  discuss  this   tactic  in general  terms: 
There  are  times,   however,  when more will  be  lost   than 
gained  if  you  tell  your  hearers  exactly  what  you are 
trying  to  do  and  how.     This   is  almost always   the  case 
with  a  doubtful  or hostile audience.1^ 
The  V.   F.   W.   audience  was  hostile—not   to Gerald 
Ford,   but   to  any   suggestion  of amnesty  in any  form. 
Although   the   tactic  of making no mention  of  this   issue 
until well   into  it  perhaps  improved  the  chances  of favor- 
able  reception of  his   ideas,   his  clear  direct  expression 
of his   intentions   evoked  clear and  direct negative responses 
from the   veterans. 
^John  F.  Wilson  and Carroll  C.   Arnold,   Public   Speak- 
ing as  a  Liberal  Art   (Boston:     Allyn  and  Bacon,   Inc.,   LVSH, 
PTTZS:  
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The word   "amnesty"   evokes  such  strong negative  con- 
notations   to   the  veterans   that  Ford might have done better 
not   to mention   it  at  all.      As  it was,   he  stated his  op- 
position  to  amnesty,   bringing applause,   and  then  added 
"Yet.".    The  contrasting  conjunction   "yet"  clued  the 
audience   that   Ford was  preparing  to  say  something against 
their beliefs — something  resembling  amnesty,  however much 
he might  deny   the  comparison. 
Gerald  Ford made  effective   use  of ethical  appeals, 
as discussed   in   Chapter  III.     The  reference  to his   former 
political   positions   and experiences   served  the dual  pur- 
pose  of strengthening his   image  for  its   own  sake  and 
lending credibility  to his  upcoming  announcement.     Logi- 
cal appeals   served  little   function   in  his  clemency remarks. 
But  for  this  audience,   this  was  an  intensely  emotional 
issue.     Emotional  appeals,   then,   stood  a better chance  of 
influencing the veterans than logical appeals. 
Ford's   speech was  not   successful   in  persuading  the 
veterans   to  support  his   clemency plan.      It  is  a  commonly 
accented  assumption  that  persuasion,   even with  the best 
of preparation,   does  not  always  achieve  the  desired  goals. 
Ford was  facing   an  audience which  held  strong beliefs;   he 
was  attempting   to  reverse   those beliefs   totally.     That 
he did  not   succeed with  the   immediate  audience  is   under- 
standable.      Persuasion   in  general   tends   to be more  ef- 
fective with  audiences   that  are  less   ego-involved with 
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the  issue.     Gerald  Ford  could hardly have  picked a more 
ego-involved audience  for  amnesty-related remarks,   unless 
it were  a  group   of  deserters  and  evaders. 
In  Chapter  I   of  this   thesis   the  concept  of  the 
"second persona"  was   discussed--of  an  identifiable  audi- 
tor  implied  by   a  discourse.     The  persona and accompanying 
ideology  implied by   Ford's  address   is  perhaps best  com- 
parable  to   a  stern but  forgiving   father.     The  father 
believes   in  hard work,   loyalty,   keeping  one's  obligations, 
and not  shirking  duty.     The   father watched  some  of his 
sons  run  from their   duty,   and break   the  law.     The  father 
knows his  sons made   a mistake.     BUL   tie   understands—he 
thinks  he  understands--that   they were  in  a  difficult 
situation,   and perhaps  did not  know  any better.     He  is 
willing  to   forgive  them,   and  let  them come  horne--but 
not without   fulfilling the  responsibilities  they had 
avoided.     They must   show   they  deserve his  mercy by working, 
and pledging  allegiance.      Then  they  can  live  at  home again. 
This   implied persona is admirable in Ford's  speech 
for  two  reasons.      First,   it   is  an  honest  expression  of 
Ford's  own beliefs,   and a  genuine attempt to do what he 
perceived  as   best   in   this   situation.     Second,   it  repre- 
sents perhaps  the best approach  to persuading auditors 
holding belief  clusters   similar  to   those  of  the  V.   F.   W. 
People   take   pleasure   in being  told  that   they  are  superior, 
and that   they are  right.     Gerald  Ford  said  to  the  veterans, 
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"You were  young  once.     You know how  difficult  it was.     But 
you  did  right.     Now,   in  your maturity,   kindness,   and wis- 
dom,   show mercy   towards   these  misguided  youth;   give  them 
a chance   to work   again."     Gerald Ford and  the  veterans  can 
pass  judgment;   having judged,   and  found   the  deserters  and 
evaders   guilty,   they  can   then  show mercy,   once  again  se- 
cure  in   their  own  Tightness.     An appeal  of  this   sort  stood 
a good chance  of   striking a sympathetic note with the 
veterans,   far  more  than,   for  example,  would  a  speech ad- 
vocating  clemency  because we  made a   terrible  mistake 
fighting  in  Vietnam.     As   an  attempt   to  persuade  men who 
tended  to  be  unforgiving   that  they should  forgive,   Ford's 
posture   is   commendable. 
But   it   is   this  very  tone  of condescension,   of 
saying  to   the  evaders   and  deserters   "because we were  right 
and you were wrong,  we'll  let you return--if you'll 
work,"  that  kept   so many  of  the  exiles  abroad.     Men who 
haci  served jail  sentences,   or  had  lived  in exile,   or had 
lived with  dishonorable  service   records  would naturally 
seek  to justify  their  actions.      If they   could not  believe 
that   they were   right   in  resisting,   then   they might  be  left 
with   little  else   to believe   in.     One   can  easily  understand 
why  so many men were not   interested  in the  Ford  clemency, 
with   Us   implications  of  judgment  and guilt.     The moral 
tone of the persona implied by lord's discourse deserves 
blame   for   limiting   the   ultimate  success  of  the clemency 
Program. 
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From Jimmy   Carter's   speech   to   the American Legion 
one  senses  much more  of  a  shrewd politician manipulating 
his  audience   and  his  speech  for  a  specific  purpose. 
According   to   the   reports  of  Carter's  aides,   the  candidate 
wanted  a   confrontation--and he got   it.     The  immediate 
temptation   is   to   look askance  at  this  address  because  of 
Carter's  deliberate seeking of an adverse reaction. 
Americans   tend   to  be   suspicious  of  anyone   in politics 
who  appears   consciously--and  effectively—persuasive. 
Also,   such  a   strategy  on  Carter's  part virtually  forced 
the  audience  of Legionnaires   in  the   "bad guys"  part   for 
giving  their  expected  reaction  to his  views.     Yet we must 
look beyond  the  manipulative  nature  of  Carter's  discourse, 
and  render   evaluation  on  other bases.     The  amnesty  remarks 
in  this   discourse  were  genuine  expressions  of  Carter's  be- 
liefs.     He,   like  Ford,   made  no  attempt  to  cloak or mis- 
represent  his  beliefs.     He  expressed  them clearly  and 
openly,   although his   definitions  of  amnesty  and pardon were 
unique.     Carter,   too,   did  as  he  promised he would--his 
first  day  in  office,   he  granted blanket  pardons  to  draft 
evaders. 
Artistically,   Carter's  address  stands  as  a better 
effort   than  Ford's.      Carter's   speech  does  not  appear  to 
be as   persuasive   in  intent   as   Ford's.       Gerald Ford 
genuinely wanted  the  V.   F.   W.   to  understand  and  go  along 
with his  views;   Carter,  perhaps anticipating from the 
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beginning  that   the  Legionnaires would  not  change  their 
minds  about   the  pardons,   simply presented  his   views. 
Carter's  entire   discourse,   in  fact,   reveals  a  similar 
strategy:      rather   than  attempting   to  convince   the  audience 
to  take his   stand  on  issues,   he was  more  concerned with 
creating  in   the   audience  a   favorable  impression of him- 
self as   a  candidate.     The   image,   not   the  issue,  was  most 
important.      If   the   image  could be   improved by  truthfully 
expressing beliefs   on  an  issue,   then  so much  the better. 
The  wording  of  this   speech   is  simple,   fluid,   and 
conversational.      The only  difficulty with word  choice 
arose over   the  usage of  the   terms   amnesty  and  pardon,   and 
the reactions   they  caused.     Yet Carter had been previously 
aware  of  the  controversial   implications  of  these  terms j" 
he chose  to  use   these  terms,   if not  directly to seek  a 
confrontation,   at   least with  the knowledge   that  they 
would not  be  well   received. 
Carter1? organizational pattern  is   similar to Ford's; 
after  a   lengthy   introduction,   Carter  said he would  talk 
about "some tough decisions."    These tough decisions 
covered a variety of issues   related to veterans'  interests. 
The  amnesty-pardon  remarks  were  the   last  of  a series  of 
policy  statements  and were   followed by   a  final   anecdote 
and  a conclusion.      Kenneth  Andersen  posits   that  this 
15Fo r  example,   see Carter's  remarks  in the Playboy 
interview,   appendix. 
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positioning of disputable points last may have merit: 
"Reinforcement theory suggests that one should proceed 
from ideas that are supportive of and easily acceptable 
to the receivers and move towards less agreeable points 
last."16 
The   fact  that   Carter  received  a standing ovation 
after his   address   indicates   that  his   statements  on other 
issues must  have been well  received by  the  Legionnaires. 
If so,   then presenting the amnesty-related comments last 
might have   softened  the potential negative  impact  of 
those  comments   on   the  ethos   of   Carter  to  this  audience. 
Since   Carter's   intent was   less  persuasive   than 
Ford's with   the  amnesty  comments,   reliance  upon various 
appeals was  not  as   essential.     Still,   the  appeals  Carter 
employed were  primarily  emotional  in nature.     Logical 
appeals  stood  little   chance with  an  audience  as  emotionally 
involved with   the   issue as  were  the Legionnaires.     Carter's 
own  ethos  was   not  well-established enough with  the audience 
to rely  upon  ethical   appeals   to  carry his  message.     As 
stated above,   the  establishing  of his  ethos  was  the  es- 
sential objective of Carter's address. 
The second persona implied by Carter's discourse 
is,   on  the whole,   a  commendable  one.     That  persona appears 
as  rational,   intelligent,   and mature.     Persons possessing 
Pracl 
16Kenneth E.  Andersen..2252SSSgU-§5g^fri69. 
tice.(Boston:     Allyn  and  Bacon,   Inc.,   W/U,   I 
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these  qualities  can discuss  matters with  each  other,   ex- 
pressing different opinions,   and even strongly disagree 
without   losing  control.      They will  understand  and accept 
disagreements,   and respect opinions   that  they  do not hold. 
Carter's  presentation,   on  a wide   range of  subjects   is 
from one  persona   expressing his  belief and  value  clusters, 
and expressing how  those   beliefs  will   translate   into 
actions.     The   second persona   is  expected  to  listen,   and 
accept  or   reject   those  beliefs  as  he  sees   fit.      Concern- 
ing the  pardons,   the  second persona  is  asked  to  realize 
that  differences  over   the   Vietnam war,   like  the  war  itself, 
belong   to  a bygone  era.     The   differences must  be  forgotten, 
and persons   still   living  under punishment   for  those  dif- 
ferences  must be absolved—without  judgment.     It   is  not 
up to  the   speaker   or  the   audience  to  decide whether  de- 
serters  and  evaders were  right or wrong,  but  it   is  up  to 
the audience  and speaker   to see  that  they  come  back. 
This   evaluation   is   not   intended  to  give blanket 
praise  of  Jimmy Carter  as   a speaker.     His  manipulations 
have not  always  been  as   successful,   the  implied  persona 
have not  always  been as  admirable,   and he  has  not  always 
been as   fully  honest  as  he  night have  been.     But   this   speech 
is one  of  Carter's    finest--in   its  effects,   artistically, 
and ethically. 
Appearances   suggest   that  Carter's pardon  program 
Bay be  as   unsuccessful  as   Ford's   in  returning  the  majority 
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of war  resisters.      If  so,   the  failure may be  explained by 
an  invalid   division  of   deserters   from evaders.     His   deci- 
sion that deserters will be handled case-by-case indicates 
that  someone must  pass   judgment  on   them,   and  decide   if they 
are worthy   of  a  pardon.     Once  again   this  proves   a poli- 
tically polarizing  issue.     The  men  who  stand  to  be  affected 
do not want  judgment  passed  upon  them.     Those opposing 
amnesty  and pardon   feel   the war resisters  should have no 
more  chances.      Carter's   attempt  at  reconciliation,   like 
Ford's,   is   genuine.     Like  Ford's   it  will  not   succeed   in 
"healing our wounds"  completely,   but   it  will   take another 
step  in  that  direction.      Perhaps  only  the passage of   time 
will  finally  dissolve   the bitterness  and hard feelings 
caused by America's   involvement  in   the  Vietnam war. 
The  American  political  environment  contains a   com- 
plex set of   interactions  between personalities,   issues, 
events,   and   communicative  acts.     Th2re are political 
figures who   devote   themselves  and all of  their rhetorical 
abilities   to  a   single  issue  or  cause,   and are willing  to 
sacrifice  all   for   that   cause.     On  the other  end of  the 
continuum there   are  political  figures who will exploit  any 
and all causes  or  issues   to   further  their own ambitions. 
Perhaps  an ideal between the   two is   the political figure 
who can contribute  to  the advancement of a humanitarian 
cause while  achieving his  own  personal  political  goals. 
Gerald  Ford  and  Jimmy  Carter  approached  this   ideal with 
.their  discourses   on  amnesty   in  1974  and  1976. 
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CUTTING  THE RED TAPE FOR VETERANS 
Amnesty 
By Gerald   R.   Ford,   President of  the  United States 
Delivered  before  the   75th  Convention 
of  the VFW,   Chicago,   Illinois 
August  19,   1974 
Commander   Ray  Soden,   Governor Walker,   my  former  members 
or  former   colleagues  of  the  United  States  Congress,  my 
fellow members   of   the  Veterans of Foreign Wars:     Let me 
express  my  deepest  gratitude  for  your  extremely warm wel- 
come,   and  may   I   say  to Mayor  Daley  and  to all  the wonderful 
people  of  Chicago who  have   done an  unbelievable  job  in 
welcoming  Betty  and myself   to Chicago,   we  are most grateful. 
I  have  a  sneaking  suspicion   that Mayor  Daley  and  the 
people  of  Chicago  knew  that   Betty was  born  in  Chicago. 
Needless   to  say,   I   deeply  appreciate your medal  and the 
citation  on my   first  trip  out  of Washington  as  your Presi- 
dent.      I hope   that   in   the months   ahead  I  can  justify  your 
faith  in making   the  citation  and   the  award  available  to 
me. 
It is good to be back in Chicago, among people from 
all parts of our great Nation, to take part in this 75th 
annual convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars. As a 
proud member of Old Kent Post VFW 830, let me talk today 
about some of the work facing veterans--and all Americans-- 
the issues  of world peace and national unity. 
Speaking of national unity, let me quickly point out 
that I an also a proud member of the American Legion and 
the AMVET5. 
In  a more   somber  note,   this  morning we  all heard  the 
tragic  news  of   the  killing of our American Ambassador  to 
Cyprus.     He,   too,   gave  his   life  in  foreign wars.     Let  us 
offer  our  prayers   and our  condolences  to his   loved ones 
for his   supreme   sacrifice  on  behalf  of all Americans. 
As   President   and  as  a  veteran,   I want  good relations 
will all veterans.     We all proudly wore the same Nation s 
uniform and patriotically saluted the same  flag.     During 
my Administration,   the  door   of my  office will be open  to 
veterans  just  as   it was   all   my  25   years  as  a Member or 
the Congress. 
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Today,   I   am happy  to announce ray  intention  to  send 
the Senate  the  nomination of my  personal   friend  and  former 
Congressional   colleague Dick Roudebush of Indiana—it 
seems   to me you know what  I am going to say--but I will 
finish  the  sentence — to  be   Administrator  of  the Veterans 
Administration. 
As  past:  national  Commander  of  the  VFW,   Roudy has 
served well as   Deputy Administrator  of  the  VA.     He  is  a 
man who gets   things   done   and,   I  am confident,  will do  a 
first-class job. 
It  seems   to me   that  we  should  recognize  the veteran 
is a human  being,   not  just   a "C"  number  to be processed 
by a computer   system.     We all  know  that  the Government 
knew our name  when we were   called  into  service.     This  Ad- 
ministration  is  going  to   see to   it  that we   still  know your 
name  and  your   problems.     A veteran  is  a person,   not  just  a 
digit   in  a  computer   system which more  often  than  not  goofs 
up. 
I  propose   the   VA  take   the  best  of  our  technology  and 
the very best   of  our human  capabilities  and combine  them. 
As President,    I  want  no  arrogance  or  indifference  to  any 
individual,   veteran  or not.     Our  Government's  machinery 
exists   to  serve  people,  not   to   frustrate  or  humiliate   them. 
I   don't  like   red  tape.     As  a matter  of  fact,   I  don't 
like  any  kind  of  tapes. 
Our  great  veterans hospitals,  which will not  lose 
their   identity,   must  be  the  very best  that  medical  skill 
and dedication   can  create.     VA hospitals  have made  many 
great  medical  breakthroughs   in   the  past.     One of America's 
great  challenges   today  is   the older veteran.     The  VA med- 
ical and nursing  care  system for  older  people must become 
a showcase   for   the  entire  Nation.     We  can work  together 
to achieve  that end and humanize the VA. 
But  to achieve   such progress,   I intend to improve the 
management   of   the  VA.     We  must  get   the  most   for  our  tax 
dollars.     While   supporting  the  new Administrator  in maxi- 
mum efforts   to  make   the best  use  of  funds  available,   I 
want  Roudy   to   take  a  constructive  new  look at  the VA s 
structure  and   the  services   that   it  renders   to our  veterans. 
and Vietnam. 
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As  Minority  Leader of   the House  and  recently as 
Vice  President,   I   stated my   strong  conviction  that un- 
conditional,   blanket   amnesty  for  anyone who   illegally 
evaded or   fled military  service   is wrong.      It  is wrong. 
Yet,   in  my   first words   as  President  of  all   the  people, 
I acknowledged  a  Power,   higher  than   the people,  Who  com- 
mands  not  only  righteousness  but   love,  not  only  justice 
but mercy. 
Unlike  my   last   two  predecessors,   I   did not  enter 
this  office   facing  the   terrible   decisions  of  a   foreign war, 
but  like   President  Truman and President  Lincoln before  him] 
I  found on  ny   desk,   where  the buck stops,   the urgent  prob- 
lem of how  to  bind  up   the Nation's wounds.     And  I  intend 
to do  that. 
As  a  lawyer,   I  believe  our  American  system of justice 
is  fundamentally   sound.     As   President,   I will work within 
it. 
As a former naval reservist, I believe our system of 
military justice is fundamentally sound. As Commander in 
Chief,   I will work within it. 
As a former  Congressman who championed  it,   I believe 
the  concept  of  an  all-volunteer  armed  force   is   funda- 
mentally   sound  and  will  work  much better  than peacetime 
conscription. 
Accordingly,   in my   first week at  the White House,   I 
requested  the  Attorney'General  of the  United  States  and 
the Secretary   of  Defense  to   report  to me  personally, 
before  September   1,   on   the  status  of   some  50,000  of our 
countrymen  convicted,   charged or under  investigation, 
or still   sought   for  violations  of   [the]   Selective  Service 
[Act]   or   the  Uniform Code of Military Justice--offenses 
loosely  described  as   desertion  and  draft-dodging. 
These  two  Cabinet officers are to consult with other 
Government  officials   concerned and communicate  me  their 
unvarnished views  and those of the full spectrum of 
American  opinion  on   this   controversial  question,   consoli- 
dating  the known  facts  and legal precedents. 
I will  then decide how best   to deal with the different 
kinds of cases--and there are differences.     Decisions ot 
ny Administration will  make  any  future penalties   lie  cne 
seriousness  of   the   individual's  mistake. 
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fraction  of  such  cases  I   find  in a quick  re- 
directly   to  Vietnam,   from which  the  last 
Only   a 
view relate 
American  combatant was  withdrawn  over  a year  aeo'bv' 
President   Nixon. 3 
But  all,   in  a  sense,   are  casualties,   still  abroad or 
absent without   leave   from the  real America. 
I want   them  to  come  home  if  they want  to work  their 
way back.   
One  of  the   last  of  my official  duties  as  Vice  Presi- 
dent,   perhaps   the  hardest  of  all,  was  to present  post- 
humously  14  Congressional  Medals  of Honor to  the  parents, 
widows,   and  children  of   fallen  Vietnam heroes. 
As   I   studied  their   records  of supreme  sacrifice,   I 
kept  thinking  how  young   they were. 
The   few  citizens  of  our   country who,   in my  judgment, 
committed  the  supreme  folly  of  shirking  their duty  at 
the  expense  of  others,  were  also  very young. 
All  of  us  who  served   in  one  war  or  another know very 
well  that   all wars   are   the  glory  and   the agony of  the 
young.     In  my  judgment,   these  young Americans  should have 
a second  chance   to  contribute  their  fair  share  to  the 
rebuilding  of  peace  among  ourselves  and with  all  nations. 
So  I   am  throwing  the weight  of my Presidency  into  the 
scales of justice on  the side of leniency.     I foresee 
their earned re-entry—earned re-entry into a new atmos- 
phere of hope,   hard work,   and mutual   trust. 
I will  act  promptly,   fairly,   and  very  firmly  in  the 
same  spirit   that   guided Abraham Lincoln and Harry  Truman. 
As I reject amnesty,   so  I  reject  revenge. 
As  men  and women whose  patriotism has been  tested and 
proved--and yours  has—I want  your help  and  understanding. 
I ask all  Americans  who   ever  asked  for goodness  and mercy 
in their  lives,   who  ever   sought   forgiveness  for  their 
trespasses,   to  join  in  rehabilitating  all   the  casualties 
of the tragic  conflict of the past. 
Naturally,   I am glad to see  the VFW at this convention 
install  a  veteran  of  the  Korean war,   John  Stang,   as  your 
new national  commander-in-chief.     And I compliment you and 
congratulate you as well as John. 
We  have   struggled  for  years   in America  to overcome 
discrimination  aeainst  younger  Americans,   against  older 
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Americans,   against   Americans of various  creeds,   religions, 
races  and,   yes,   against  women.     I  will  not   tolerate  any 
discrimination  against  veterans,   especially  those who 
served  honorably   in   the  war  in Vietnam. 
I  an deeply   concerned  about  employment  opportunities 
for  the Vietnam-era   veterans.     We  have had  some  success 
in placing veterans  in the age span of 20  to 34,  but the 
facts  and   figures   show us   that  there  are  some  tough  prob- 
lems in  this  category. 
As   of   last  month,   the  rate  of  unemployment   for  veterans 
between  20  and  24 was  nearly  10 percent,  much  too high.     The 
rate  of  unemployment   for   these young veterans who  are mem- 
bers  of minority   groups  was   19  percent.     And  far,   far too 
many disabled  veterans  are  still without jobs. 
I   car   assure  you,  without hesitation or  reservation, 
that  this  Administration  puts  a very high priority  on aid- 
ing the  men who bore  the  brunt of battle.     If we  can  send 
men  thousands   and  thousands  of miles   from home   to  fight  in 
the rice  paddies,   certainly we  can  send  them back  to  school 
and better  jobs  at  home. 
1 am consequen 
bill in this light, 
has to be constrain 
We are all soldiers 
The veterans educat 
before me very shor 
working hard, along 
management, and oth 
excessive Governmen 
tly  considering  the  veterans   education 
But   your Government,   of necessity, 
ed by  other  considerations  as well. 
in a war against brutal inflation. 
ion bill more than likely will come 
tly for action.     It comes when I am 
with  others   from the Congress,   labor, 
erwise,   on  a nonpartisan battle  against 
t   spending. 
America   today  is   fighting  for  its  economic   life.     The 
facts  are   that  uncontrolled   inflation  could  destroy   the 
fabric  and   the   foundation  of  America,   and I will not  hesi- 
tate  to  veto  any  legislation   to  try  and  control   infla- 
tionary excesses.     I  am open to conciliation and compromise 
on the total amount  authorized so that we can protect 
[veteran]   trainees  and all  other Americans  against   the  ris- 
ing cost of living. 
I commend not only the past service of veterans but 
also the continuing involvement of many of you in tne 
National  Guard  and  Reserve   forces.     With current  manpower 
reductions   in  the active duty Army,   Navy, Air Force,   ana 
Marines,   the  Commander  in  Chief must,   of necessity,   place 
continuing  reliance  on  the   readiness  of  our  National 
Guard and  Reserves.     And  I   intend  to  put  muscle  into   th_s 
program. 
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Peace--it  depends  upon  the  strength and  readiness  of 
our defenses.     And  I will   support  every  sensible measure 
to enhance the morale and the combat readiness of our 
Armed  Forces. 
The  United  States,   our  allies,   and our  friends  around 
the world must  maintain  strength  and  resolve.     Potential 
adversaries  obviously watch  the   state  of our readiness  and 
the strength of our will.     I will offer them no temptations. 
America is not the policeman of the world, but we 
continue to be the backbone of a free world collective 
security  setup. 
Just as  America will maintain its nuclear deterrent 
strength,   we  will  never   fall  behind  in negotiations   to 
control — and  hopefully  reduce — this   threat   to mankind.     A 
great  nation   is  not  only   strong but wise,  not  only prin- 
cipled but purposeful.     A fundamental purpose of our 
Nation  must  be  to  achieve  peace  through  strength and 
meaningful  negotiations. 
1  must  never be  construed  as  a  lack  of 
that  I   can  count  on you and  the   fami- 
every one of you.     Peace and security 
ess and dedication, 
erienced war  firsthand.     I want  to  make 
ive  that Washington never  sends  another 
The   list  of mourners  is  already  far  too 
list  of   those who wait  and wonder—the 
missing in action.     I will never forget 
Our  good wil 
will.     And  I  know 
lies of each and 
require  preparedn 
You have  exp 
certain and posit 
tragic   telegram, 
long.     So  is  the 
families of  those 
them. 
Together  we   are  going  forward  to_tackle   future prob- 
lems,   including  the  scourge  of  inflation which  is  today 
our Nation's  public  enemy  number  one.     Our  tasK  is  ROL 
easy.      But   I  have   faith  in America       Through our  system 
of democracy  and   free  enterprise,   the  United  States   nas 
achieved remarkable,   unbelievable progress.     We have shared 
our plenty with all mankind. 
This   is   the   same  Nation  that   "anscended  inflations 
and recessions,   slumps and booms,   to ^YJ.^Kis  ilthe higher  levels   of  prosperity  *nd  productivity.     This   is  t 
same Nation  that   emerged   from the   smoke  °!  ^arl Harbor 
on December   7,   1941,   to   change   its  own destiny  and 
history  of  the world-and  for  the  better. 
During  the   first   few months   that  ,L was  Vice  President, 
I traveled  some   118,000 miles  and visited AU  or s 
States.     What   1   saw and what   I  heard  gave me  renewe 
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inspiration.      It made  me  proud,   proud of my  country.     It 
sustains me now. 
Our  great  Republic  is  nearly 200 years  old,   but  in 
many,   many ways  we   are just  getting  started.     Most Ameri- 
cans  have   faith  in   the American  system.     Let  us  now work 
for America,   in which  all  Americans  can  take  an  even 
greater  pride.      I  am proud of America.     You are  proud of 
America.     We   should  be proud  to  be Americans. 
Thank  you very  much. 
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PROGRAM FOR THE RETURN OF VIETNAM ERA 
DRAFT  EVADERS  AND MILITARY DESERTERS 
The   President's  Remarks  Announcing 
the   Program.     September  16,   1974 
Good morning: 
In my   first  week  as   President,   I  asked  the  Attorney 
General and  the   Secretary of Defense  to  report  to me, 
after  consultation with  other Government  officials  and 
private  citizens   concerned,   on  the  status  of those  young 
Americans   who  have  been  convicted,   charged,   investigated, 
or are  still being  sought  as  draft  evaders  or military 
deserters. 
On August   19,   at  the national  convention  of Veterans 
of Fc    sign  Wars   in  the  city of Chicago,   I  announced my 
inter    .on   to give   these  young people  a  chance  to  earn  their 
return   to   the mainstream  of American  society so  that  they 
can,   if  they  choose,   contribute,   even  though belatedly, 
to  the  building  and  the betterment  of  our  country and the 
v;o rid. 
I  did   this   for  the  simple  reason  that   for  American 
fighting men,   the   long and divisive war  in Vietnam has  been 
over  for more   than  a  year,   and  I was  determined  then,   as 
now,   to do   everything  in  my  power  to bind up  the  Nation's 
woun 
I promised   to  throw  the weight of my Presidency into 
the scales   of justice on  the  side of leniency and mercy, 
but  I promised  also  to work within  the  existing  system of 
military and  civilian  law and  the precedents  set by my 
oredecessors who   faced  similar postwar  situations,   among 
them Presidents Abraham Lincoln and Harry S.   Truman. 
Mv objective of making future penalties fit the 
seriousness   of each individual's offense and of mitigating 
punishment   already meted out in a spirit of equity has 
proved an   immensely hard  and very  complicated matter,  even 
more  difficult   than  I  knew  it would be. 
But  the  agencies   of Government  concerned and my own 
staff have  worked with me   literally night and day in order 
to develop   fair  and orderly  procedures   and  completed their 
work  for my   final   approval  over  this   last weekend. 
£££&■&$*.I 
190 
I  do not want   to  delay  another  day  in  resolving  the 
dilemmas   of  the  past,   so  that we may all  get  going on   the 
pressing problems   of  the  present.     Therefore,   I  am today 
signing  the  necessary  Presidential  proclamation and 
Executive  orders   that will  put   this   plan  into  effect. 
The  program provides   for administrative  disposition 
of cases   involving  draft  evaders and military deserters 
not  yet  convicted  or punished.     In   such cases,   2 months 
of alternate   service will  be  required which may be  reduced 
for mitigating   circumstances. 
The  program  also  deals  with cases  of  those already 
convicted by  a   civilian  or military   court.     For  the  latter 
purpose,   I  am  establishing  a  Clemency Review Board  of nine 
distinguished  Americans  whose  duty   it will  be  to assist 
me  in assuring   that   the  Government's   forgiveness  is  ex- 
tended  to  applicable  cases  of prior   conviction  as  equitably 
and as  impartially  as   is  humanly possible. 
The  primary  purpose  of  this program is   the  reconcil- 
iation  of  all  our  people  and  the restoration  of  the 
essential  unity  of Americans within which honest differences 
of opinion  do  not   descend  to  angry  discord and mutual  prob- 
lems are not polarized by excessive  passion. 
My  sincere   hope   is   that   this  is  a  constructive  step 
toward a calmer and cool   " appreciation of our individual 
rights  and  responsibilities  and our  common purpose  as   a 
nation whose  future   is always more  important   than its past. 
At   this  point,   I will   sign  the  proclamation  that   I 
mentioned  in  my   statement,   followed  by an Executive order 
for  the  establishment  of  the  Clemency Board,   followed  by 
the  signing of  an  Execu   ive  order  for  the  Director  of 
Selective Service,   who will have a prime responsibility 
in  the handlv :.  of   the  matters   involving alternate  service. 
Thank  you  very much. 
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JIMMY  CARTER:     POSITION  PAPER ON  AMNESTY 
JANUARY  26,   1976 
When   I  am president,   I  am going to  issue  a blanket 
pardon  for  all   those  who  are  outside  our  country,   or  in 
this   country,   who  did not  serve   in  the  armed  forces.     I 
am going  to  issue  a  pardon not  an  amnesty.     There  is not 
much  difference;   there  wouldn't  be  any punishment.     I 
think those  kids  who  have  lived  in  Sweden   or  in  Canada 
or have  avoided  arrest  have been  punished  enough.     I 
think  it   is   time   to  get   it over with. 
In my opinion,   amnesty says what you did was right. 
Pardon  says whether  what you did was  right  or wrong,   you 
are  forgiven   for   it.     Where  I  live,   most  of  the  young) 
people who were   drafted are poor  or black.     They  didn't 
know where  Canada was,   they  didn't  know where  Sweden was, 
they  didn't  have   enough  money  to  hide  in  college.     They 
went   to  Vietnam.      Some   of  them came  back;   a  lot of  them 
didn't.      And   I  personally have had  a hard  time  coming(to 
the Dardon   thing,   I'll   have  to  be   frank with you       It  s 
just'hard   for me   to  equate what   the  young  people  did who 
went  and  hid  in  Sweden with what   the  young men  did who 
went   to  Vietnam  thinking  it  was   a bad war,   but who  gave 
their  lives   for   it.     And  I'd  like  to  draw  that  subtle 
distinction   to assuage  my  own  conscience. 
Own Woi 
(Cited  in,   Robert  W.   Turner,   Ed.,  Jimmy Carter  in His 
ords   (New York:     Ballantine  Books,   1976,   pp.   i-Jl- 
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CARTER  -  MONDALE  ON THE  ISSUES 
Remarks  by Jimmy  Carter  to  the 
American Legion 
Seattle,   Washington 
August   24,   1976 
It   is   a  pleasure  to  appear here  today before  my   fel- 
low Legionnaires  and  to have   this   opportunity  to   discuss 
matters  of  common   concern   to  us  as  veterans  and as Ameri- 
cans. 
I  am,   as  you may  know,   a member of  Legion Post  #2  in 
Americus,   Georgia,   as  was  my   father before me. 
A  tradition  of military  service  runs  deep  in  our 
family.     My  first   ancestor  to  live   in  Georgia,   James  Carter, 
fought   in   the  Revolutionary War.     Almost  a hundred years 
later,   others   fought   in  the War between  the  States,   and 
my  father,   Earl   Carter,   served as  a  first  lieutenant   in 
the Army  during  the  First World War. 
Including my   time  at   the  U.   S.   Naval Academy,   I  spent 
11 years   in  the   Navy,   most  of my  sea duty in  submarines. 
I had  the   good   fortune   to   serve  under Admiral  Rickover  on 
the  development   of  one  of  the   first  atomic  submarines,   and 
I have   tried  to   carry  over  into my business  career and my 
political   life  the  high  standards  of  dedication and compe- 
tence  that   I   learned  from that  remarkable military  leader. 
My  son  Jack  continued  our  family's   tradition  in  the 
military,   but  his   service  came   in an era  quite  different 
from my  own.     Jack   left  college  several  years  ago  and 
volunteered   to  serve  in  Vietnam.     He  did  so because he 
didn't  think it was  right   for hin to escape service simply 
because  he  had  the  money and  the educational background 
to stay  in  college. 
During  the   Second World War,   and even during  the 
Korean War,   I  always  wore my  uniform with  immense  pride, 
and it was a badge of honor among my civilian friends and 
neighbors. 
That  was  not   the  case when Jack came home  from Danang 
in 1969.     He and the uniform he wore were all  too often 
greeted with   scorn  and  derision.     Many  of his   friends 
Cold him he was  a  fool   to risk his   life in a meaningless 
war  that  couldn't  be won. 
Hundreds of  thousands  of Vietnam veterans were meet- 
ing that  same bitter reception all  over America,  ana i 
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believe  very  strongly  that  those  scenes,   and  the national 
mood  they  reflected,   amount  to nothing  less  than  an 
American  tragedy. 
I believe  in patriotism      I believe that people should 
be willing  to   fight   to  defend  our  country.     That   is how 
can  flag passed by. 
I know  that  your  patriotism has  been  demonstrated not 
only  in  your military  service,   but   in  your work in  com- 
munity and  national  affairs,   such  as  your  outstanding  "War 
on  Cancer"   fund  drive.     But we must  recognize  that  for 
millions  of our  fellow Americans,   patriotism  is  out of 
fashion,   or  is  an object of scorn and jokes.     That  fact  is 
part  of  the  bitter  heritage of  an unpopular war. 
I  do not   seek  a  blind  or   uncritical  patriotism. 
Obviously  a  government's  policies must be   deserving of  public 
support.     But   in  recent  years,   disagreement with our nation's 
policies   too often became rejection of our nation itself. 
There  is  a  great  need  for   the  next  President  to do  every- 
thing  in his  power,   by word and deed,   to restore national 
pride  and patriotism  in  our  country—and  if I  am elected, 
that   is what  I   intend  to  do, 
I  also  believe   in  tradition.     I was Governor of 
Georgia when  Congress  passed  the  law  that  changed  the 
observation  of Armistice  Day away  from the  traditional   date 
of November   11.      I   thought   that  action was   unnecessary, 
insensitive,   and offensive,   and we  kept November  11 as 
Armistice  Day   in  Georgia. 
I  did not  come  here just   to get  your vote or  endorse- 
ment,   nor  just   to make  a  good   impression on you.     I  come 
here  as  a nominee   for  President who has  spent   full   time 
the  last  20  months   learning  about  this  country—what it 
is  and what   it  ought   to  be. 
I  want   to   talk  to  you  about  some   tough decisions-- 
as veterans,   yes,   but   al '.0   as  Americans who  are  farmers 
and  truck  drivers,   doctors   and   lawyers,   fathers  and  grand- 
fathers,   school   teachers  and  civil   servants,   employed  and 
unemployed,   rich and poor. 
We must  maintain  adequate   military strength compared 
to that of our potential adversaries.     This relative strength 
can  be  assured: 
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by  a  commitment   to  necessary  military  expenditures- 
by  elimination of waste,   duplication  among  forces,' 
excessive  personnel  costs,   unnecessary  new weapons  systems 
inefficient   contracting procedures; 
and by  a  mutual   search  for peace   so  that  armament 
levels   can be  reduced  among nations,   because  the most  im- 
portant   single   factor  in  avoiding nuclear war  is  the  mu- 
tual  desire   for  peace  among  the  superpowers. 
I  would never  again  see  our  country become militarily 
involved  in  the   internal  affairs  of another country  unless 
our own  security was  directly  threatened.     But   it  is   im- 
perative  that   the world know  that  we will  meet  obligations 
and commitments   to  our  allies   and   that we will  keep our 
nation   strong. 
We   seek  friendship with  the  unaligned  and  developing 
nations  of  the world.     Many of  them are weak and vulner- 
able and  they need  allies  who  can  contribute  to  their 
peace,   security and  prosperity.     Yet we must remember  that 
excessive   foreign  cor.', itments   can  overtax our national 
ability.     We  must   therefore be  cautious  in making commit- 
ments,   but   firm  in  honoring  them. 
I  have  spoken  recently with many  experts  in national 
defense  matters,   and  I  believe we  have,   overall,   adequate 
ability   to  defend  ourselves,   to meet  obligations  to our 
allies,   and  to   carry  out  a  legitimate   foreign policy.     But 
we must  be  constantly  vigilant  to  recognize and  correct 
adverse  trends. 
Our total American ground combat   forces are less  than 
half  those  of   the  Soviet  Union,   and the number of men 
under  arms   in  that   country has   increased by a million while 
ours have  decreased by  1% million since 1968.    During the 
same period  the number  of  U.   S.   ships  has  been  cut  in half. 
For every   ta ."; we  have,   the  Soviets have at  least  eight. 
Because of our greatly improved anti-tank weapons,   this 
heavy  Soviet   investment   in  tanks  may prove   to have  been 
an unwise   investment. 
Of  course   there  are   counterbalancing  factors  of 
strength such  as  superior quality of our weapons,   the 
relative   security  of  our  own borders,   our more  ready  ac- 
cess to  the sea,   and the  trustworthiness and military 
capability of our allies. 
There   is  now,   in  my  opinion,   an overall  rough  equi- 
valency in  direct military strength.     This balance must 
be maintained. 
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Yet,   as  we   seek  an  adequate defense,  we must  face   the 
fact that  the very words   "national security" have fallen 
into  disrepute.      I  want   to  hear  those words  spoken with 
respect once  again.     Too often,   those words are now viewed 
with scorn,   because   they  have  been misused by political 
leaders   to  hide  a  multitude  of  sins,   and because  they 
have been  used  to justify  inefficiency and waste  in our 
defense establishment. 
Whatever  the  price  and whatever  the  pressures,   the 
President  must  insist  on  a national   defense posture  that 
is lean and muscular and  flexible. 
It   is   sometimes   said  that   the  threat of war has 
receded.      But   in  Europe,   the Middle  East,   in northeast 
Asia,   potential   for  conflict  still  exists,  powerful  armed 
forces  are  deployed  and Americans have  recently been 
brutally  killed.     To  deny  that   these  situations  pose a 
potential  danger   to  peace  is   to   turn  away  from reality. 
Our  military  power must  be  continually  reviewed.     In 
Europe,   NATO  must   increase  its   combat  readiness  and adapt 
its  forces   to  new military  technology,   if it  is   to offset 
steady   improvements   in Warsaw Pact  forces.     In  the eastern 
Mediterranean,   strong U.   S.   naval power must be maintained. 
We must  also   assure   a  close  and   confident  defense  relation- 
ship with  South Korea  and  Japan. 
We must maintain rough equivalency with 
Union in strategic nuclear forces. Equally 
and our allies must have conventional milita 
adequate to reduce dependence on nuclear str 
In a world where massive mutual devastation 
result of any use of nuclear weapons, such s 
forces cannot solely be relied upon to deter 
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Only   then  can  we,   in  Theodore  Roosevelt's  phrase 
speak softly but  carry  a  big stick. 
I  recognize,   of  course,   as  you do,   that  it  is not 
enough  for   the  President  to  talk about  patriotism and 
national   security.      He must  take positive,   aggressive 
action  to  ensure  that  our  defense  establishment  is worthy 
of national  respect.     That   calls  for  leadership,   and it 
calls  for  management. 
In  any  given  annual budget,   now or  in the   future, 
there  is  a   limited  amount  of money  available  for national 
defense.     When  any   resources  are wasted,   our nation's 
security  is  weakened.     We  now have  an  excessive  drain on 
defense   funding   from waste  and  unnecessary expenditures. 
We  must better  coordinate   long-range  planning and 
budgeting  among  departments  responsible  for military, 
foreign,   fiscal,   economic,   transportation and social  af- 
fairs  of our  government.     A spirit  of cooperation must be 
restored. 
Foreign aid must  be  consistent  with our national  pur- 
poses,   and  designed   to  strengthen our allies  and  friends 
and  to   fulfill  humanitarian purposes.     I'm tired of our 
taxing  the  poor people   in  our  rich  country and sending 
the  money  to  the  rich  people  in poor  countries. 
We  must   frankly  and constantly  assess  the  effective- 
ness   of  our  present   voluntary  recruitment  program.     As 
unemployment  drops   and  civilian jobs  become more plenti- 
ful,   it  will  be  much more  difficult  to maintain  our 
present military strength. 
We must ensure that oversized support establishment 
does not prevent us from maintaining needed combat force 
levels. 
We  must  recognize   that  our  military personnel  are 
transferred  too  much.     At  any  given moment,   about one 
out of seven of those personnel  is in the process of mov- 
ing,   or   is   away  from his   family  on  temporary  training duty 
This year $2.5 billion will go  simply to move service per- 
sonnel,   their  families,   television  sets  and furniture  tro 
one base   to  another.      Such   frequent  moves not  only  eat  up 
money,   they  undermine  morale.     If we  extend  the  average 
tour  of  duty  by  just   two  months,  we  could  save up  to 
$400  million  per  year. 
We need to reexamine our military training Programs. 
Recent congressional hearings,   by the way,   ^f^1^ ™at 
the ratio  of  students   to  instructors  and  support personnel 
om 
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is  2.2   to   1.     By moving  to  a  ratio  of  only  three  students 
to each  instructor,   we   could  save hundreds  of  $ millions 
per year. 
Cost  overruns   have  become  chronic.     The Pentagon 
itself estimates   that   the  total  current  cost of overruns 
on the  45 weapons   systems  now  in  the  process  of develop- 
ment  in  the   three   services — exclusive  of inflation--is 
$13-14 billion.     Over  the next  five   years  that would ap- 
proximate  the  cost   of  the  proposed  B-l bomber  program over 
the same period. 
We need  sound,   tough management  of 
only  to  eliminate  waste,   but   to  ensure 
tures  are  correlated with  foreign polic 
Tough management  will mean   that  overlap 
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Ever  since  I  was  Governor of Georgia,  when  I  attended 
National  Guard  training  sessions  every  summer,   I have been 
concerned   that  our  reserve   forces,  both  the  regular re- 
serve  and  the  National   Guard,   do not  play a   strong enough 
role  in  our  military  preparedness.     We need  to  shift   toward 
a highly   trained,   combat-worthy  reserve,  well  equipped and 
closely  coordinated with  regular  forces--always  capable 
of playing a crucial role in the nation's defense. 
If we  can  get   the  flab  out of  the  Pentagon's  budget, 
I believe  that  the  public will  evaluate questions  about 
weapons  systems   and  force  levels  on  their merits  in a  calm 
and rational  manner.     Our people will   support  an adequate 
defense  establishment without   complaint,   so   long as  they 
know that  their   tax  dollars   are not  being wasted. 
The  threat   to   our  security comes  not only  from states 
that  might  be  hostile.      International   terrorism knows  no 
boundaries,   recognizes  no  law  of warfare,   accepts no 
standards  of  conduct.     It  is   brutality at  its worst,   the 
law of  the jungle   in   its  most  primitive  form. 
Recently at Entebbe the  Israelis reaffirmed courage- 
ously the old principle   that  every state has   the right to 
defend its  citizens  against brutal and arbitrary violence- 
violence  that   in   this   case was  even based on  collusion 
between the  terrorists and a government. 
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The   issue  of  international  terrorism must be  a 
priority   item for  the  entire  international  community.     If 
I become  President,   I   intend  to  recommend strong multi- 
national   sanctions  against  guilty  nations  as  a necessary 
and productive  means   for   crushing   this   intolerable  threat 
to  international   law and  peace.     International  terrorism 
must be  stopped  once   and   for all! 
In our  own   country,   we must  recognize  that,   in  far 
too many   cases,   the  Vietnam veteran has  been a victim of 
governmental   insensitivity and neglect.     Large bureaucra- 
cies of the federal  government have often been incompe- 
tent,   inefficient,   and unresponsive  in their  fulfillment 
of responsibilities   to veterans.     Each month,   thousands 
of veterans   are  plagued with  late   delivery of badly needed 
benefit  checks.      Hundreds   of millions  of dollars  of benefit 
payments  have  been  improperly  computed.     The average VA 
hospital   has  only  half  the   doctors  and  supporting personnel 
found  in   the   average  community hospital. 
The   poor  record  of the  government  bureaucracy has been 
especially bad  in  programs   intended  to  help recent  veterans 
to  find jobs.     In   1973  and  1974 Congress passed  legisla- 
tion  requiring  special  consideration   for veterans  in public 
service  jobs,   in   training   programs,   for jobs with  federal 
contractors,   and   for  jobs   in  the   federal government.     None 
of  these   requirements   has   been   fully  or  effectively  car- 
ried  out. 
For  example,   despite   the  mandates  of the  law,  many 
federal  departments  and agencies  have  few disabled veterans 
or Vietnam veterans   serving within  them.     It  took  the Labor 
Depanment   18  months   to establish   administrative  guidelines 
to ensure  the hi-ing of veterans.     In 1975,   16 federal 
agencies   failed  even   to  submit  required plans   for hiring 
disabled  veterans   until  congressional  inquiries were begun. 
The  record of placement in private sector jobs and 
training  has  been  no  better.     In  1975  more  than  two  thirds 
of the  153,000 job training slots went unfilled,   largely 
due   to  inadequate  administrative  procedures. 
Yet   last month  there   were   still   531,000 Vietnam vet- 
erans  who  had no   jobs. 
The reason  for this  dismal record is clear: 
It  is a  failure of leadership. 
Sympathetic     leadership would "t^S^'S^f ten 
present administration--a  budget recommending cuts 
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percent  or  more   to  veterans'   programs  and denying  full 
cost  of  living protection  to  disabled  veterans.   ' 
Concerned  leadership would not  have vetoed a bill 
overwhelmingly  voted by  Congress   for higher education al- 
lowances,   better work-day  programs,   more  educational  loans 
and employment  and   training preferences  for more  than  two   ' 
million  veterans. 
Only because   the  Congress  overrode  this  veto do Viet- 
nam    veterans   enjoy  some  of  the educational benefits  they 
deserve. 
I  believe we  need  to  address  the needs  of veterans, 
especially  of  Vietnam veterans,  with sympathetic  and 
active  leadership  rather  than with vetoes  and passive 
resistance.     Men  who  have  endured so much  suffering,   so 
bravely,   fighting   in  a   far-off  land,   should not now suffer 
anew  in  their  own   country  at   the hands  of  insensitive bu- 
reaucrats  and   indifferent  politicians. 
If  I  become  President,   the  American veteran,   of all 
ages,   of  all  wars,   is   going  to have  a  friend,   a  comrade 
and a  firm ally   in  the  White  House.     My administration will 
act  to  strengthen   the  competence,   the  responsiveness,   and 
the  independence   of  the  Veterans'   Administration.     I will 
appoint   the  most   capable  administrators  available  and I 
will  insist on fair and sensitive treatment for veterans 
by every  employ.. '   of  the  executive  branch of government 
from top   to  bottom. 
I would  like   to  speak  for a moment  about  the  single 
hardest  decision   I  have  had  to make  during the  campaign. 
That was  on   the  issue  of  amnesty.     Where  I  come  from,  most 
of the men who went  off  to   fight   in  Vietnam were poor. 
They  didn't   know where  Canada was,   they didn't  know where 
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Sweden was,   they  didn't  have   the oney  to  hi e  from t e 
draft  in  college.     Many  of  them thought it was  a bad war, 
but they went   anyway.     A  lot  of  them came back with  scarred 
minds  or bodies,   or with  missing  limbs.     Some  didn  t  come 
back at all.     They suffered under the threat of death, 
and they  still  suffer   from the  indifference of many of 
their  fellow Americans.     The  Vietnam veterans  are our na- 
tion's  greatest  unsung heroes. 
I   could  never  equate what  they have  done with  those 
who left  this  country to avoid the draft. 
But   I  think  it   is   time  for the damage,  hatred and 
divisiveness of the Vietnam war to be over. 
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I  do  not   favor  a  blanket  amnesty,  but  for  those who 
violated  Selective   Service  laws,   I  intend  to  grant a 
blanket pardon. 
To  me,   there   is   a  difference.     Amnesty means  that 
what  you  did  is   right.     A pardon means   that what  you did-- 
right  or  wrong--is   forgiven.      So,   pardon--yes;   amnesty— 
no. 
For  deserters,   each case should be handled on an 
individual  basis   in  accordance with our nation's   system 
of military justice. 
We  may not   all  be  able  to agree  about what was  the 
right  course   for  the   nation  to  take  in  1966.     But we  can 
now agree   to  respect   those  differences  and to  forget  them. 
We can  come  together   and seek a  rebirth of patriotism in 
which all our citizens can join. 
We  must bind  up   our wounds.     We   simply cannot afford 
to let  them fester  any  longer.     The world  is  too  dangerous. 
We cannot  remain   distracted  from what  must  be our over- 
riding aim.     Our  attention must   turn  to rebuilding the 
military,   economic  and  spiritual   foundations  of  a  peaceful 
world order. 
Those who  most want  peace,   and who best  understand 
the need  for strength as a prerequisite for peace,  are 
our past and present   servicemen and their families,    AS 
a  former   submarine  officer,   I  know that  fact  from exper- 
ience. 
I  can  still   remember hearing President Truman explain 
to  the world  that   the   atomic  bomb  had been dropped °" 
Hiroshima.      1 was   at   sea  in an old battleship  in  the North 
Atlantic.     None of us  had ever heard even a rumor of this 
quantum leap  in destructive power.    We had no way of com 
Jrehending  the  meaning of  this new weapon ,wh^adbeen 
dropped on  Japan.     We  were mainly  relieved at  the Prospect 
that the need  for  invading Japan might be averted    thus 
saving what would   surely  have  been  the  loss  of hundreds 
of thousands of American and Japanese  lives. 
After we  saw the 
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Obviously,   such   a  holocaust   is  beyond our  capacity 
even to imagine.     Numbers like 10 million dead or 200 
million  dead  seem unbelievable.     But  they are  true. 
The Duke  of Wellington  said  in  1838:     "A great  country 
cannot wage  a  little war."     In our  time  that  doctrine has 
acquired new meaning.      In  a  nuclear world,   we  cannot  rely 
on  little wars   to  prevent  big wars.     We must maintain our 
strength and  use   it   to  prevent all wars. 
Our people  have  been  shocked and hurt  over  and over 
again.     Things  which  we  used  to  take   for granted are now 
subject   to  widespread  doubt.     Things  like  trust  in our 
leaders,   confidence  in our  institutions—even  love  and 
respect   for  the   flag  and  support  and appreciation  for  the 
men and women who   defend  the   flag.     But   I  believe  there 
is no one   in  this   country—certainly  there  is no one  in 
this room--who  does  not want   to heal  our wounds  and restore 
the precious  qualities  and  the national  strengths we  seem 
to have   lost. 
I  hope   to  play  a  role  in  that noble  enterprise. 
I hope you will help. 
Thank  you. 
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CARTER  ON  AMNESTY  IN THE  PLAYBOY INTERVIEW 
NOVEMBER,   1976 
PLAYBOY:     You've  said you'll  pardon men who  refused 
military service because of  the Vietnam war but not neces- 
sarily   those who   deserted while  they  were  in  the Armed 
Forces.     Is that right? 
CARTER:      That's   right.      I would  not  include  them. 
Deserters   ought  to  be  handled on  a  separate-case basis. 
There's  a  difference   to me.      I was   in  the Navy  for a  long 
time.     Somebody who  goes   into   the military  joins  a kind 
of mutual  partnership  arrangement,   you know what   I mean? 
Your  life  depends   on  other  people,   their  lives  depend on 
you.     So   I  don't   intend to  pardon  the  deserters.     As  far 
as  the   other   categories  of war resisters go,   to me  the 
ones who  stayed in   this  country  and  let  their opposition 
to the  war be  known  publicly  are  more  heroic  than  those 
who went  and hid  in  Sweden.     But   I'm not  capable of 
judging motives,   so   I'm just   going  to  declare  a blanket 
pardon. 
PLAYBOY:     When? 
CARTER:      The   first week   I'm  in  office. 
PLAYBOY:     You've   avoided  the word amnesty and chosen 
to use   the word pardon,   but  there  doesn't  seem to be much 
difference  between   the   two  in   the  dictionary.     Could  it be 
because  amnesty is  more  emotionally  charged and pardon  a 
word more  people will   accept? 
CARTER:     You  know  I  can't  deny  that.     But my  reason 
for distinguishing between  the  two  is   that  I  think  that 
all of  those  poor,   and  often black,   young men who went  to 
Vietnam are more worthy of recognition that those wno 
defected,   and  the  word pardon   includes  those who  simply 
avoided  the  war  completely.     But   I  just want  to bring tne 
defectors back  to   this  country without punishment and, 
in doing so,   I would  like   to have the  support of the 
American people.      I  haven't been  able   to devise for pri 
vate or public presentation a better way to do it. 
("Playboy   Interview:     Jimmy Carter," Playboy., 
November,   1976,   pp.    73-74. 
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FORD AND  CARTER ON AMNESTY 
From  the  Debate  of  September  23,   1976 
FRANK REYNOLDS:     Mr.   President,   when you came  into 
office,   you spoke  very  eloquently of  the need for a time 
for healing,   and  very  early   in your administration,  you 
went  out  to  Chicago  and  you  announced,   you proposed,   a 
program of case-by-case   pardons  for  draft  resisters  to 
restore  them  to   full   citizenship.     Some   14,000 young men 
took advantage  of  your offer,   but  another 90,000  did not. 
In granting  the  pardon  to   former President Nixon,   sir, 
part  of your  rationale was   to  put Watergate  behind us;   to, 
if I  may  quote you again,   "truly  end our  long national 
nightmare."     Why   does  not   the  same  rationale  apply now, 
today,   in  our  bi-centennial  year,   to  the  young men who 
resisted  in Vietnam,   and many of  them still  in exile abroad? 
GERALD FORD:     The  amnesty program that   I  recommended 
in Chicago  in   September  of   1974,   would give  to all  draft 
evaders  and military   deserters  the opportunity to earn 
their good record back.     About  fourteen to fifteen thousand 
did  take  advantage  of  that  program.     We  gave  them ample 
tine.     I  am against  an across-the-board pardon of draft 
evaders or military deserters. 
Now  in  the  case  of  Mr.   Nixon,   the  reason  the pardon 
was  given  was   that   this   country was   in  a very,  very_ 
divided condition.     There was hatred,   there was divisive- 
ness.     People   had   lost   faith   in their  government  in many 
many  respects.     Mr.   Nixon  resigned and  I became President 
It  seemed  to  me  that   if   I was   to adequately  and effectively 
handle  the problems  of high   inflation,   a  growing ^cession, 
the   involvement  of  the  United States  still  in Vietnam 
that   I had  to   give   100 percent of my  time  to   those  two 
major problems.      Richard  Nixon  resigned.     That  is  disgrace. 
The  first   President  out  of  38   that  ever resigned" from 
public  office   out   of pressure.     So when you  look at   the 
penalty  that  he paid,   and when you analyze  the requirements 
that   I had  to   spend all  of my  time working on  the  economy 
which was   in   trouble,   that  I   inherited,  working on      r 
problems   in Southeast  Asia,   which were  still  P^|U^S UJ. 
it seemed   to  me   that  Mr.   Nixon had been penalized enough 
by his resignation  in  disgrace-and the need and the 
necessity   for  me   to  concentrate  on the  problems ot  tne 
country   fully   justified  the  action  that   i  coo*. 
FRANK REYNOLDS:     I  take   it then    sir    that you do noi 
believe   that  you  are  going  to  recons^and  thir^ ^ 
those 90,000   that   are   still  abroad.     Have  t     y 
penalized  enough?     Many  of  them have been  there y 
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GERALD  FORD:     Well,   Mr.   Carter has  indicated  that  he 
would give  a  blanket  pardon  to all   draft  evaders,     I  do 
not  agree  with   that  point  of view.     I  gave,   in  September 
of  1974,   an  opportunity   for  all   draft  evaders,   all  de- 
serters,   to  come  in,   voluntarily,   clear their records by 
earning  an  opportunity  to  restore  their  good citizenship. 
I  don't   think we   should  go  any  further. 
EDWIN  NEWMAN: Governor Carter? 
JIMMY  CARTER:     Well,   I   think  it's  very  difficult  for 
President  Ford  to  explain   the difference between  the par- 
don of  President  Nixon  and his  attitude  toward  those who 
violated the  draft   laws.     As  a matter of  fact,   I  don't 
advocate  amnesty.      I  advocate pardons.     There's  a  differ- 
ence,   in my  opinion,   and   in  accordance with  the  rulings 
of the  Supreme   Court  and   in  accordance with  the  definition 
in  the  dictionary.     Amnesty  means   that what  you did was 
right.     Pardon means   that what you  did,  whether  it's 
right or wrong,   you're   forgiven   for  it.     And I  do  advocate 
a pardon  for   draft   evaders.     I  think  it's  accurate  to  say 
that  two  years  ago  when  Mr.   Ford put  in  this  amnesty 
that  three   times   as  many  deserters were excused as  were 
the ones who  evaded  the  draft.     But   I  think  that  now is 
the time  to heal our country after the Vietnam war,  and 
I  think   that  what  the people  are  concerned about  is not 
the  pardon,   or  the   amnesty  of  those who evaded the  draft, 
but whether  or not  our  crime  system is  fair.     We've got 
a sharp   distinction  drawn  between white  collar  crime-- 
the big-shots who are rich who are influential,  very 
seldom go  to  jail--those  who  are  poor and have no   influence 
quite often  are   the   ones  who  are  punished,   and  the whole 
subject  of  crime   is  one   that  concerns  our people very much, 
and I believe  that  the  fairness of it is what is a major 
problem  that,  addresses  our   leader.     And this  is  something 
that hasn't been addressed adequately by this administra- 
tion.     But  I hope to have  a complete responsibility on my 
shoulders   to  help  brine-  about  a  fair  criminal justice 
system,   and also   to bring about an end to the divisiveness 
that has  occurred in our  country as a result of the 
Vietnam war. 
